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INTRODUCTION
This report on Natural Gas Trade in the Pacific Basin is the
second of three units being produced by the Center for Energy Policy
Research. The first unit on Canadian-U.S. trade has already been
published, and the third, on Western Europe, will be completed by
August 1986.
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JAPANESE LNG POLICY:
EXPERIENCE IN SEARCH OF DIRECTION
by
Loren C. Cox
This paper will examine how a set of past policies and practices has
produced a pattern of LNG use in Japan which has likely reached the maximum
possible volume under those conditions. It appears as though this effect
was unintended, and now even may be seen as unfortunate. However, changing
these conditions is difficult, and the likelihood of success uncertain.
The policies and practices described are those of Japan because it is
the giant of liquefied natural gas (LNG) utilization. Japanese experience
has created much of the world's perception about LNG, and both producing
and consuming countries' expectations have been shaped by that experience.
In this paper, we describe key elements of the Japanese experience, and
show that it was perhaps more random or accidental than deliberate, with
consequences that may be self-limiting to greatly increased natural gas use
in that country.
LNG IN JAPAN
Because the Asia-Pacific region's perception of LNG trade has been so
influenced by the Japanese experience, Japan was selected to examine policy
issues for both consuming and producing countries in the region.
In this paper, a major focus is given to town gas companies, even
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though they import only 20 percent of current contract volumes. As will be
discussed later, the dominance by electric utility use of LNG imports will
likely continue. However, the potential growth of natural gas use in Japan
is probably higher outside the electric utility sector, which thus
highlights the role of--and policy toward--town gas companies as a major
determinant of future LNG imports into Japan.
To understand current Japanese policy on gas utilization, examination
of its historic development is necessary. This examination shows that
three important factors have not yet been successfully integrated in
current Japanese policy making. These are: 1) regulation of gas
distribution companies (referred to in this paper as town gas companies);
2) environmental regulation; and 3) electric utility fuel diversification
strategies following the two oil price shocks.
Town Gas Companies--Background
The development of town gas companies using manufactured gas followed
patterns similar to that in other countries. Commercial enterprises were
begun in the late 19th century to gasify coal, primarily for lighting.
Development of electric lighting early in the 20th century affected this
principal market of the town gas companies, and gas sales began to be
directed toward other purposes, primarily for cooking.
Because Japan has virtually no natural gas resources, town gas
companies were especially dependent on coal for manufacturing of gas.
Domestic coal reserves are also limited and were subject to price
increases. Thus, as the price of coal increased, town gas companies--whose
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sale prices to municipalities were largely fixed--were caught in savage
margin squeezes. In some cases, bankruptcies resulted, causing failures of
service. To ameliorate such problems, National Gas Act legislation was
enacted by the Imperial Diet in 1923, 1925, and 1930. These provisions
included:
1. The establishment of new gas manufacturing plants and modifications
to existing plants to be on a permission basis;
2. Regulations governing the use of public property such as rivers,
roads, etc., for distributing gas;
3. The regulation of gas prices and related terms and conditions;
4. Safety aspects for gas manufacturing plant;
5. Limitations relating to calorified value, pressure, and quantity1;
and
6. In 1930, amendments giving national authority for permitting
increases in capital structure and resolving disputes between
companies and municipalities.
By the late 1940s and early 1950s, town gas companies had begun to
recover from the war years and resume full service to customers. A series
of legislative changes in the 1950s led to a regulatory pattern that gave
considerable authority to gas companies in their service areas, but which
also imposed service obligations. Because there were no interprefectural
or intercity movements of gas by pipeline, each gas company was responsible
for its own supplies and marketing. As a result, the gas industry
remained fragmented, largely local in its orientation, and serving mostly a
residential market, which could support the rather high-cost gas supply.
1Malcolm W.H. Peebles, Evolution of the Gas Industry, New York University
Press, New York, New York, p. 96.
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In the mid-1950s, feedstock for gas manufacturing began to shift away
from sole dependence on coal and toward crude oil, naptha, and (liquefied
petroleum gases (LPGs). The acceleration in the Japanese economy increased
gas demand in all sectors, and especially the residential. Gas use for
water heaters became more widespread, though space heating still lagged.
Some sales began to the industrial sector (primarily feedstock for the
chemicals business) and for new commercial buildings in the major
metropolitan areas.
Thus, by the mid-1960s, town gas companies were enjoying major growth
in their markets, especially the residential sector. The limited use of
gas for cooking and water heating permitted high unit prices despite
considerable load fluctuation. New hookups increased revenue, and everyone
was reasonably happy. As indicated previously, the structure of the town
gas industry and its regulation were locally oriented and served a
high-value residential market. By the mid-1960s world oil prices were low,
and oil-based feedstocks were increasing in use without significant
controversy.
Town Gas Policy
The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) has
exerted considerable influence over major portions of industrial policy in
Japan. It appears as though the town gas sector is one to which MITI has
given virtually no attention historically. There is no literature
speculating on why this sector has received so little emphasis, so some
speculation is in order.
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First, one might ask why the town gas sector is sufficiently important
to warrant attention. In terms of the history described above, there was
little reason to invite major policy attention. The gas supplied was
oriented to an entirely local market, was small in volume, and produced by
companies that were of diverse ownership (about 180 private and 70
municipal). 2 Of course, not all parts of the industry are small, as
measured by number of customers, with Tokyo Gas Company the world's largest
gas utility with over 6 million customers and Osaka Gas Company with over 4
million.3
During the post-World War II period, other sectors of Japanese energy
industry received significant attention by MITI, especially oil and
electric utility companies (with nuclear power development receiving
particular attention and resources). The lack of attention to town gas
companies was therefore likely simply due to lack of interest. Because
town gas was serving the residential sector for cooking, hot water, and
some space heating, premium prices could be claimed, and even gas
manufacturing from coal or naptha could be profitable in that market.
Thus, no "problem" was seen to be solved in this sector, so apparently no
MITI attention (or resources) seemed warranted--at least until the late
1960s and beyond.
Unfortunately, this past orientation has not evolved into policy more
appropriate from the 1980s to the end of this century. As will be
2 Peebles, ibid., p. 108.
3 Peebles, ibid.
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discussed below, town gas companies' capacity for growth now depends on
their ability to expand markets beyond the residential into other sectors,
especially the industrial. Constrained by structural change in the
Japanese economy and environmental rules, only LNG appears to offer the
prospect of major expansion, especially to industrial customers. To
successfully compete in the industrial sector, LNG feedstock price must
compete with other fuels now used on the industrial sector.
The key to a stronger competitive position may be an expanded and
integrated transportation system that would allow load balancing shifts of
gas supply, increase flexibility, decrease dependence on storage and LNG
tanker schedules, and reduce technical supply/delivery problems. However,
the Japanese policy of benign neglect of the gas industry has not resulted
in such an interconnected system. This circumstance now makes it more
difficult for town gas companies to take a lead--or even prominent--role in
negotiations for LNG projects. Instead, in past projects they have been
linked with electric power companies who have approached LNG with a quite
different economic outlook.
Thus, the lack of interconnection among major gas-using areas puts a
very different perspective on LNG usage by town gas companies than would
have occurred if these companies had been rationalized into something like
the nine electric power company service areas. A decision to rationalize
may well be critical in setting out a strategy for expanded LNG
utilization. If the decision is taken to continue to allow nearly 250 town
gas companies to operate in historical fashion, then LNG importation will
continue to depend on electric utility company strategies and decisions.
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If the decision is made to rationalize organization of the service areas,
then town gas company import of LNG could be significantly separated from
electric utility decisions.
The implications of this policy decision will be touched upon later
when we take up the issue of pricing and take-or-pay terms. Historically,
electric utility circumstances have differed from town gas interests,
remain so today, and will likely diverge further in the future.
Impact of Environmental Policy
For now, however, we will return to the 1960s when environmental
constraints were becoming increasingly binding on both town gas and
electric utility companies. Coal-based gas was still utilized, with coke
being sold to the steel industry, then thriving. To maintain the supply of
coke to industry requirements, the gas had to flow in fairly constant
volumes. This led to an increase in industrial base-load gas contracts.
At the same time, electric utility companies were expanding to meet
rapidly increasing demand. Capacity additions were fired by all
traditional fuels, with nuclear reactors beginning to emerge as serious
competition. However, coal-fired plants continued to be constructed for
base-load and there was a major expansion of capacity fired by high-sulfur
crude oil. Demand was growing strongly and electric utilities were
scrambling to install capacity. Contributions to pollution by these
facilities combined with continued gas/coke processing by the town gas
industry began to produce serious air quality problems.
The exceptional performance of the Japanese economy in the 1950s and
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1960s needs no elaboration. Also well-documented are the series of
environmental problems in both water and air quality in this period. Toxic
discharges into streams resulted in a series of environmental issues that
received spectacular publicity. Population reconcentration and economic
growth in Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya brought increasing demand for both
electricity and gas. Use of all fuels increased, but especially
high-sulfur crude oil and coal.
The resulting increase in sulfur and other air contaminants fed growing
public concern about the need for tougher air quality rules. In the 1960s,
the first air quality laws were passed, and gave substantial approval power
to local governments. By the mid-1960s some of that authority was being
utilized. In 1964, Yokohama City made a land sale to Tokyo Electric Power
4
Company conditional on the use of low-sulfur oil and high stacks.
It was in the context of these increasingly stringent air quality
standards that LNG first emerged as a desirable and feasible fuel for both
town gas and electric utility companies. Phillips and Marathon had
substantial reserves of natural gas in the Cook Inlet area of Alaska, and
lacked an obvious local market of equivalent magnitude. They had begun
examining LNG sales to Japan in the early 1960s, and the discussions
continued for some years. The central issue appeared to be pricing, with
the cost of LNG facilities suggesting a c.i.f. price somewhat higher than
that for crude oil.
4Julian Gresser, Koichiro Fujikura, and Okio Morishima, Japanese
Environmental Policy: A Comparative Assessment, The M.I.T. Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1981, p. 265.
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When finally concluded, the contract called for a 15-year term for
delivery of 960,000 tons per year at U.S. 1969 $.52 per Btu c.i.f. At this
time the Btu equivalent price for oil was approximately $0.30.5 Thus, the
difference paid by the importers, Tokyo Gas Company and Tokyo Electric
Power Company, was motivated by the need to increase capacity, which was
becoming increasingly difficult to do using heavier oils or coal (as noted
above). Thus, clean, but higher-priced LNG made sense to both companies in
the mid-1960s.
The next Japanese project was from Brunei, with delivery commencing in
1972 at over 7 billion cubic meters per year. This was five times the size
of the Alaska project and also was fostered by the 1960s' environmental
restrictions previously mentioned. By commencement of delivery, oil prices
increased by more than those for LNG, with the latter being less than 30
percent higher. Again, this was a premium worth paying in order to
continue to expand capacity in an environmentally acceptable way. The lead
participants in the Brunei project again were Tokyo Electric Power and
Tokyo Gas. Osaka Gas also made its first appearance in LNG trade, with an
interest of about 10 percent in this project.
Recalling that the c.i.f. price in 1969 was $.52 per Btu for
Alaska-Japan, and not greatly higher for Brunei-Japan in 1972, two points
should be noted. First, there is some basis to consider that today's LNG
prices need not be at the levels of 1985 oil prices--even considering that
cost inflation has been higher in LNG-type equipment than the pattern of
5Tadahiko Ohashi, An Analysis of the Future of Natural Gas in Japan, Tokyo
Gas Company, Tokyo, Japan, 1985, p. 17.
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general cost inflation. We will return to this question later in this
study (see Supply paper). The second point is that pre-1973 contracts were
based on the need for a fuel that allowed capacity for both town gas and
electricity to be expanded. Without the Alaska and Brunei arrangements,
both Tokyo Electric and Tokyo Gas would have been pressed to meet demand
for service then occurring. Thus, they were willing to pay a premium for
fuels that would allow them to expand their revenue base and meet their
customers' growing demand. Seen in this light, LNG contracts that allowed
expansion of service in a tightening environmental climate likely were
appropriate.
Policy Toward Supply Diversification: Oil Imports and Electric Utility
Companies
By the mid-1970s, concern for environmental matters was swamped by the
oil price jump of 1973-74. Japan had increased its oil imports more than
ten-fold between 1960 and 1973,6 and was deeply concerned about its heavy
reliance on Middle East suppliers. In this context, stability of supply
was of special concern, since disruption was the least tolerable outcome
for an import-dependent nation.
MITI initiated a series of policy actions that were designed both to
diversify supply sources, and even more importantly, to reduce reliance on
oil imports. For the electric utility sector, an already ambitious nuclear
program was accelerated, coal use expanded (from suppliers as diverse as
the United States, Canada, Australia, and South Africa), and LNG imports
6Joseph A. Yager with Shelley Matsuba, The Energy Balance in Northeast
Asia, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1984, pp. 10-11.
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were encouraged. All of these steps had significant impact on electric
utility companies, but of special note was the LNG question.
A striking characteristic of Japan is that crude oil was (and is)
burned directly in electric utility boilers. Therefore, any substitution
of crude oil imports by LNG for that purpose would be considered desirable,
especially if the price were the same and diversification of supply sources
was attained. The supply diversification has been achieved with contracts
in place with Alaska (Cook Inlet), Brunei, Abu Dhabi, Malaysia, and
Australia, and active discussions with Canada, Alaska (North Slope),
Thailand, U.S.S.R. (Sakhalin), and Qatar will further proliferate supply
points.
Because a significant policy goal was to reduce oil imports, cost
minimization took a back seat to other factors. Thus, if LNG could be
imported at a price no higher than high-sulfur (or even low-sulfur) crudes,
then the electric power company was largely indifferent from a cost
perspective. The rigidities of take-or-pay contracts and other problems
were in part off-set by the environmental advantage LNG substitution gave
to the companies.
However, while the unique circumstances of the electric utility sector
made them indifferent to this LNG contracting and price structure, we shall
see later that the town gas companies were not to remain indifferent. But
for the present, all seemed well.
During the year following initial deliveries of gas from Brunei (1972),
the first oil price shock occurred. After 1973, two new gas projects were
initiated bringing LNG from Abu Dhabi, and more importantly, from
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Indonesia. Including all Japanese imports of LNG through the Northwest
Shelf Project (Australia), electric power companies have taken 78 percent
of the total. This preponderant influence of the electric power companies
has led to an LNG import policy with significant implications for future
LNG use.
The first effect of electric utility dominance arises from the
willingness to pay a c.i.f. price for LNG at crude parity. The apparent
reasons for this are several. As mentioned previously, Japanese electric
utility companies historically have burned crude oil directly under their
boilers, so they are indifferent to a fuel whose delivered cost is nearly
the same. Since the company is following a policy to reduce oil imports,
LNG use is seen as desirable. In addition, the long-term contracts for LNG
fit the long lead time style of this sector, and gives companies some sense
of supply security. By substituting LNG for oil, the utilities also
respond to air pollution concerns and thus are seen as good citizens.
But perhaps the most important reason for utilities' relative
indifference to price is that LNG buys them time. Under the high
take-or-pay requirements, electric utilities use LNG for
base-to-intermediate load generation. While installed nuclear capacity is
built, a national interconnecting electrical grid is established, and
technology for clean utilization of coal is developed, LNG provides an
excellent interim solution for electric utility companies. Additionally,
the national policy of minimizing oil imports and diversifying the number
of nations supplying both oil and LNG is being advanced.
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Current LNG Contracts: A Major Problem for Town Gas Companies
Unfortunately, what works for the electric utility company is a serious
barrier to the major Japanese town gas companies, and eventually to those
gas-producing nations that hope to export LNG to Japan. Recalling our
earlier discussion about manufactured gas by town gas companies, it was
evident that the only market available was that which could pay the highest
prices: the residential customer and the chemical industry, which needed
gas for feedstock. Now, the market expansion available to the town gas
companies is primarily in the industrial and commercial sectors, though
some modest residential growth may be expected. Prices of competing fuels
are set by government policy and as can be seen in the following two
tables, LNG delivered by gas companies faces very rugged competition.
Whether fuels competing with town gas/LNG are subsidized (either
explicitly, or implicitly as kerosene has been in the past) will not be
dealt with in this paper. However, it may be surmised that Japanese policy
has been to discourage town gas expansion into markets traditionally held
by suppliers of oil products (including LPGs). This interpretation of
circumstances may be given weight by the decision in 1984 to place the same
import tax on LNG as had been previously levied on crude oil and product
imports.7 The combination of these factors has had a considerable negative
impact on the growing competitiveness of town gas companies. It is an open
question whether MITI policy intended this effect, but its consequences may
be most serious--as will be discussed below.
7International Energy Agency, Energy Policies and Programmes of IEA
Countries: 1984 Review, Paris, France, 1985, p. 322.
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Table 1
Unit Price Trends of Energy in the Residential and Commercial Sector
Yen Per Thousand Kcal
Kerosene LPG Electricity
2.17
3.47
4.48
5.39
9.34
9.87
10.86
10.10
6.47
11.40
13.91
14.61
19.24
21.32
21.83
22.00
14.64
17.44
21.56
21.43
28.06
28.10
28.10
28.10
Relative Indices
City
Gas
5.40
8.15
11.18
10.65
14.60
14.60
14.60
19.60
Kerosene LPG Electricity
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
3.0
3.3
3.1
2.7
2.1
2.2
2.0
2.2
6.7
5.0
4.8
4.0
3.0
2.8
2.6
2.8
City
Gas
2.5
2.3
2.5
2.0
1.6
1.5
1.3
1.4
Source: Kazuo Furuto, "Kerosene Demand as Part of Total Energy Demand in the
Residential and Commercial Sector," Energy in Japan, July 1983, p. 18, Table 4.
1983 figures are estimates from the Institute of Energy Economics.
0-
fiscal
year
1970
1974
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
0-
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Table 2
Comparison of Industrial Fuel Prices and Burner Tip Costs
(Yen Per Thousand Kcal)
Fuel Prices
Average
1981 1982
High Sulfur C = 100
1981 1982 19831983
Kerosene
High fuel oil A
Fuel oil C
High-sulfur heavy
-fuel oil- C
Industrial LNG
Butane
Coal
8.55
7.86
6.51
5.84
7.51
6.54
3.06
9.81
9.04
6.73
6.05
8.08
6.61
2.78
9.34
8.59
6.02
146 162 175
135 149 161
111 111 113
5.34
7.07
7.11
2.42
100
129
112
52
100
134
109
46
100
132
133
45
Burner-tip Costs
Kerosene
Heavy oil A*
Low-sulfur C*
High-sulfur C*
Industrial LNG*
Butane
Coal*
8.72
8.12
6.84
6.36
7.70
7.22
6.37
9.98
9.30
7.06
6.57
8.26
7.29
6.09
9.51
8.85
6.35
5.86
7.26
7.79
5.73
131*
122
102
100
115
108*
95
152
141
108
100
126
111
93
162
151
109
100
124
133
98
*Mid-points of ranges.
Source: Naoto Sagawa, "Inter-energy Competition in Japan, the United States
and Western Europe," Energy in Japan, November 1983, Table 3, p. 20. 1982
and 1983 figures are estimates from the Institute of Energy Economics.
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Of course, the collapse of oil prices in early 1986 has had a variety
of impacts on LNG importation into Japan. First, because current LNG
contracts are based on official selling prices, LNG prices are remaining
higher longer than oil or oil product prices. This is a problem for all
Japanese LNG users, but especially acute for town gas companies. Because
there has been a relaxation of oil product imports to Japan (together with
lower product prices from spot crudes imported by Japanese refiners), price
competition for industrial and commercial users is becoming even more
difficult for town gas companies--and the problem will increase in
severity.
Another effect of falling crude prices is to highlight the problem of
rigid take-or-pay requirements in LNG contracts. Any pause in demand
cannot be met by reduced takes of LNG supplies. The obvious alternative
for a Japanese importer would be to re-sell some portion of contracted
supply, perhaps to a new user, or to a user who had a peak demand counter
to the original importer. However, this alternative cannot be pursued
because of a second problem: Current LNG contracts expressly prohibit the
re-sale or transfer of LNG shipments. These two rigidities in current
contracts increasingly cause difficulties for both electric utilities and
town gas companies, and increase the likelihood of LNG being perceived as a
fuel of significant risks and problems. Electric utility companies have
alternative fuels to rely upon, but town gas companies may be more gravely
affected.
Thus, if LNG is available to town gas companies at a crude oil price
(whether official selling price or other basis) equivalent, the companies'
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markets will be limited. Therefore, the amount of LNG the gas companies
can absorb at that price will be severely constrained. Indeed, for the
reasons described above, currently participating gas companies probably are
nearing their peak absorption of LNG. Since it is unlikely that electric
utility companies will have interest in new LNG projects for the reasons
cited above, we thus now may be witnessing peak LNG utilization in Japan.
Of course, there are circumstances under which electric utility
companies could increase their utilization of LNG. An internal study by
ARCO Alaska pointed out that at a 3 percent growth in electricity demand,
incremental supply between 1995 and 2000 would be 100 billion kWhs. Of
this, half the supply is projected to be nuclear, and the other half from
coal, LNG, oil, or other sources. If the demand growth forecast is
correct, any slippage in nuclear schedules or coal plant construction would
create potential increased demand for LNG. The study does not analyze the
fuel mix if oil prices continue to be weak.
While the possibility of increased electric utility use must be
reckoned with, falling oil prices (and the contract problems mentioned
previously) make it more likely that we are in fact seeing the peak of LNG
utilization in Japan. If so, a potentially grave issue must be considered.
If the following factors continue to exist, we may see the prospect of
serious problems for the three major town gas companies:
1. Low oil prices and continued use of official prices for LNG
pricing;
2. Rigid take-or-pay and no-resale terms in LNG contracts;
3. Explicit or implicit Japanese policy which works against expanded
town gas utilization of LNG by industrial, commercial, and
residential sectors; and
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4. LNG contracts pegged at c.i.f. oil parity.
Put simply, all town gas company growth since 1970 is directly
correlated to their increased utilization of LNG. While town gas is less
than 20 percent of all LNG imports, it now represents over 60 percent of
the total feedstock of the town gas companies--and is still growing. 8 If
LNG imports are constrained because of the four factors mentioned above,
the gas companies could face quite serious feedstock problems. The
dominant position of electric utility companies in LNG imports means the
future flow of gas is dependent upon their needs. If electricity
generation grows with other fuels, town gas companies may face a no-growth
situation or even declining sales.
While it may be extreme to suggest that company viability is
threatened, major problems are certainly possible. Until some method is
worked out to free town gas LNG supplies from the rigidities of current
contracting practices, potentially serious problems loom. The current
sharp drop in oil prices may bring these concerns into prominence much more
quickly.
Summary
This discussion has shown how policy regulation of town gas companies
has led to a fragmented industry that lacks the connections necessary to
balance loads and make the most efficient national use of expensive
feedstock resources. Instead, high manufacturing costs, high storage costs
8Japan Gas Assocation data, reported in Ohashi, op.cit.
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for LNG, and dependence on electric utilities for LNG projects have
rendered further expansion most difficult. We also have seen how
environmental regulations have affected the perspective of appropriate
pricing for LNG resources. While the environmental issue remains
important, demand is seriously constrained at LNG prices equivalent to oil
prices. Finally, we have examined how electric utility interests and
contracting prices have established LNG price levels and contracting
practices that limit the amount of LNG that will be used in Japan.
A NOTE ON KOREA
The Republic of Korea (Korea) situation offers an interesting potential
contrast to Japan. Korea contracted with Indonesia for 2 million tons of
LNG to commence deliveries in 1986, with a potential additional 1 mm tons
per year by 1989-90. Original Korean plans were to follow the Japanese
pattern of LNG use in electric power generation, thus backing out oil
imports.
However, Korea now is reported to be considering an alternative policy
for LNG utilization. Instead of use in electric power generation, the
Koreans are evaluating conversion of oil-burning plants to coal to take
advantage of very low-cost coal imports. As the following calculation
indicates (Table 3), the economics are attractive, and would be even more
so if coal prices were lower.
Because the Koreans have already committed to the LNG deliveries, they
are considering a strategy of town gas utilization of the LNG. This would
involve a trunk gas pipeline of some 500 kilometers to reach potential
-20-
Table 3
Increased Costs of Conversion and Use of Fuel
A 350 MW Generating Plant Using LNG and Coal as Two
Possible Alternatives to Oil
(6,000 Full Load Factor Equivalents p.a.)
(U.S. $ thousands)
Steam Coala
LNG
($5.5/MMBtu)
LNG
($4.5/MMBtu)
Cost of Conversion:
Oil to alternative p.a.
Annualized cost of
UI1DE "scrubber:"
Capital Cost p.a.c
Operating costs
Operating costs in
excess of oil-firing
alternative
Costs of fuel
Totals
Cost per kWh (U.S. cents)
LNG "premium"
5,812 258 258
2,640
5,471
2,506
55,965.8
72,394.8
3.44
)d
102,358.4
102,616.4
4.88
1.44
)d
83,748
84,005
4.0
0.56
SOURCES: ELSAM, 1982. Interviews: Vestkraft, Esbjerg; Jysk-fynske elsamarbejde
(ELSAM), Fredericia, Denmark. Gas efficiency factor from Medici (1974). The
use of Danish data in this table is due to an inability to acquire the relevant
material from Japan. The Danish electrical industry has achieved a wide reputation
for its efficiency and for ease of information access, which makes it an "ideal"
shadow price case for the Japanese electrical industry. It is likely that these
Danish estimates are low in comparison to estimates elsewhere and in Japan.
NOTES: aAverage c.i.f. September 1982: $64.02/metric ton; 6,500 kcal/kg 3%
less efficiency than fuel oil.
bCost of conversion estimated at $52.9 million for coal, $2.36 million
for natural gas. Annualized even payments over 15 years principle and
interest. 7% interest.
CCapital costs of UHDE "scrubber:" $24.1 million. Amortized as with
cost of conversion.
dThere are operating cost savings not entered here. See text for
explanation. It is assumed as well that LNG has 10% more boiler
efficiency than oil.
From: J.D. Davis, Blue Gold: The Political Economy of Natural Gas, 1984, p. 225.
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industrial base-load customers in the southern peninsula (Ulsan, Pusan,
etc.) and a distribution system for tying in residential and commercial
customers en route in Seoul, ChunChon, Taegu, Pusan, etc. This would
encompass a majority both of the population and of the commercial stock in
the country.
While no published estimates of cost currently are available, such a
policy and utilization pattern would appear attractive. It would allow LNG
to be treated as natural gas, including a full range of sector pricing from
premium residential to base-load industrial. If LNG exporters understand
that LNG would be treated as natural gas in Korea (which they appear not to
with respect to Japan), then Korean demand could be substantial.
PRODUCING COUNTRY POLICY
The preceeding sections have reviewed the circumstances affecting
natural gas use in Japan (and Korea). Market conditions have changed
rather drastically over the last 15 years, and the oil price falls over the
last 3 months suggest that the changes are still occurring.
One conclusion that seems inescapable is that c.i.f. oil parity priced
LNG projects will not find a future market in Japan. The only circumstance
in which this would occur is a substantial shortfall in planned nuclear or
coal electricity generation capacity expansion. Such a situation could
then create an additional call on LNG for such base-loading plants--at
least for some interim period.
As indicated in this review, and in the Demand paper by Arthur Wright,
the likely real opportunity for expansion of LNG trade is outside of the
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electric utility sector. The town gas companies offer the potential for
major expansion, but not under the pricing and take-or-pay conditions of
previous contracts. Additions to gas distribution infrastructure are
costly, and the interfuel competition severe--especially with falling or
unstable oil prices. Several implications are clear from this situation,
and are ones which must be faced by current and/or potential exporters of
LNG.
In view of the future potential markets in East Asia, some serious
rethinking of LNG pricing is in order. With contract price references
being turned upside down by the oil market, previous fears about existing
contract structures being threatened by new contract arrangements are now
moot. Any profitable export scheme should be considered on its own merit,
unless there is a more profitable domestic utilization project available.
Because the future of LNG prices is so uncertain, two other producer
policies should be carefully examined. National policies toward royalties
and taxes were shaped during an era of increasing prices, and are clearly
no longer appropriate for lower and unstable price movements. The kind of
flexibility demonstrated by recent Canadian gas policy suggests a more
appropriate policy for the next several years of LNG trade. Otherwise, new
investment planning by producing companies will be adversely affected.
The second matter is the question of discount rates. With the value of
gas in the ground so uncertain, then higher discount rates should be
utilized than those thought appropriate in the 1970s and early 1980s. Such
a change will not make an uneconomic project worthy, but may change
perspectives on the tactics of project timing.
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Finally, as will be recalled from the discussion of the Alaska and
Brunei projects, c.i.f. prices were less than $1.00 U.S. in current
dollars. Either there has been no technological progress at any stage of
the LNG "chain," including liquefaction facilities, ocean transport,
storage and regasification, or some other set of events have gravely
affected cost reductions in this process. One suspects that some of the
events affecting cost have been rent-taking by engineering/construction
firms and suppliers, labor, government (through taxation), and producing
companies--all of whom perhaps have a rate-of-return expectation no longer
appropriate to future LNG projects.
Other papers in this project examine the issues of supply costs and
demand under alternative prices. Regardless, it is clear that either the
era of LNG has ended, or a second LNG era with a new perspective is about
to emerge. Policy makers in producing countries and Japan must be prepared
to examine and, when necessary, discard old perceptions and practices.
-24-
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INTRODUCTION
Strategic Issues in Pacific-Basin Demand for Natural Gas
Compared with North America, the U.S.S.R., and Western Europe, the
Pacific Basin is still a young market for natural gas. Production and use
of natural gas date only from the late 1960s, and in earnest only from the
mid-1970s. The region has, of course, been undergoing rapid economic
growth and structural change. If the recent pace of economic progress
continues through the end of this century, we might expect to find the
Pacific-Basin gas market considerably more mature by the year 2000.
Economic progress will not, however, be the only determinant of the
course of this market over the next fifteen years. Institutional factors
will also play a central role.1 Two in particular--how the overall market
is organized, and the way the individual participants in the market choose
to make decisions--will be very important. Other chapters in this report
discuss institutional factors (e.g., those on supply, contracts, and
government policies). But these factors are especially important for
understanding gas demand in the Pacific Basin.
The future of gas demand depends on complex strategic decisions made
under considerable uncertainty. Much new gas demand can occur only if
energy consumers install expensive, durable gas-using equipment. Decisions
to do so are contingent on reliable access, on predictable terms, to gas
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supplies, which themselves entail large investments not easily converted to
other uses if proven unsound. Both demand and supply decisions hinge on
what people expect gas prices to be, or (perhaps more important) how they
expect them to be formed (for instance, in relation to oil prices). These
decisions also are contingent upon governmental permissions to proceed with
projects. Governmental decision making is often an important source of
uncertainty in its own right.
This complex of decisions is not unique to the Pacific-Basin gas
market. What sets this market apart from the other major international
markets is that its trade flows consist exclusively of liquefied natural
gas (LNG). Technologically, this characteristic of the Pacific-Basin
market is the mere product of geography and geology. Economically,
however, the "LNG factor" has made a real difference in the evolution of
the market to this point. A critical role has been played by the
institutions that have grown up for trading LNG.
These institutions were born of the world oil price shocks of the
1970s. True, it was the higher real energy prices, plus expectations that
they would go yet higher, that made many LNG projects economically viable.
But the atmosphere of scarcity that prevailed at the time meant that LNG
was viewed as one of the "premium" fuels that could close the "gap" as
precious oil supplies ran out. Government price and import policies toward
oil made it acceptable to pay the premium for LNG. Not surprisingly, it
was thought only right and natural that LNG prices should be tied firmly to
oil prices. Moreover, many governments (not trusting world energy markets
and worried about security of supply) involved themselves directly in
negotiating and even undertaking LNG ventures. As a result, LNG contracts
were treated as matters of high national policy.
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Times, and attitudes, have changed in world energy markets. Several
LNG contracts have gone sour in North America, but the ramifications have
been limited--contract litigation for one interstate pipeline, Chapter 11
bankruptcy for one LNG importing firm. No existing deals in the Pacific
Basin have yet been broken, but the actual impact of the changes in world
energy markets has been greater there because of the dominance of LNG in
gas trade. This is especially true of prospects for future growth of
natural gas demand in the region. The magnitude and geographic pattern of
demand growth will depend crucially on the answers to questions like, "How
will LNG be priced?," "Will different contract forms emerge?", and "Can
people form the stable expectations that will be required if Pacific-Basin
trade in LNG is to expand?"
If nothing much changes in the institutions for trading LNG, we should
not expect much growth in demand for natural gas in the Pacific Basin. If,
however, LNG comes to be priced more independently--not uncorrelated with
oil but not tightly indexed, either, and not on an exact thermal-equivalent
basis--and if the market's actors (including especially governments) are
willing to consider more flexible contract forms, international trade in
natural gas in this region will grow more in accordance with the bright
prospects for overall economic progress.
Actors in he Pacific Basin Market for Natural Gas
The demand side of the Pacific Basin gas market consists of Japan and
The Rest--a group of much smaller users, singly and collectively, actually
and potentially, than Japan. Japan is by far the dominant factor on this
side of the market, to the point of possessing considerable potential
monopsony power.2 The Rest, which include Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong,
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Australia, and Thailand, are not without interest or significance. The
group counts among its numbers several rapidly growing economies, and two
of them are potential producer-exporters as well as consumers of natural
gas. Nevertheless, Japan now represents the bulk of Pacific-Basin gas
demand and (under any plausible set of assumptions) will continue to do so
at least through the end of this century. Even unusually rapid demand
growth among The Rest will only cut into, not end, Japan's dominance.
Thus, it is no exaggeration to argue that, as Japan goes, so goes
Pacific Basin trade in natural gas. (The same would be true for coal and
oil, though to a lesser extent in the latter case because of the better
organized world market). For this reason, we shall focus in this chapter
primarily on the demand for natural gas in Japan. Before taking up the
Japanese case, however, it is well to examine briefly The Rest of the
actors in the Pacific Basin market for natural gas.
The Rest of the Market in Brief
Korea and Taiwan have recently been among the economic (and ,
industrial) growth leaders of the world. Of the two, Korea is the more
likely to play a visible role in Pacific Basin gas trade over the next
fifteen years, merely by virtue of having already signed a contract to
import LNG. The imported LNG is to be used in electric power generation.
Outside analysts have suggested that Korea could make more effective use of
this gas in industry, and instead generate power with coal. This strategy
would, however, require large investments in gas distribution and
combustion equipment--investments of the kind that the Korean government is
currently reluctant to sanction because of the pressure it would place on
its net foreign borrowing situation. A careful analysis of this set of
mW
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issues is beyond the scope of this chapter. Here, we simply note the
interesting possibility that Korea could become quite a bit more of a
factor than it is at present in Pacific Basin gas trade, but that for this
to happen would require changes in domestic economic and financial policies
that are not now in prospect.
Thailand and Australia both have domestic natural gas resources.
Australia will shortly become an active seller in Pacific Basin gas trade
and is counted among the modern industrialized nations of the world.
However, Australia's exportable gas is on the Northwest Shelf, too far from
the populous and developed southeast to compete with central Australian gas
reserves; and the southwest Australian market will not put a very big dent
in LNG exports. Thailand is aggressively pursuing economic growth;
however, even with rapid economic growth and intensive domestic use of
natural gas, Thailand will not make much of a difference in total Pacific
Basin gas demand for some years.
Finally, Hong Kong has long been a vibrant economic force in eastern
Asia, far out of proportion to its tiny size. That very size, however,
restricts the potential significance of any gas demand growth for the
broader regional market. In addition, the uncertainties growing out of the
transfer to the Peoples Republic of China at the end of this century are
likely to put a damper on the growth of the Hong Kong economy, and on
growth in the demand for natural gas, over the period covered by this
study.
Outline of the Remainder of the Chapter
The first step in understanding Japanese gas demand prospects for the
period 1985-2000 is to define some terms and develop certain concepts that
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will be used throughout the remaining discussion. This we do in the
section immediately following.
Directly following that, we briefly consider several special features
of the Japanese case. These special features derive from those of LNG,
discussed earlier. Most of Japanese gas use, and all of any future
increments, (1) consist of LNG that (2) is imported. A third special
feature is the way LNG is priced. Prospects for significant growth in
demand over the next fifteen years hinge on whether this third special
feature changes and (if so) how.
The ensuing material gets down to cases. These are presented in
alternative-scenario format, reflecting the two quite different world views
that lie behind them. We term the first scenario the "consensus view,"
referring to the broad agreement among government officials and many
business representatives that the fate of Japanese purchases and uses of
LNG from now until the year 2000 has been largely settled. In contrast,
the second scenario--labelled the "dissenting view"--considers the
conditions necessary for Pacific Basin gas trade to expand significantly
over the next fifteen years. Obviously, for this to happen Japanese gas
demand must grow faster than is foreseen in the consensus view. Two -9
prerequisites, though, are (1) that the relative price of LNG decline
enough to permit greater penetration of industrial markets; and (2) that
Japanese decision makers (public and private) respond appropriately to the
decline. Of course, decision makers (public and private) in the LNG-
supplying countries must also reconcile themselves to the lower returns -
that would go with a lower relative LNG price.
The chapter concludes with a summary and a recap of the main
conclusions.
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THE NATURE OF DEMAND FOR NATURAL GAS
Economic Demand Functions for Gas
Throughout this chapter, the "demand" for gas will refer to a function
relating different quantities demanded by purchasers to different prices
charged by sellers. Typically, one or more "shift parameters" will (if
varied) increase or decrease the entire function. The central shift
parameter in gas demand functions is the price of the competing oil product
(e.g., residual fuel oil). Other shift parameters are household income,
user equipment stocks and prices, technologies, and people's preferences
(or "tastes").
By postulating that individuals or firms behave rationally, we can
deduce that demand curves "slope downward": At low prices, greater amounts
of a given good will be demanded than at higher prices--holding constant
the various.shift parameters. As a rule, quantity demanded will respond
more to a given price change in the long run than in the short run. The
shift parameters tend to be fixed in the short run but variable in the long
run. If a price changes suddenly, purchasers' short-run quantity responses
will be restricted in scope. With time, however, that scope will broaden
as long-run changes--in people's tastes, end-use equipment, technologies,
purchases of complementary goods, and so on--occur.
No discussion of economic demand functions for natural gas in the mid-
1980s would be complete without paying some attention to changes in world
oil prices. We noted above that the price of the competing oil product is
typically the "central" shift parameter in gas demand functions: An
increase in oil prices will increase gas demand, and vice versa. The
magnitude of the effect of a given change in oil prices will differ,
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depending on people's expectations about the permanence of the change. If
they expect it to last, the effect on gas demand will be greater than if
the change is viewed as transitory.
With the benefit of hindsight, it appears that many people thought the
oil price increases of the 1970s were permanent. Otherwise they would not
have locked themselves into gas contracts with price and other terms set at
"premium" levels and tied to oil at or near thermal parity. We now (March
1986) know that oil-price expectations should be based on volatility, not
continual increases. Therefore, energy users will tend to add a risk
premium to oil prices that will at least partly cushion the decline in gas
demand owing to falling oil prices. Further, expectations based on oil-
price volatility should lead to different contract forms for trading
natural gas. In particular, we should expect greater reliance on flexible-
price contracts, with price referents much more loosely tied to oil.
Note that the reduced demand for natural gas caused by falling oil
prices will be offset somewhat by supply-side macroeconomic expansion
throughout the world induced by lower energy prices. This expansion will
be the obverse of the negative supply-side shocks to aggregate world output
caused by the oil-price increases of the 1970s.
"Final" and "Derived" Demands
There are various categories, or customer classes, of gas demand,
depending on the customer's specific end use. Only residential demand for
gas is final as opposed to "intermediate" on the scale of human
consumption. Commercial, industrial, and electric-utility demands are, in
economic argot, derived from the ultimate demands for goods produced with
the gas. Both kinds of demand still depend, short- and long-run, on the
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price of gas. But the price often differs by customer class, and the other
arguments in the demand functions differ as well.
For residential gas demand, the prices of near substitutes--mainly
distillate fuel oil ("No. 2") and increasingly electric power--are
important shift parameters. Household income is also an argument, as is
user equipment: in the short run, the stock itself, and in the long run,
the prices of equipment. Government policies may affect residential demand
for gas, too. In Japan, for instance, government subsidies to kerosene may
have retarded the growth of residential gas demand.
The derived demands of commercial, industrial, and electric-utility
customers do not depend on income, except indirectly in the aggregate
through its effect on final-goods demands. Stocks of equipment and
technology are important arguments of these demands. The long-run decision
to install "dual-fuel" (gas and oil) capability (or more rarely, in the
case of coal, to maintain spare combustion capacity) makes fuel switching a
short-run possibility. For most commercial demands, relevant substitutes
include distillate fuel oil or electric power. Industrial users can
substitute either distillate or residual fuel oil, depending on the
application; substitution in most feedstock uses is limited in the short
run, because of design complexities in chemical processes. Electric
utilities view residual fuel oil as the effective short-run substitute fuel
for natural gas. Coal (base load) and distillate fuel oil (peaking) are
long-run substitutes, as of course are nuclear, hydro, pumped storage and
other non-fossil-fuel forms of generation. Finally, public policies may
also affect derived demands for gas--viz., regulation of the siting of
nuclear plants and restrictions on sulphur emissions.
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The different categories of gas demand tend to have different marginal
values in use, given a particular market equilibrium. The differences
trace to the supply prices (costs of provision) of acceptable alternatives,
whether it be rival fuel/energy systems or substitute processes or final
goods. Homeowners, for example, can heat with distillate fuel oil, gas, or
electricity (coal is no longer widely acceptable); or they can wear extra
layers of clothing, learn to enjoy ambient temperatures of 60 degrees F.
(15 degrees C.), or move to a warmer climate. Electric utilities, in
contrast, may find coal a quite acceptable alternative to natural gas for
raising steam, even if expensive scrubbing is required for environmental
reasons,.
Broadly speaking, residential (R) and commercial (C) gas demands are
less responsive to variations in price than are industrial (I) and
electric-utility (EU) demands. We say that R and C are less "price-
elastic" than I and EU demands: For a given percentage change in price,
the percentage changes in quantities demanded for R and C use are
relatively smaller than are true of I and EU uses. R and C demands are
sometimes labelled "captive," suggesting that homeowners and shopkeepers
are prisoners of capital outlays that represent a large fraction of their
total costs of gas use. There are, of course, exceptions. Some very large
commercial gas customers (e.g., apartment houses) find it worthwhile to
invest in fuel-switching capability. And certain industrial customers--
e.g., petrochemical producers and some firms using process heat--employ
techniques designed expressly for natural gas. Thus, they have less
elastic demands than the "penny-switchers" who swing from gas to residual
fuel oil and back in response to relative-price movements of as little as a
penny per million Btu (MMBtu).
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These seeming arcana of natural gas economics are important to
understanding how gas markets operate under various conditions.
Differences in marginal use-value and price elasticity across market
segments imply the existence of distinct ranges in the total demand curve
in a given gas market. Figure 1 depicts a stylized market for natural gas
at end-use. The highest demand prices and steepest slopes occur in the
region labelled "R+C" (for residential and commercial). Next comes the
region of industrial demand (labelled "I"), followed by that for electric
utilities' demands (labelled "EU"). The range of the R+C region of the
demand curve below where the I region begins is not relevant: No seller
will sell gas for R+C use if I-use will fetch a better price. This is
similarly true for the range of the I region below where the EU region
begins.
Exactly where on the demand curve a given market will "clear"--where,
in other words, the supply to that market intersects the demand--is of
considerable importance to gas marketing decisions. A price-taking (or
price-regulated) seller of gas will realize greater revenues, other factors
constant, if the market clears in the R+C range than in the I or EU range
of the demand curve. (Absent government regulation, price discrimination
may be feasible in natural gas sales because of the high cost to most
customers of reselling purchased gas. Where scale economies exist [e.g.,
in large-diameter pipelines], price discrimination--in inverse proportion
to the customers' price elasticities of demands--is even desirable from the
standpoint of economic efficiency.)
Not long ago, natural gas was regarded as a "premium" fuel in many
parts of the world--North America (except on the Gulf Coast), Western
Europe, Japan (but not in the U.S.S.R.)--because incremental units of gas
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delivered to many markets fetched R+C prices. Today, people have begun to
view it more as a "blue-collar" fuel that will clear in the I range
(against residual fuel oil) or even (in the long run) in the EU range
(against coal)--in the process opening up new markets to natural gas. This
view is now common in North America, and to a lesser extent in Western
Europe. In the Pacific Basin and especially in Japan, however, gas
(derived from LNG) is still a premium fuel. Whether this will change
depends (as we have noted) on institutional as well as economic factors.
NATURAL GAS DEMAND IN THE JAPANESE POLICY SETTING
The LNG Factor at Work
Natural gas decision making in Japan illustrates well our earlier
assertion that Pacific Basin gas trade differs from other international gas
markets because it is conducted exclusively in LNG. Flows of the good in
Japan are organized in the familiar discrete, vertically integrated
projects consisting of liquefaction, special transportation, and
storage/regasification. More important, however, the purchase and use of
LNG are bound up with government import policies, because Japan imports
virtually all of its primary energy other than hydroelectric power.
Environmental concerns lay behind the initial introduction of LNG into
Japan in the late 1960s. By the mid-1970s, however, the policy focus had
shifted, following the Arab oil embargo and the oil price shock, to the
displacement of oil and the diversification of both types and sources of
energy.
The political concern for security means that the Japanese government
intervenes actively to influence with whom LNG deals are negotiated.
Further, once the deals are struck, their political value means that the
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Japanese government has a stake in protecting their financial viability, if
necessary by intervening in pricing and even allocation decisions.
Combined with the inherent clumsiness of LNG technology, the result is a
rigidly structured set of arrangements for making decisions about buying
and selling LNG.
These arrangements do not operate through the competitive market
forces of conventional economic analysis. Market forces are of course one
constraint, because most of the operatives in LNG (as well as other forms
of energy) are private entities that do not willingly incur losses. But to
understand the Japanese demand for natural gas--its past evolution and
future prospects--one must keep in mind that government policies also
constrain the decisions made.
Two Competing Views of the Future of Natural Gas in Japan
Natural gas has in a short space of time become a major factor in the
Japanese energy picture. This has happened under the aegis of the combined
economic and political system just outlined. Among the majority of the
participants in this system--the government agencies who have overseen the
rapid rise of natural gas, and the business firms (virtually all of them
electric and gas utilities) who have carried it out--there seems to be a
consensus about the future prospects for natural gas in Japan. The major
published forecasts all seem quite similar, as we shall see. Subject to
minor differences of emphasis, the consensus is that natural gas will
continue to grow in the future but at a noticeably slower pace than over
the past decade or so. Implicitly, holders of the consensus view assume
that the existing institutions, which succeeded in managing rapid growth,
will prove equally successful at managing the more modest future pace.
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A dissenting view is that it would be possible, and economically
advantageous, to have considerably faster future growth of natural gas in
Japan than the consensus scenario entails. Proponents of this more
optimistic scenario range from academic gadflies to representatives of
Japanese construction firms (and foreign owners of rights to gas supplies)
who chafe under the constraints that (in their view) the existing system
places on gas growth. Central to the dissenting view is the notion that
change is abroad in world gas markets. Since about 1980, these markets
(along with those for other energy goods) have gone from being supply-
constrained to being demand-constrained. To take advantage of this change,
the dissenters argue, Japan will have to alter its approach to LNG deals,
perhaps even its attitude toward the core issue of energy import security.
Failure to adopt new tactics to take advantage of the change will be costly
and may even place Japan at a disadvantage in world LNG trade. Not
altering present institutions and policies will certainly stifle the
investments (e.g., in infrastructure for moving gas around once it is
landed) required if natural gas is to realize its full potential in the
Japanese economy.
These two competing views of the future of natural gas in Japan are
the vehicle for the remaining discussion in this paper.
SCENARIO I: THE CONSENSUS VIEW
Development of Gas Use in Japan
As in Europe and North America, the original gas business in Japan
consisted of "town" or "city" gas, which was manufactured from coal or LPG
and used for lighting and cooking. The town gas industry tapped into what
few indigenous resources of natural gas Japan possesses, but they are small
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enough to be negligible by present standards, which include the large-scale
importation of LNG.
The LNG era began in the late 1960s, prompted (as already noted) by
concerns for air quality. As Table 1 illustrates, however, the second and
larger wave of LNG contracts followed the disruptions in the world oil
market in 1973-74. These new contracts diversified Japan's sources of LNG,
adding three new suppliers. The latest round of new contracts added
another (Australia), and prospective contracts (with Thailand and the
U.S.S.R.) would continue the pattern. The goal of diversification is
openly stated,3 and one source refers to a "MITI ban on extra LNG
dependency on Indonesia"4 (currently the largest single supplier) as a
reason for turning to Australia and (at the time) Canada.
The existing and planned LNG projects all exhibit the familiar
discrete, lumpy form--vertically integrated from field to burner tip, with
continuous-flow "take-or-pay" provisions and seller restrictions on end-use
written into the contracts. With two minor exceptions (involving 3.4
percent of total contract volumes), all of the contracts have been signed
by large electric utilities and the "big three" town gas companies (Osaka
Gas, Toho Gas and Tokyo Gas). Table 2 shows how heavily these two groups
of producers have dominated the importation of LNG into Japan. Table 3
shows the rapid increase in the use of LNG in electric power generation,
and Table 4 illustrates how the importation of LNG has penetrated the city
gas industry. Note that the increase between 1970 and 1983 in the use of
LNG to produce city gas roughly equals the increase in total city gas sales
over the same period.
All of this activity has been set up in "supply-mode" rather than
"network" form. Once landed in Japan, LNG can be shifted among customers
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Table 1
LNG Projects (Japan)
103t
SOURCE
U.S.A.
(ALASKA)
BRUNEI
U.A.E.
(ABU DHABI)
INDONESIA
(I)
MALAYSIA
INDONESIA
(II)
INDONESIA
(III)
SUBTOTAL
AUSTRALIA
CANADA
(cancel led
January 1986
SUBTOTAL
STARTING
YEAR
1969
1972
1977
1977
1983
1983
1984
1989
1989
CONTRACT
PERIOD
(YEARS)
20
20
20
23
20
20
20
19
20
ANNUAL
AMOUNT
960
5140
2060
7500
600
3200
3300
28160
5840
2350
8190
36350
IMPORTERS
Tokyo Gas 240
Tokyo E.P. 720
Tokyo Gas 1060
Tokyo E.P. 3450
Osaka Gas 630
Tokyo E.P. 2060
Kansai E.P. 2400
Chubu E.P. 1500
Kyushu E.P. 1500
Osaka Gas 1300
Nippon Steel 600
Tokyo Gas 2000
Tokyo E.P. 4000
Chubu E.P. 1500
Kansai E.P. 800
Toho Gas 500
Osaka Gas 400
Tohoku E.P. 2550
Tokyo E.P. 400
Others 350
Electricity 21430
Gas 5780
Others 950
Tokyo E.P. 900
Kansai E.P. 900
Chubu E.P. 900
Chugoku E.P. 900
Kyushu E.P. 900
Tokyo Gas 580
Osaka Gas 580
Toho Gas 180
Chubu E.P. 1600
Chugoku E.P. 300
Kyushu E.P. 300
Toho Gas 150
Electricity 6700
GAS 1490
Electricity
Gas
Others
28130
7620
950
OPERATED
PLANNED
TOTAL
-
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Table 2
LNG Use by Sector
103t
Electricity
92
717
714
677
1,379
2,475
3,326
3,920
5,703
8,603
11,708
12,987
13,227
13,358
16,332
20,616
29,000
30,000
30,000
City Gas
75
241
251
278
959
1,300
1,621
1,972
2,429
2,703
3,070
3,444
3,801
3,992
4,692
5,051
7,200
9,600
11,100
Others
17
92
213
191
216
298
338
369
383
300
400
400
Sources: Synthetic Energy Statistics
Japan Gas Association
of Japan (MITI) D1'//33
Fiscal
Year
1969
1970
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
1980
81
82
83
84
1990
1995
2000
Total
167
958
965
955
2,338
3,775
4,947
5,909
8,224
11,519
14,969
16,647
17,326
17,688
20,393
26,050
36,500
40,000
41,500
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Table 4
Raw Material Balance of City Gas in Japan
10 Kcal, (%)
year 2000
>,> raw y ear 1970 1975 1980 1983 1990 1995
material Low High
(37.2) (22.3) (13.3) (10.0) (7.1) (6.8) (4.9) (4.7)
19,294 17,500 13,383 11,701 10,440 10,440 10,440 10,440
LNG (15.2) (34.3) (42.3) (61.0) (71.3) (76.5) (74.0) (80.4)
(NATURAL GAS) 7,891 26,929 42,550 71,323 104,830 138,010 157,790 178,540
(47.6) (43.4) (44.4) (29.0) (21.6) (17.7) (21.1) (14.9)
24,703 34,170 44,713 33,884 31,820 31,960 44,880 33,150
(100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100)
51,888 78,599 100,646 116,908 147,090 180,410 213,110 222,130
Source: Japan Gas Association
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only within the immediate environs of the importing entity (electric or gas
utility). Limited movements by tank-truck occur, but there is nothing
resembling an interrelated national pipeline grid of the kind now common
throughout North America and Europe. This lack is of some significance for
the kinds of problems that the growing Japanese gas industry has faced, as
we shall discuss presently.
Since the mid-1970s, the price terms in the LNG contracts have been
closely pegged to crude oil prices. A rough calculation of the ratio of
average LNG prices paid (per unit of heat value) to average crude oil
prices paid shows a drop from 1.72 in 1969 to 0.75 in 1974, then a gradual
rise to parity by 1978, where it has remained (except for the period of the
second oil-price spike, 1979-80).5 Pegging LNG contract prices to crude
was demanded by sellers, who were able to play on the perception of gas as
a "premium" fuel that could close the oil "gap." The practice is not
generally found in pipeline-gas markets, where the ratio ranges from about
two-thirds to nine-tenths.6 Recently, the practice has been called into
question in LNG trade, as world energy market conditions and perceptions
have changed. Japanese actors in LNG trading have begun to try to reduce
the ratio, but the extent of the reduction to aim for remains controversial
and in fact figures in the differences between the "consensus" and the
"dissenting" scenarios.
Problems and Solutions
Deals arranged under the system just outlined supported rapid growth
of LNG use in Japan during the 1970s and into the 1980s. As can be seen in
Table 2, the use of LNG rose more than 25-fold between 1972 and 1984, and
more than 3-fold between 1977 and 1984. However, this growth was not
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without its problems. In part, the problems trace to the tendency (common
to all the advanced industrial countries) to overestimate total energy
use--or (equivalently) to underestimate the price elasticities of energy
demands--following the oil price shock of the 1970s. But the problems also
trace in part to the rigidities of the Japanese system for arranging LNG
deals.
Rapid as it has been, actual growth in LNG use has not fully lived up
to earlier expectations. This is reflected in several ways, including
continual postponements of initial deliveries under new contracts, and
repeated reductions in forecasts of future consumption (hence also in the
implied growth rates inbetween).7 Because of the rigid take-or-pay
requirements in the existing LNG contracts, Japanese gas and electric
utilities have found themselves with an excess supply of LNG.8 In
response, in 1985 MITI established an "LNG Introduction Promotion Center"
to encourage some 248 small local town gas companies to begin using LNG as
a feedstock in making town gas. The Center will provide information and
technical assistance, and also undertake a study to investigate
establishing a special joint company to tackle the thorny problem of
transporting LNG from the present delivery points to the small town gas
companies.9
Another response to the excess supply of LNG has been to try to induce
industrial firms to use LNG. Subsidies are available to defray part of the
cost of hook-ups 10 Also, in 1980 MITI established a special rate for gas
used by industrial-end users meeting certain conditions. This rate was
about half that applicable to gas for household use, and it "compares
favorably with the current fuel oil A price."11 A noteworthy feature of
these measures is that they are aimed not at short-term, temporary--
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"interruptible"--use but rather at long-term, "firm" use. To qualify for
the special industrial rate, firms have to guarantee takes of 90-100
percent of contract volumes for a minimum of three years. Offering lower
prices to industrial gas users makes good sense, given their relatively
high price elasticities of demand. However, we would not normally expect
"firm" as opposed to "interruptible" service to be provided (indeed,
required) at the low prices. Presumably, this arrangement is an ad hoc
response to an unforeseen excess supply and not a long-term policy.
Importers of LNG into Japan have also encountered phase problems.
Their LNG contracts call for quite rigid delivery schedules and fixed
amounts per delivery, in large part because of economies in the seagoing
_- shipping of LNG. Their own calls for LNG, however, vary over time, with
the seasons and with business activity. In North American and European gas
markets, this kind of imbalance is handled by arranging short-term sales
and purchases (e.g., on an "interruptible" basis, at somewhat lower prices)
to occasional customers. This is not possible in Japan, however, because
-- it lacks the necessary gas transportation network. Also, many LNG
contracts contain clauses that restrict resale--the product in our view of
the prevailing oil-market conditions at the time the contracts were signed.
Consensus Forecasts
Whatever the current problems with LNG, both the policies to deal with
them and the underlying system appear to have broad support. The main
groups represented in the consensus are the Japanese government, the large
electric utilities active in LNG contracting, the "Big Three" gas utilities
(Osaka, Toho, and Tokyo), and apparently some industrial companies
(including oil firms).
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The consensus extends to forecasts about the future of LNG to the year
2000. Table 5 gives a number of forecasts by three different groups,
prepared at various points over the past two or three years. MITIs foresee
the greatest growth in LNG use, but they are not all that different from
the IEEs (but the IEE has to our knowledge not yet made a forecast for
2000). The PAJ forecasts are notably lower than both MITIs and the IEEs
(perhaps reflecting some wishful thinking). Comparing the 8/85 PAJ
forecast with the 11/83 (revised) MITI forecast, PAJ's figures are lower by
11.5 % in 1990, 13.5 % in 1995, and 15.4 % in 2000. The other notable
feature of the forecasts in Table 5 is the progressive scaling back that
has occurred over time. The later MITI and PAJ forecasts call for very
little growth in Japanese LNG use between 1995 and 2000. The totals for
both years are in fact very close to the total contract volumes. If they
prove accurate, these consensus forecasts leave little room for additional
gas trade in the Pacific Basin originating from Japanese demand.
SCENARIO II: THE DISSENTING VIEW
The consensus view of the future of natural gas in Japan is not a
unanimous one. A few observers argue that the use of natural gas--from
LNG--could expand substantially faster than the modest pace assumed by the
government and many private actors. For the dissenters' view to be viable,
of course, would require some basic changes, both in the LNG market and in
Japanese policies toward gas and other forms of energy. Neither set of
changes is inevitable or certain, but they are not impossible either. Of
the two, the market changes are perhaps the more likely.
We first examine the feasibility of the dissenting view. Then we
sketch the conditions necessary for this view to come to pass and consider
the chances for these conditions actually to obtain.
-25-
TABLE 5. "CONSENSUS" FORECASTS OF JAPANESE L.N.G. USE
(million metric tons)
Forecasting
Agency and Date: 1984 (actual)
NITI (4/82)
NITI (11/83)
(later revision:
IEE (6/84)
PAJ (6/84)
PAJ (8/85)
LEGEND: MITI = Ministry of International Trade
IEE = Institute of Energy Economics
PAJ = Petroleum Association of Japan
and Industry
NOTE: IEE's forecast for 1995 is the sane for all three scenarios
considered: "ost likely," "low-growth," and "high-growth."
Presumably, then, the variation in total gas use is expected
to be accounted for by variations in non-LNG sources of gas.
SOURCES: Tokyo Gas Co., The Role of LNG (Past, Present, and Future),
Tokyo, June 1985.
IEE, "Japan's Long-Term Energy Supply/Demand Forecast,"
manuscript, June 7, 1984.
PAJ, documents given to Professor Richard Samuels,
autumn 1985.
1990 1995 2000
26.7
26.7
26.7
26.7
26.7
26.7
n. .
40.0
40.0
51.9
43.0
41.5)
43.0
36 5
36.5
34 0
33 2
32,3
40.0
37.0
34.6
40.9
35.1
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Feasbility of the Dissenting View on LNG Demand in Japan
The core issue of feasibility is how much room there is in the
Japanese economy to expand the use of natural gas. Two rough calculations
are available.
One calculation, by Tadahiko Ohashi,12 focuses narrowly on the "Big
Three" city gas companies, Osaka, Toho, and Tokyo, inclusive of the smaller
gas companies that are proximate enough to them to take more LNG if it were
offered. He first estimates the "ultimate supply capacity" of the Big
Three, based on "existing pipeline networks and re-gasification sites." Of
the total of 15-16 million tons annually of LNG-equivalent, only some 80
percent, or 12-13 million tons of LNG, could actually be supplied by LNG,
he says, "because of the rigidity of LNG supply and the policy of
diversification of raw materials." Subtracting the gas utilities' existing
contracts for LNG (some 7.62 million tons, total) gives "additional
capability" for new LNG supplies of 4.4-4.5 million tons. This capability
is some 16.9 to 20.7 percent of the 1984 figure for total Japanese LNG
consumption (see Table 2). [Note: The "optimistic" variant of the model
assumes that LNG use in 1990, 1995, and 2000 is 20 percent greater than the
MITI forecast.] Thus, substantial demand growth just in the "Big Three"
service areas could be accommodated without much additional investment in
distribution capacity.
The Ohashi calculation is a decidedly conservative one. Not only does
it not envision major investment in new gas-supply infrastructure, it also
assumes no changes in LNG supply arrangements, and it ignores expansion of
demand from the electric utility sector. A number of observers think that
the consensus view of electric-utility demand for LNG is too low, given
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environmental concerns about coal-fired and nuclear capacity, and an
apparent trend toward relatively greater peak (as opposed to base-load)
demand for electricity.1 3
In the other calculation, much rougher than that just described, we
attempt to establish an absolute outer bound for Japanese LNG use in the
mid-1980s. Using the detailed "Green Book" of energy balances,1 4 we
calculate that in 1984 the Japanese economy could--emphasize could--have
absorbed an additional 194.7 million metric tons of LNG by displacing coal,
crude oil and refined products, and synthetic gas. The logic of the
calculation is as follows:
1. Replace all non-LNG sources of city gas with LNG.
2. Replace all petroleum products, crude oil, coal, and
coke used in generating electricity with LNG. (But
do not displace any nuclear, hydro, or existing LNG
generation.)
3. Replace all petroleum products and coal used in
industry with LNG.
4. Replace all petroleum products used in the residential
and commercial sectors with LNG.
5. In the industrial, residential and commercial sectors,
we did not displace the city gas or the electric power
used, bcause they are already taken into account in
items 1-4.
The data in the source are reported in 106 kCal; we converted them to 106
MMt by multiplying by 1.23. The numerical totals for each category above
are as follows:
1. 5.7 MMt
2. 70.1 MMt
3. 82.4 MMt
4. 36.5 MMt
Total: 194.7 MMt
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Total 1984 consumption of LNG in Japan comes to only 13.4 percent of this
absolute outer bound. Thus, even minor penetration by LNG into the
existing non-LNG fuel uses would support rather large increases in LNG
trade in the Pacific Basin.
Obviously, the greatest room for extra LNG use in Japan is in
industry, but the potential is also great in electric-power production.
Even in the residential sector, which is widely regarded as nearly
saturated so far as LNG is concerned, a penetration of only 25 percent of
the 1984 outer-bound potential would mean increased use of more than 9
million tons of LNG per year. Of course, such a penetration would be the
most expensive of the lot, in terms of required investment in additional
distribution infrastructure.
Conditions for a Non-Consensus Approach to LNG in Japan
Four conditions must obtain before the dissenting view would be
practicable.
LNG Pricing
The first and most important condition has to do with LNG pricing. In
the words of one prominent analyst:15 "Even though this [MITI, Nov. 1983]
forecast is widely supported among Japanese energy experts, no one can deny
that LNG pricing is the key to the actual future demand for LNG."
The relative price of LNG must be lower than it currently is (roughly
at parity with crude oil), and the process of redetermining LNG prices over
time must be released from its bondage to crude oil. (The ideal referent
would be a liquid spot price for LNG--see the next subsection.) This
condition would permit LNG to compete in "non-premium" fuel markets. These
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two changes will require flexibility mainly on the part of the sellers in
the Pacific Basin Market, although buyers renegotiating for additional LNG
supplies would be in a position to "encourage" them.
Spot LNG Trading
The second condition is much greater flexibility in worldwide trading
of LNG> Ideally, this would take the form of a liquid spot market--that
is, one active enough that no one deal would significantly affect the
price.1 6 A "liquid spot" market would be far boarder (i.e., more liquid)
than a distress-sale "spot" market that acts merely as a safety valve for
occasional surpluses or shortfalls. (Spot transactions in the latter sense
seem already to have appeared in the Pacific Basin.)1 7
Regional (If Not National) Gas Networks in Japan
The third condition is designed to permit greater flexibility in
trading LNG inside Japan. The principal component of this condition would
be substantial investment in regional, if not national, gas networks. In
addition, it would obviously require relaxation of diversification
requirements by fuel type (though not necessarily by geographic source).
Price Discrimination in INVERSE Proportion to the Elasticity of Demand
The fourth condition is to adopt LNG pricing that discriminates in
inverse proportion to the price elasticity of user demand. This would be
in contrast to the present policy of offering "firm" service--designed for
customers will low price elasticities of demand--at preferentially low
rates. So-called Ramsey-price gas rates would provide added flexibility in
the market by additing users who are willing to switch on or off gas as
market conditions ease or tighten.
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How likely is it that the above four conditions can be met? On
pricing, the essential development is that suppliers acknowledge that world
energy markets, including those for gas, are now demand-constrained, not
supply-constrained as they were in the 1970s and early 1980s. Realism here
should reduce their reservation prices for gas, wean them from the
insistence on tying gas prices tightly to crude oil or refined products,
and (one would hope) persuade them that restricting the resale of LNG will
only hamper the long-term growth of the market. Realism of this kind has
broken out in North America and Western Europe, and shows distinct signs of
doing so in the Pacific Basin. Admittedly, the rapid slide of oil prices
in late 1985 and early 1986 has made realism more painful to bear.
The conventional wisdom is that LNG cannot be traded on a liquid
spot basis, because the projects are lumpy and require careful coordination
of the inputs and outputs. But lumpiness is a relative, not an absolute
measure; in an expanded LNG market, an LNG train that was "lumpy" in 1980
would be but a part of a larger flow in (say) the 1990s. And vertical
coordination between inputs and outputs within projects was a necessity
born of the limited extent of trading, and therefore of facilities for
producing, shipping, and handling LNG. No intrinsic characteristic of LNG
makes such coordination necessary--if participants in the market could get
reliable access to facilities when they wanted to trade. Where excess LNG
capacity has made suppliers willing to trade, a few spot transactions have
already occurred (in Europe as well as the Pacific Basin). The argument
that LNG cannot be traded spot is reminiscent of the parallel--spurious--
argument about common carriage in North American pipeline networks in the
1930s. Ironically, a key argument in the latter debate was that natural
gas could not be economically stored--scarcely a constraint in the case of
LNG!
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Regional gas distribution networks could take the form of pipeline
grids (such as now exist in North America and Europe) or of "nodes" of LNG
delivery and regasification facilities interconnected by tankers. Japanese
actors and observers, whether in the "consensus" or the "dissenting" camp,
seem strongly to prefer interconnected nodes to pipeline systems. For a
nmumber of reasons--e.g., the island layout of the country, the danger of
earthquakes, and population densities--pipeline construction is viewed as
very, indeed, prohibitively expensive.1 8 A nodal system, however, meets
with a rather favorable reception--provided, of course, that the demand is
there--precisely the point of contention between the consensus and
dissenting views.
Regional (if not national) gas distribution networks would be an
expensive proposition, without a doubt. However, they could be cheap at
the price in the long run, compared with (1) continued subsidies to "firm"
industrial customers necessitated by market rigidity owing to the lack of
networks; and (2) foregoing the greater use of LNG. The latter point could
be especially telling if Japan, by refusing to build such networks, were to
cut itself off from falling LNG prices in the Pacific Basin. Note that
Japan may get at least the beginnings of regional networks out of its "LNG
Introduction Promotion Center," established in 1985.
The fourth and final condition, adopting Ramsey-pricing in place of
the existing pattern of subsidizing LNG use by price-insensitive industrial
users, would not be controversial, once the other three conditions had been
met. As argued earlier, the necessity to subsidize "firm" instead of
"interruptible" use stemmed in part from the rigid nature of the existing
system of LNG purchase and use in Japan. Absent that system, Ramsey prices
would virtually suggest themselves as the appropriate way to price gas.
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This has begun to happen in the North American market, despite a time-
honored tradition of cross-subsidizing homeowners' and small businesses'
uses of gas out of pipeline revenues from industrial customers. The force
behind the change is that gas markets are now seen as demand, not supply
constrained.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Pacific Basin market for natural gas resembles other major gas
markets around the world in many respects. Future economic growth will
obviously be a key determinant of gas demand, as will oil prices and
people's expectations about when and how they will change. Both demand and
supply decisions involve large capital outlays that depend on complex
decisions under uncertainty. Government policies figure centrally in
decisions on the production and use of natural gas.
What sets the Pacific Basin market apart from the other major
international markets for gas is that its trade flows consist exclusively
of LNG. In the setting of the 1970s--particularly, the two oil-price
shocks and the expectations that oil prices would remain high or even
increase--a peculiar set of institutions and policies grew up for trading
LNG. Important characteristics of these trading arrangements include the
use of oil prices as contract referents for setting LNG prices, high take-
or-pays, and restrictions on resale. The Japanese government also
participated actively in setting the terms used in trading LNG. This
trading system was the basis for the rapid introduction and growth of LNG
use in the Japanese economy.
The future prospects for Japanese demand for LNG divide into two broad
competing scenarios. One, which we have called the "consensus view,"
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FOOTNOTES
The Pacific Basin is very much like North America and Western Europe in
at least this respect.
2 The extent of this monopsony power and Japan's ability to exercise it
depends on, among other things, the way LNG trade is organized, the level
of world oil prices, and the extent of The Rest's gas demands. Japan will
be freer to exercise monopsony power, other things equal, the more that
sellers of LNG are effectively limited to the Pacific Basin. Within that
area, the greater the gas demands of The Rest, the less will Japan be able
to exert market buying power.
For instance, "to ensure a stable supply of LNG, Japan has been
endeavoring to diversify its import sources and is planning to start
importing from Australia and Canada" -- Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI), Energy in Japan: Facts and Figures, Tokyo, August 1985, p.
24.
International Gas Report, November 8, 1985, p. 10.
Ministry of Finance, Japan Exports and Imports, cited in Tokyo Gas Co.,
The Role of LNG (Past, Present and Future), Tokyo, June 1985, Table 8. The
ratio reported is the joint outcome of many forces, including changes in
exchange rates, the lags in the link between crude oil and LNG prices, and
changes in the composition of crudes purchased in Japan. However, the
broad range of the movement in the ratio seems indicative of the general
trend of this relationship.
6 An exception to the rule cropped up in the North American gas market
during the 1970s, in the form of "indefinite" price escalators pegged to
various indices of oil prices.
7 For instance, between April 1982 and November 1983, MITI reduced its
forecast of LNG use in 1990 and 2000 as follows:
April 1982 November 1983
forecast Forecast %Reduction
1990 43.0 36.5 MMt 15.1%
2000 51.9 43.0 MMt 17.1%
The forecast for 2000 has subsequently been reduced by a further 1.5 MMt to
41.5 MMt (see Tables 2 and 5).
8 One estimate puts this excess supply at 1.6 MMt of LNG by fiscal year
1988 (Japan Petroleum and Energy Weekly, September 2, 1985.
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9 We have not yet found any discussion of the broader implications of
solving this thorny problem -- namely, that a grid of some sort to link the
small town gas companies to LNG supplies could also be used to bring direct
gas service to industrial and large commercial customers. That is, we
could have here the beginnings of a national Japanese gas grid. We return
to this question in section 5.
10 See, for example, Institute of Energy Economics, --[Journal]--, p. 51.
11 Japan Petroleum and Energy Weekly, October 8, 1984, pp. 4-5; also,
Institute of Energy Economics, op.cit., p. 46.
12 op.cit., pp. 13-14.
13 For example, private communication from a Canadian gas-producing firm,
commenting on the first draft of the Pacific Basin report. -
14 Institute of Energy Economics, Energy Balances in Japan (1984), Energy
Data and Modelling Center, 1985.
15 Tadahiko Ohashi, "An Analysis of the Future of Natural Gas in Japan,"
typescript, June 1985, p. 1.
16 Barring huge growth in gas demand from the rest of the region, this
condition would also require that Japanese participants in the market act
as individuals, not in concert (e.g., through a government agency).
17 International Gas Report, December 2, 1985.
18 Osaka Gas Co. undertook an economic feasibility study of a pipeline
running westward from the Himeji LNG terminal (just west of Osaka), through
Okayama and Hiroshima, across the Kanmon Straits to Nagasaki (summarized in
a company communication kindly supplied at the January 1986 project meeting
at M.I.T.). The implied costs per MMBtu would make gas delivered through
the pipeline system prohibitively expensive. We are not clear to what
extent this study explored the possible increase in gas use along the
pipeline, with concomitant savings per MMBtu from laying a larger diameter
pipe.
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"[Lied by Algeria, the OPEC countries have taken the position that
'oil-gas [price] equivalency...[is]... necessary incentive to develop
(natural gas) reserves economically."'
"Today's gloomy LNG market, with shipments to the U.S. halted while
European and Japanese buyers clamor for better terms, has ot discouraged
half a dozen countries from planning new export capacity."
SUMMARY
The natural gas market in the Asia-Pacific region is currently
in a state of supply surplus, demonstrated by the low level of
exploitation of reserves and the disparity between the number of eager
sellers and the paucity of buyers. Regulatory delays affecting several
projects have mitigated the surplus, but not removed it. The resources
in the region are underexploited, growing rapidly, and still immature.
Thus, no physical contraint on supply can be foreseen.
The high level of profits available from an LNG project in the
region is the main reason for the number of eager sellers, and exists
because of the cartelized price for petroleum in world markets. However,
some of the projects are less profitable than others, and could suffer
should competition induce price cutting or in response to continued low
oil prices.
LNG costs should remain stable in the worst event, for two reasons.
World Natural Gas Outlook: What Role For OPEC?, Bijan
Mossavar-Rahmani and Sharmin Mossavar-Rahmani, Economist Intelligence
Unit, Special Report No. 157, 1984, p. 4.
2 "Poor LNG Outlook Not Dispelling Plans to Expand Capacity,"
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 12/2/85, p. 4.
2Since the resource base is still immature, production costs are quite
small and unikely to increase rapidly. Second, the major costs of LNG
projects are the actual processes of liquefying, transporting, and
regasifying the natural gas, which is not a resource cost, but a
manufacturing cost. Since manufacturing costs typically fall over time,
scarcity not being a factor, so should LNG costs. In addition, it
appears that a variety of factors led to excessive cost escalation in the
construction of liquefaction plants. Most or all of these factors
are now gone or diminishing, so near-time costs for new projects could
show serious declines.
INTRODUCTION
Like the North American natural gas market, the Asia-Pacific
market finds itself with a supply surplus in the face of weak demand.
Unlike North America, supply to the major consuming centers requires
tanker transport. As a result, long lead times and heavy capital
investment are necessary. Thus, the market changes only slowly, and
participants often have more at risk.
Given this situation, our aim is to analyze the options available to
producers. These options are defined on the one side by the cost of
producing and transporting the gas and on the other by the value of the
gas in its various uses. This chapter will seek to indicate the costs
involved, as well as providing direction for these costs.
The second section will provide a brief history of natural gas
supply in the Asia-Pacific region, followed by a section on the current
situation regarding resources and production. Following that is a
discussion of LNG costs, including the different estimates and the
3reasons they differ, as well as the factors that have led to changes in
costs over time and our expectations for future costs. The final section
will offer conclusions, and appendices will cover field development costs
and details of the large projects now proposed or underway.
BACKGROUND
The history of natural gas utilization in the Asia-Pacific area is
much shorter than in North America for the simple reason that most supply
lies not only far from consumers, but across vast expanses of ocean.
High distribution costs require an industrialized economy to utilize gas
efficiently, and of the developed countries in the region only Australia
has historically had any significant reserves. Of course, coal gas has
been used for decades, especially in Japan, although its market
penetration has always been limited.3
Thus, establishment of a market required the development of the
technology to liquefy and ship natural gas, which occurred in the
1960s,4 but in light of the expense of shipment and the highly
competitive crude oil prices prevailing, the economic impetus for the
development of LNG projects was less than compelling.
Although the availabiity of cheap crude oil did not encourage
development of new energy resources, when Japanese policy-makers moved to
discourage the emisssion of sulfur from power plants, the electric
utility industry began to seek supplies of fuels containing less
Tokyo Gas was founded in 1985, for instance.
4 The first commercial shipments of LNG began between Algeria and
Britain in 1964.
4pollutants.5 This, combined with the availability of abundant gas
reserves lacking local markets, first in Alaska's Cook Inlet, then in
Brunei, led to the initiation of LNG trade in the Pacific.
Actually, at the time regional gas reserves were not large.
In 1969, the year the first LNG project in the Pacific began operation,
natual gas reserves in the region totalled 50 trillion cubic feet (Tcf),
equal to about 3 years of total Japanese energy consumption.6 However,
most of this supply was located in Pakistan, whose reserves were
subsequently downgraded. In fact, Indonesia, Brunei, and Malaysia, the
three largest exporters at present, only held 3 Tcf of reserves.
This reflected, in large part, the definition of reserves as
resources available given current prices. Not only was there little
incentive to explore for gas with oil at $3 a barrel, but any gas strike
would be labelled sub-marginal or uneconomic, if not listed as a dry
hole, unless it was in close proximity to a consumer. As Figure 1 shows,
gas reserves soared upward with the development of a market. By January
1974, reserves in the "non-consuming" countries7 had soared ten-fold, to
35 Tcf, although production was still only 129 billion cubic feet (Bcf),
or less than half a percent of reserves.8 These three countries now
boast early 100 Tcf of reserves.
This is discussed in more detail in the chapter on policy.
6 Oil and Gas Journal, 12/30/68, p. 102.
Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia. Bangladesh and Pakistan had 8
and 10 Tcf in reserves in 1974 respectively, but have to date used their
gas for domestic consumption. Afghanistan will be considered a part of
the European gas market, since its exports have been exclusively directed
at the U.S.S.R.
8
Oil and Gas Journal, 12/31/73, p. 86-87.
Ibid., 12/30/85, pp. 66-67.
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6The two oil crises that occurred during the 1970s played a
significant role in the development of both natural gas reserves and the
LNG trade in the Pacific.10 By raising the price of the major
competitive fuel, the value of LNG was increased substantially, and the
profits to be had from a project increased concomitantly, despite large
cost increases. Since LNG imports were being priced at crude oil parity
(cif), their prices increased with every oil price increase, as can be
seen in Figure 2. Using constant costs for an export project, Figure 3
shows how the typical wellhead value of natural gas dedicated to an LNG
project has risen over the years. (As will be demonstrated below, costs
have not, in fact, been constant, and are thus overstated in the earlier
years.)
The wellhead value, though, understates the perceived value of the
gas during the 1970s, especially after the Iranian Oil Crisis. The idea
that the world was suffering from resource scarcity became widely held,
with prediction of soaring energy prices dominating discussion. (This
was furthered by the natural gas shortage in the United States.) In
reality, the apparent resource scarcity was due to short-term,
non-geologic phenomena including regulation effects and supply
disruption. The United States in particular experienced a supply "short"
as a result of regulation, although policy-makers had long argued that
the regulations were in response to the shortage rather than the
other way around.
Table 1 lists all of the existing LNG projects and those still being
actively considered in the Asia-Pacific region. Many of those proposed
The oil crises also provided a strong desire for diversification
away from petroleum consumption for security reasons, which played a role
in encouraging the importation of LNG, especially in Japan.
7ALAS KIAN
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Figure 2
LNG PRICES TO JAPAN
(CIF)
1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983
Source: International' 'Crude 'Oil and Product Prices,
July 1985.
LL
-W
8Figure 3
PROFITABILITY OF
7
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
LNG PROJECTS
1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983
-- CIF PRICE + WELLHEAD VALUE
Prices from Figure 2, costs assumed
Lb
OD0
wq
1969
Sources: at $/Mcf
9Table 1
LNG Projects in the Asia-Pacific Region
A. Currently Operational
Exporter
Alaska
Brunei
Abu Dhabi
Indonesia (Badak 1)
Indonesia (Arun 1)
Malaysia
Indonesia (Badak 2)
Indonesia (Arun 2)
Total
Starting
Date
1969
1973
1977
1977
1978
1983
1983
1984
Ending
Date
1989
1993
1997
1997
1998
2003
2003
2004
Quantity
(million tonnes)
.96
5.14
2.06
3.0
4.5
6.0
3.2
3.3
28.16
(1408 Bcf)
B. Planned or Proposed
Exporter
Indonesia (Arun 3, to
Korea)
Indonesia (to Taiwan)
Australia
Canada
Alaska (TAGS)
Phase I
Phase II
Phase III
Qatar
USSR (Sakhalin)
Australia (Elf to ?)
Starting
Date*
1986
1988?
1989?
1989?
1990
1992
1994
1990
1990+
mid-1990s
Quantity
(mt)
2
1.5
6
2.9
4.8
4.1
5.6
6
3
2
Status
Under
construction
In negotiations
Contracts
signed
Not finalized
Proposed
II
Proposed
In Negotiations
Proposed
*Estimated
Sources: BP Review of World Gas for existing, published reports for
all others.
Note: Japan is buyer except where otherwise noted.
-
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were initiated in resonse to express interest on the part of Japanses
buyers, who, like many other consumers, seriously overestimated their
needs for natural gas during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Because of
this overestimation, among other reasons, a number of projects that were
considered firm wound up postponed for a number of years, and several
eager suppliers are finding it difficult to arouse much interest on the
part of prospective buyers.1 1
The market is, in effect, in disequilibium: too many Btus chasing
too little demand. Since the cost of providing the Btus is well under
the current price, moving in the direction of equilibrium means lower
prices to increase demand and reduce supply. The constrainst on the
movement of prices and supply will be addressed in the next two sections.
THE SUPPLY OF NATURAL GAS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
Unlike North America, where the United States and Canada collect and
distribute extensive amounts of data on production, reserves, and
expenditures, few countries in the Asia-Pacific region provide data that
can be used in a meaningful way, 12 particularly regarding expenditures.
As a result, this analysis involves estimating costs from the physical
evidence available, rather than transfomring the data into the
appropriate forms.
Some producers have complained that the Japanese deliberately
encouraged the development of a glut to improve their own bargaining
position, but, in reality, most buyers (and producers) were reacting to
the same perceived market environment with identical expectations. In
addition, domestic regulatory difficulties in the producing countries
have been responsible for many of the delays that have occurred.
12 Australia collects and publishes substantial data on production
and reserves, but not expenditures, nor does it break down reserves into
discoveries versus revisions and extensions, etc.
11
Fortunately, because resource development is still quite immature in
the region, much of the gas comes from a few large fields, rather than a
mutitude of smaller ones as in North America, and so relying on physical
data (e.g., water depth, field depth, and flow rates) is a much esaier
task.
Resources
Table 2 shows production and reserves in the countries of the
Pacific Basin, including (for reference) the United States and Canada.
The United States is taken as an indication of a possible or attainable
depletion rate, given the economic incentives and the lack of a
government ceiling on depletion. A frequent rule of thumb in the oil
industry is to have a 15:1 reserves:production ratio, i.e., 6.67 percent
depletion, but the United States has long produced at higher rates. The
higher the depletion rate, the larger the needed investment, but the
quicker the payout. There is always a tradeoff between the two.13
It is apparent that the Pacific Basin reserves are being
under-depleted and the case is even stronger than Table 2 would
indicate. The gas fields known to date were found as an accidental
result of the search for oil. Deliberate search for gas would thus
result in more discovery. Moreover, experience shows that reserves
keep expanding even without new-field discovery, because of the
extensions of old fields, and increasing knowledge of how to extract more
13
For a more complete explanation, see M.A. Adelman, "OPEC
as a Cartel," in James M. Griffin and David J. Teece, eds., OPEC Behavior
and World Oil Prices, (George Allen & Unwin), 1982, especially pp. 57-59.
12
m.
TABLE 2
PRODUCTION THROUGH YEAR/
RESERVES AT YEAR END
-........ 1985 …......................1984 ----------
Product.
(Bcf)
Australia 480
Brunei 299
Indonesia 1089
Japan 80
alaysia 277
New Zeala 141
Pakistan 366
Taian 48
Thailand 128
Total 2908
Reserves
(tcf)
18.22
7.4
35.6
1.1
52.7
5.52
15.4
0.81
5.4
142.15
Productio Production/
Reserves Product. Reserves Reserves
0.026
0.04
0.031
0.073
0.005
0.026
0;024
0.059
0.024
0.02
(Bcf)
444
312
732
74
120
135
355
60
78
2310
(tcf)
17.85
7.3
40
0.72
50
5.44
15.76
0.54
5.9
143.51
0.025
0.043
0.018
0.103
0.002
0.025
0.023
0.111
0.013
0.016
… 1982 …-------
Production/
Product. Reserves Reserves
(Bcf)
416
342
569
80
37
101
315
60
(tcf)
17.77
6.8
29.6
0.72
34
5.55
18.54
0.56
n.a. 11
1920 124.54
0.023
0.05
0.019
0.111
0.001
0.018
0.017
0.107
n.a.
0.015
17261 197 0.088 18068 198 0.091
3245 99.7 0.033 2652 92.3 0.029
Notes 1985 production estimated using prod thru 9185 ultiplied
by the average 1981-84 (yearly prod/cues 9/85 prod) factor
Thailand factor based on 83 and 84 factors only.
sources: Oil Gas Journal 1982-1985
reserves. 'orldwide Oil 6as at a Glance'
production. 'Worldwide Oil 8as Production'
for each country.
U.S.
Canada
18731
2546
204 0.092
97 0.026
Om
_F
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hydrocarbon more cheaply.14 But both finding and development require
investment, which does not make sense if reserves already available are
not being used. The low depletion rate indicates that production can be
greatly increased at little increase in cost, or possibly even some
decrease because of learning effects, economies of scale, and utilization
of existing infrastructure.
Figure 1 showed that reserves have been increasing rapidly in the
Asia-Pacific area in the last 15 years, from 53 Tcf at the beginning of
1969 to 96 Tcf in 1986. That this should occur despite the lack of
markets for additional gas is suggestive of the extent of the underlying
resource. In fact, drilling in the area is much less than in North
America, as can be seen in Table 3, which shows rigs active and wells
drilled in 1984. Of course, the United States has considerably more land
area suitable for exploration, but even when corrected for this, the
drilling level in the United States is still roughly ten times that of
Southeast Asia.1 5 Historically, of course, the ratio is even more
14 For a fuller discussion, see "Supply Aspects of North American
Gas Trade," by M.A. Adelman and Michael C. Lynch, with the assistance of
Kenichi Ohashi, in Final Report on Canadian-U.S. Natural Gas Trade, MIT
Energy Laboratory Report 85-013. Hereafter referred to as the North
American paper.
15 The United States has roughly 3.8 million square miles of
sedimentary basins, while Southeast Asia (Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia,
and Thailand) have 153 thousand. (See Estimates of Undiscovered
Recoverable Conventional Resources of Oil and Gas in the United States,
U.S. Geological Survey Circular 860, 1981, p. 13, and "Assessment of
Undiscovered Conventionally Recoverable Petroleum Resources in Tertiary
Sedimentary Basins of Malaysia and Brunei," by Keith Robinson,
U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 84-328, 1984, p. 4.) Thus, using
the data from Table 3, there are 20.7 well completions in the United
States per 1000 square miles of sedimentary basins, and only 2.2 in
Southeast Asia. For rigs active, the U.S. figure is actually slightly
below that for Southeast Asia, reflecting the fact that many U.S. wells
are drilled onshore and require much less rig-time. Unfortunately, the
figures cannot be broken down into exploratory versus development wells,
or onshore versus offshore. Data for seismic crews operating in
14
TABLE 3
EXPLORATORY ACTIVITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
Seismic Crews
Operating
(Onshore)(Offshore)
440 46
89 3
Rigs Active
(Onshore) (Offshore)
2216 213
Well
Completions
78542
7095
Austral i a
New Zealand
Far East
of which:
Brunei
Indonesia
Malaysia
Thailand
Other
93 16
24
0
179
2
56
0
5
116
10
0
69
7
26
9
6
21
182
15
404
6
267
20
38
73
Notes: Seismic activity is first half of 1984;
rigs active are for 1984, and well completions for 1983.
All data is reported in International Petroleum Encyclopedia,
1985, Pennwell Publishing, pp. 241, 283-285.
U.S.
Canada
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strongly biased in favor of the United States than is reflected by the
most recent data. Thus, the level of exploratory activity could be
considered relatively light, especially in regard to the potential,
although current levels are certainly more encouraging that those in the
past.
The reasons for the low level of activity are related to a variety
of factors, including the rate at which governments grant exploration
permits, production ceiling, especially in Indonesia, and other
government disincentives, but also the lack of markets for natural gas,
where that has been discovered. The rapid, if unintentional, rise in
natural gas reserves that occurred in the last fifteen years indicates
that lack of resource has not been a constraint.
Given the much lower level of exploration in these areas, estimates
of the ultimate potential are bound to be much less accurate. Of course,
they are not necessarily accurate in heavily explored areas such as the
United States, but there the problem is more one of data interpretation
rather than of data availability.1 6 Various observers have made
estimates of the resources in the region, and these are presented in
Table 4. As can be seen, most believe that the amount of undiscovered
"conventional" natural gas is still several times the current level of
reserves.
These estimates indicate the current potential economically
exploitable resources. As noted in our previous report, they
underestimate future resource development because of definitional
problems. Specifically, they rely on current technology, prices,
Southeast Asia are unavaiable.
See the North American report for a full discussion.
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Table 4
Estimates of Ultimately Recoverable Reserves of Natural Gas
in the Asia-Pacific Region(Tcf)
Esti matedEsti mated
Total Undiscovered
Source Region URR Resources
Hendricks Oceania 350
Asia 200
Mobil Oceania 555 450
IGT Australia+ 500 462.7
NewZealand
Other Asia 520 358.4
DOE Indonesia 115 42
Malaysia + 133 80
Brunei
Thailand 37 21
Masters/ Asia+ 750 500
USGS Oceania
Notes: IGT Other Asia includes USSR, and 2650 TCF was
subtracted from URR to derive number shown, based on
Hendricks, see page 68.
Sources: Hendricks and Mobil from IGT, pp. 51, 67.
IGT is Joseph D. Parent, A Survey of United States
and Total World Production, Proved Reserves,
and Remaining Recoverable Resources of Fossil Fuels
and Uranium, Institute of Gas Technology, 1980.
Masters is from Charles D. Masters, "World Petroleum
Resources - a Perspective," USGS Open-File Report
85-248, 1985.
DOE is from USGS estimates, cited in The Petroleum
Resources of Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, and
Thailand, 7/84, p. 102.
ff
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and costs. Thus, they may include a minimum size as a cutoff for
economically exploitable fields in a given area, which relates to
the current state of development of that area. Over the years and
decades, as infrastructure is built up through the development of
currently exploitable fields, the incremental cost of adding a new field
drops, since it can exploit existing pipelines, handling and processing
facilities, service industries, and so forth.
Looked at another way, the minimum economic field size in Indonesia
at present is much larger than in, for example, Oklahoma. Yet, in
Oklahoma, the minimum economic field size has dropped over time due to
the expansion of the natural gas pipeline system, as more fields are
added. The same will occur in Indonesia, so by the time the currently
known fields are declining, the potential resource base will have grown
as the minimum economic field size drops.
Production Costs
Cost data for Pacific Basin oil and gas are very scarce. However,
the Basin is similar to offshore Louisiana, although drilling is somewhat
easier, as indicated by the following:
"Southeast Asia platforms are generally less expensive
because the wave design criteria allows [sic] for a
lighter structure, except where typhoons are most
prevalent. Contributing to the lighter costs are
smaller labor expenses. [New Zealand is an exception.]
Platform costs everywhere else are virtually the same
as the Gulf of Mexico."
Thus, it is possible to use the data for the U.S. offshore region to
estimate costs in the Pacific basin. In Table 5, the estimation proceeds
17 Leonard Leblanc, "Platform Price Tag Climbs,"
Offshore, September 1978, p. 86.
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TABLE 5
DEVELOPMENT COSTS
1 Drilling and equiping wells per well
2 Allowance for dry holes and
non drilling costs per well
3 Allowance for pipeline to shore and
possible higher cost of overseas
operations per well
4 Total development cost per well
5 Annual development-operating cost per well
6 Development-operating costs per day
per well
7 Development-operating cost as sold
8 development cost in ground
2.9 ($MM)
2.9 ($MM)
2.9
8.7
1.91
5200
0. 260
O. 060
($MM)
($MM)
($MM)
($)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
sources: 1. 1984 JAS 10,000' Off LA
2. Adelman and Ward
3. assumed 50% of 1 + 2
4. line 1 + line 2 + line 3
5. line 4 (.12 + .05 +.05), allowing 12% disc. rate,
5Y% depletion, 5% operating costs
6. line 5 /365
7. line 6 / assumed flowrate of 20 MMcfd
8. dev cost at wellhead = line 4 0.17 / 7.3 bcf/year =
$0.203/Mcf (.17=depletion + disc. rate, 7.3 bcf = yearly
production
dev cost in ground = dev cost at wellhead divided by
(1+(i/a))=(1+(.12/.05))
19
as follows. Producing depths in the Pacific Basin rarely reach 10,000
feet. In 1984, it cost about $3 million for an offshore Louisiana well
to that depth (including its share of platform). An allowance for
development dry holes, and for non-drilling expenditures (chiefly lease
equipment), doubles this.
In addition, 50 percent has been arbitrarily added to allow for
pipelining to shore and for possibly higher costs of working overseas.
Thus, the base case well costs $8.7 million.
A depletion/decline rate of 5 percent for the base case is then
assumed, and a cost of capital (minimum rate of return) of 12 percent.
In the United States, it would be 10 percent, but some allowance for
greater risk must be made outside North America.
More uncertain is the 5 percent for operating costs. In estimating
costs for Canada, operating costs for the Venture project were set to
zero on the assumption that liquids extracted from the gas and sold would
about balance off operating costs. This is not done here because the
liquids are not so easily accumulated and sold in the relatively remote
locations in the Pacific Basin,
Thus, the $8.7 million investment is equivalent to an annual cost of
$1.9 million per year, or $5200 per well per day.1 8
Appendix A lists 102 nonassociated gas or gas-condensate fields.
The average flow rate was 20 million cubic feet (MMcf) per well per day,
with of course much variation. (This equates to 3,000 barrels of oil per
day, which is a good but not great rate.) The development-operating cost
is then $5200/20 MMcf, or 26 cents per Mcf. If the needed rate of return
The methodology by which total costs are converted into annual
costs is discussed in the North American paper, pp. 33-36.
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were, say, not 12 but 20 percent, then the needed revenue would be 36
cents.
Reported costs, whether from a private or a public company, may
differ from this esimates for a variety of reasons. Accounting
techniques may vary, some companies may have higher or lower costs than
others, due to better or worse efficiency levels, or differences in
timing of investment,1 9 the fear of expropriation may encourage a company
to report higher costs to deter such a move, or lower costs to
demonstrate competence, and so forth. These things cannot be estimated
given available data; all we can estimate is a norm for the region.
Appendix B provides several estimates of mostly offshore
developments in the Pacific Basin. They vary over and under the base
case, due to differences in field depth, pipeline length, etc. Where
there is sufficient information to vary the base case, i.e., total
investment, initial flow rate, and depletion/decline rate, we derive an
estimated cost figure for comparison. Announcements by companies will
normally overstate costs, of course, since governments are watching.2 0
However, there is no means of correction. It is evident that the base
case is within the range of what has been announced, and the scale of the
error is not significant.
In Appendix C, discussion of actual projects will show the cost
variation that occurs. The reference case of $0.26-$0.36/Mcf represents
fields in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei; other areas like Australia,
Companies that paid land bonuses or bought equipment in the
early 1980s would show higher costs than those who waited until later and
bought (or paid) in a more competitive environment.
20 Under the most prevalent type of production-sharing contract, in
developing an oil field, the company's share of production is partly
determined by the level of costs.
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Table 6
Delivered Costs of LNG
Recent Estimates ($/MMBtu)
WA-WE NA-WE PG-WE PG-Japan
Siegal & Niering (1980) $3.35-390 3.95-4.50 3.95-4 50
Vrancken (1982)* 4.30-4.70 3.00-3.40 4.60-4.80
IEA (1982) 4.15 3.40 4.90 4.90
BMR (1984) 4.41 5.25 4.41
DiNapoli (1984) 3.30 4.30
WA = West Africa
NA = North Africa
WE = West Europe
PG = Persian Gulf
NOTE: Regasification assumed at $0.40 and production and gathering at $0.30
unless otherwise shown.
*Liquefaction plant taxed at 50%.
Sources: OPEC = The OPEC Natural Gas Dilemma, by Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani, and
Sharmin Mossavar-Rahmai, Westview Press, 1986, (using calcuations originally
made by the OPEC Gas Pricing Committee).
DiNapoli = "Economics of LNG Projects," Oil and Gas Journal, 2/20/84.
IEA = Natural Gas: Prospects to 2000, OECD/IEA, Paris, 1982.
Mueller = "LNG: A Prince or a Pauper?" by Donald L. Mueller, Vice President,
International Gas Development Corporation, presented 9/26/83, Calgary, Alberta,
Canada.
Vrancken = "The Exportation of Natural Gas," by Peter Vrancken, advisor to
Peeten LNG, Ltd. in The Economics of Natural Gas Development, Conference
Speakers' Papers, venice, Italy, 6/21 - 22, 1982, sponsored by Financial Times
and Jensen Associates, Inc.
Siegal & Niering = "Special Report on World Natural Gas Pricing," by Jeffrey
Siegal and Frank E. Niering, Jr , Petroleum Economist, 9/80.
LNG-6 = LNG Handbook: A Commemorative Publiscation of LNG-6, 1981. We are
indebted to JGC Corporation for this information.
Bonfiglioli and Cima = Cited in IEA, p. 125.
22
Canada, and Qatar will shown noticeable deviations from this estimate.
OCEAN-BORNE SHIPMENT OF NATURAL GAS
In analyzing costs of producing natural gas in the Asia-Pacific
region, the previous section demonstrated that they were below those in
North America, especially in the United States. The much lower
utilization of resources in the Pacific Basin is partly a function of the
high cost of transportation, which is by necessity accomplished through
the tanker shipment of LNG. Since there is substantial difference of
opinion as to the actual costs of delivering LNG, and a large degree of
uncertainty regarding the direction of future costs, a more detailed
examination is necessary.
Current Estimates2 1
The most concise estimates of current LNG costs are shown in Table
6. In section A, the estimates are shown in dollars as given, and in
section B they are converted to common dollars using the U.S. implicit
price deflator, although this index may not be the appropriate one for
inflating LNG costs.2 2 For a long-distance project, such as one from the
Persian Gulf to Japan, the analyses seem to be in rough agreement, at
least in given dollars, although the highest estimate is more than a
third higher than the lowest. A more detailed examination of the
analyses and of specific aspects of costs is provided below.
21 Examples of specific project costs will be discussed in more
detail in the section on cost escalation and in the appendix on proposed
projects.
22 '~
In point of fact, the dollars being used are not always made
explicit; in some cases, we have assumed them based on the time of publication.
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Table 7
Liquefaction Plant Costs Estimates
Source: Capacity
(mcf/d)
IEA 870
2600
Vrancken 870
870
Mueller 500
500
DiNapoli 1000
Brown & Root:
Phase I: 658
Phase II: 562
Phase III: 767
LNG-6
Base case 411
Middle Eas 548
Southeast 548
Capital
Capital Cost
Cost (per bcf/d)
(Million 1982$)
1160 1333
2899 1115
1300 1494
1500 1724
863 1726
1055 2110
1217 1217
1863
1132
1633
930
1395
1162
2833
2016
2129
2263
2545
2121
Sources:
IEA = Natural Gas: Prospects to 2000, International
Energy Agency, (Paris, 1982).
Brown & Root = "Trans Alaska Gas System:
Economics of an Alternative for North Slope Natural Gas"
(Anchorage, 1983).
DiNapoli = "Economics of LNG Projects," Oil and Gas
Journal, 2/20/84.
Vrancken = "The Exportation of Natural Gas", in
The Economics of Natural Gas Development (Venice, 1982).
Mueller = "LNG: A Prince or a Pauper" presented
in Calgary 9/83.
LNG-6 = LNG Handbook, a Commemorative Publication of LNG-6,
1981. We are indebted to JGC Corporation for this information.
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Table 8
Liquefaction Cost Estimates
($/Mcf)
LNG-6
DiNapoli
3 mt plant
6 mt plant
IEA
Bonfiglioli and Cima
OPEC
1.20
1.75
1.20
1.10
1.10-1.40
2.10
Sources: See Table 6.
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Liquefaction Costs
Estimates of the capital cost for a liquefaction plant are provided
in Table 7. (See the section on cost escalation for a list of reported
plant costs.) The variance is quite large, but can be partly explained.
Costs for construction depend in part on the region where the plant is
built and the size of the plant, both of which are discussed below, and,
as in the case with Phase I of the TAGS system, the extent to which the
system is being overbuilt to handle subsequent additions to capacity.
In addition, the assumptions about future inflation and interest rates
can substantially affect the estimated costs.23 The main reason for the
divergence seems to be the different size used, given the importance of
economies of scale. When these estimates are plotted for size and
cost/unit of capacity (see Figure 4), economies of scale can be seen.
Table 8 shows the costs per Mcf as derived by these and other
analysts.2 4 There does seem to be a certain convergence around $1.00/Mcf
plus fuel costs (discussed below), which are roughly $0.15-$0.30/Mcf,
depending on the assumption about prices to the liquefaction plant. In
fact, this agrees fairly well with the results of a survey performed for
this project of a number of Japanese gas distribution companies, trading
23
Exchange rate fluctuations play an important, but complex role,
and have not been considered here.
24 Unfortunately, the Mossavar-Rahmanis published a long paper (the
EIU report referred to on page 1) and a shorter excerpt ("OPEC Natural
Gas Projects Face a Bleak Outlook," Petroleum Intelligence Weekly,
3/19/84, pp. 7-8), which showed startingly different costs. The recent
publication of the book, The OPEC Natural Gas Dilemma, Westview Press,
1986, does not exactly resolve the estimate dilemma, since it repeats
both sets of costs. The lower costs are attributed to a 1980 OPEC study,
and the higher are said to be Iranian estimates (see pages 84-85). Based
on these estimates, the book provides a base case example for an LNG
project (p. 98), and these are the ones reported here.
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companies, construction companies, and large consumers (shown in Figure
5)25
Shipping and Tanker Costs
Table 9 shows a strong convergence on the question of shipping
costs, although the size of the ships employed does have some effect. In
fact, it indicates that capital cost estimates fall within a narrow
range, agree relatively closely with reported actual costs, and have not
changed much over time. Our survey indicated that costs have been
slightly less than the estimates shown in Table 9 (see Figure 6).
Regasification Costs
Regasification again produces close agreement, as seen in Table 10.
The only real difference is derived from a question of economies of
scale, with DiNapoli suggesting that a small import facility will be much
more expensive per unit of capacity. In this instance, however, our
survey respondents suggested costs were slightly lower (see Figure 7),
which may be due to cheaper construction costs in Japan than elsewhere.2 6
Conclusion: Costs per Mcf
Thus, it appears that current LNG costs are on the order of
25 Although the results indicate the cost level estimated by
respondents, the survey was carried out by indicating our estimates of
the different costs associated with LNG and asking respondents to differ
with them. This technique does produce a certain bias toward the
original estimate, which should be kept in mind when observing these
results.
26 Contrary to the tendency to agree with a provided estimate, as
mentioned in the previous footnote, our respondents largely disagreed
with our original estimate, which was $0.35/Mcf.
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Table 9A
Shipping Cost Estimates
($/Mcf/1000 miles)
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.16
Table 9B
Tanker Costs
Current $ (Million) Tanker Size (tcm) 1984 $/100 tcm
1965 U.K.-Algeria
1966 U.S.-Japan [50 total]* ?? same ??
1970 Algeria-W.E.
Brunei-Japan
General
1974 Algeria
1978 Malaysia
1982 IEA
Jensen
1983 DiNapoli 150
*Project 60% larger than U.K./Algeria. Assume three
Sources: See Table 6, and published reports.
DiNapoli
Mueller
Vrancken
OPEC
Year Country
13.2
13.3
12
16
332
248
50
27-30
28
302
120
75
87.6
95.7
120
100
92
76
125
150
160
125
149
130
142
144
100
ships.
161
30
Table 10A
Regasification Cost Estimates
($/Mcf)
OPEC
Di Napol i
3 mt
6 mt
IEA
Bonfiglioli
0.44
0.60
0.40
0.40
0.30-0.40
Sources: See Table 6.
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Table 10B
LNG Regasification Plant Cost Estimates
Million $ (Current)
16-20
50-90
450
650
543.4
Size (mcf/d)
48
484
484
968
1000
106 $/bcf/d
1,167
352
1,162
839
585
Sources: Published reports, and see Table 6.
Year
1965
1970
1982
Importer
Spain
U.S.
IEA
1983 DiNapoli
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Figure 7
REGASIFICATION COSTS
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Source: CEPR survey of Japanese companies.
6
U) 5
w(nz0
0
U) 4
w
03 3b.0
m
z 2
0 T
34
$1.00/Mcf for liquefaction, plus fuel, $SO.20/Mcf per 1000 miles of
shipping distance, and $0.35/Mcf for regasification (at least in
Japan).2 7 However, this does not address the difference in capital costs
by locale, economies of scale, fuel costs, and the future trend for LNG
costs, all of which are discussed below.
Cost Variance by Locale
Unfortunately, the costs of constructing a liquefaction plant cannot
be easily fixed, in part because of differences in construction costs by
geographical area. These are partly a function of differences in
construction costs in general, such as labor costs, land values, etc.,
and partly due to special circumstances relating to LNG, such as the
nature of the soil at a site and its suitability for use as insulation,
local safety regulations, etc. Since there have only been six
liquefaction plants constructed serving the Pacific market to date,2 8 and
since these plants were constructed at different times and under
different circumsances, it is not possible to provide a definitive
statement of the variance in liquefaction plant construction costs by
geographical location.
On the other hand, there are clearly differences, and it would be
useful to address them. In our survey, we asked the respondants to
estimate the difference between average liquefaction costs and those for
particular producing countries. The responses are shown in Figure 8,
27 Unlike the case for liquefaction, fuel, and other natural gas
losses (e.g., boiloff) are included in the shipping and regasification
costs because they are much smaller in those instances. A fuller
discussion of fuel costs follows.
28 Counting Arun and Badak in Indonesia as separate plants,
but not any subsequent additions to capacity.
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Figure 8
GEOGRAPHICAL VARIANCE IN
LIQUEFACTION COSTS
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which indicates that Australia and Qatar have higher than average costs,
presumably due to high labor costs, while the costs in the other
producing countries are fairly close to the base case.
Economies of Scale
It has long been argued that economies of scale in LNG projects are
substantial, thus reducing the motivation for countries with small
surplus natural gas reserves to exploit them. Again, the small number of
active LNG projects, and the fact that they all tend to be large,2 9
limits our ability to provide much empirical work on this subject.
However, a quick glance back at Figure 4 shows the obvious correlation
between size and estimated cost per unit.
The best work to date on this subject is that of DiNapoli, who shows
sharply declining costs until a fairly large size is reached. Figure 9
shows his estimates for liquefaction, regasification, and total costs for
different size projects. Overall, he estimates that for a 3,900 mile
distance, the cost of service falls from $4.21/Mcf for a 250 MMcf/d (90
Bcf/yr) project, to $2.41/Mcf for one eight times as large, or 2 Bcf/d
(730 Bcf/yr). (Most of the savings occur in the early stages of
scale-up.)
This is important for the development of natural gas reserves for
export in the Pacific Basin. Where large reserves are available, such as
Indonesia, projects are much more profitable than in countries with
exportable surpluses that are relatively small, such as Thailand. Since
the size of reserves can also be indicative of production costs, the
Most existing liquefaction plants are on the order of 4 to 6
million tonnes of LNG per year (200 to 300 Bcf).
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Figure 9
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effect can be even stronger than that shown in Figure 9. Thus, the small
producers must accept lower netbacks and are more vulnerable to falling
prices.
Fuel Costs
One of the most overlooked variables in the estimation of
liquefaction costs, as well as in overall LNG costs, is the price that
the project is charged for the natural gas it uses. Since LNG projects
use roughly 20 percent of the inputted natural gas for fuel and other
losses, the price charged for this fuel can make a substantial
difference.
For existing liquefaction plants, the fuel use appears to be
approximately 15 percent.3 0 (DiNapoli later argued that for new projects
it should be in the range of 8 to 10 percent, and the cost effects of
this will be shown below.3 1 ) For shipping, the best estimate is 0.125
30 The LNG-6 Handbook gives a figure of 13-15 percent, the OPEC Gas
Pricing Committee estimates 15 percent (MossavarRahmani, op. cit.,
p. 99), and DiNapoli's estimate puts it at 13.5-16 percent, in
"Estimating Costs for Base-load LNG Plants," Oil and Gas Journal,
11/17/75, p. 58. In Trans Alaska Gas System: Economics of an
Alternative for North Slope Gas, 1983 (hereafter referred to as the Brown
& Root report), the total system fuel use was put at 12.2 percent. (See
Economics section, p. 38.) According to Walter J. Mead, El Paso put
liquefaction plant fuel use at 5.34 percent of input volume. (Walter
J. Mead, with George W. Rogers and Rufus Z. Smith, Transporting Natural
Gas from the Arctic: The Alternative Systems, American Enterprise
Institute, 1977, p. 18.) This may reflect a semantic definition, since
approximately two-thirds of total natural gas use is for fuel, and the
rest is loss during storage and ship loading. See DiNapoli, ibid.
31 Robert N. DiNapoli, "Economics of LNG Projects," Oil and
Gas Journal, 2/20/84, p. 50. Industry sources have suggested that
electric drivers would reduce fuel use to 6-7 percent, with an
electricity cost of $0.15/Mcf. In areas where plant-gate natural gas
costs were high and electricity relatively cheap, electric-driven
compressors might be competitive. Alaska and Canada come to mind as two
possible examples.
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percent per day of shipping time,3 2 which at 18.5 knots would be
approximately 1 percent from Indonesia to Japan and 2 percent for Abu
Dhabi. Estimates of fuel use in regasification include DiNapoli's 1.5
percent, OPEC's 2.2 percent, and El Paso's 8 percent. 3 3 We will use 2
percent as a compromise between DiNapoli and OPEC.
Using the values of 15 percent for liquefaction, 0.125 percent/day
shipping loss, and 2 percent for regasification, Table 11 shows the cost
of fuel for an LNG project exporting to Japan from various points under
three different pricing assumptions. Naturally, since most of the use is
not distance related, there is little difference between them. However,
the price charged is very important, and can raise the price of delivered
natural gas from $0.20/Mcf to $0.90/Mcf.
Various analysts use different estimates for the cost of fuel.
Bonfiglioli and Cima performed sensitivity analyses from $2 to $4/Mcf,
while DiNapoli uses $1/Mcf as a base case for liquefaction feed (as does
LNG-6), but also performs sensitivity analyses with prices up to $3/Mcf.
For boiloff and ship fuel, he assumes prices equivalent to $34/barrel for
32 This is from DiNapoli (1984, p. 49). OPEC's estimate is
8 percent total, but this includes fuel use and does not indicate
the variation according to distance. (EIU, ibid.) El Paso estimated
losses at 1.59 percent for a 2000 mile (or 4--ay) journey, which would be
0.4 percent per day. The most authoritative estimate is from a brochure
describing the characteristics of new LNG tankers, entitled "Mitsui-Moss
Type High Performance LNG Carrier", from Mitsui Engineering &
Shipbuilding Co., Ltd., which describes boil-off rates at 0.25 percent
per day for existing ships and 0.12 percent per day for new, high
performance ships.
Mead puts the El Paso regasification fuel use at 0.08 percent,
but we assume that to be a typographical error. See Robert N. DiNapoli,
"Design Needs for Base-load LNG Storage, Regasification," Oil and Gas
Journal, 10/22/73, p. 70.
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Table 11
Cost of Natural Gas Used as Fuel
($/Mcf delivered)
A. $5/Mcf fuel price
Country
Persian
Gulf
Indonesia
Austral i a
Al aska
Canada
Malaysia
Thailand
Brunei
Li quef actionRegasi fi -
requirementscat ion
0.65 0.15
0.65
0.65
0.65
0.65
0.65
0.65
0.65
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
Boiloff Total
0.09 0.894
O.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.844
0.844
0.844
0.844
0.844
0.844
0.838
B. $3/Mcf fuel price
Country
Persian
Gulf
Indonesia
Australia
Alaska
Canada
Malaysia
Thailand
Brunei
Li quef act i onRegasi f i -
requirementscat ion
0.39 0.09
0.39
0.39
0.39
0.39
0.39
0.39
0. 39
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.09
Boiloff Total
0.07 0.551
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.513
0.514
0.514
0.514
0.511
0.511
0.506
C. $1/Mcf fuel price
Country
Persian
Gulf
Indonesia
Australia
Alaska
Canada
Malaysia
Thailand
Brunei
Li quef actionRegasi f i -
requirementscation
0.13 0.03
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.03
0. 03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
Boiloff Total
0.02 0.184
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.171
0.171
0.171
0.171
0.170
0.170
0.169
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oil. 3 4 Although the evidence from the OPEC Gas Pricing Committee is not
clear, it suggests that they consider $5/Mcf an appropriate value, since
it is the value they would otherwise receive for the gas when delivered
to the customer.35 However, since they are delivering most of the gas to
the liquefaction plant gate at a fraction of the cost of delivery to the
regasification plant, the revenues on the gas used for liquefaction are
substantially higher than for gas delivered to the LNG importer.
Although there is no logical justification for this, it does not make a
difference when the exporting country owns the liquefaction plant: It is
merely a question of where the profits are counted. It has, however,
served to raise the costs described for LNG projects by OPEC members to
justify the need for high prices.
If, instead, a project were to be charged for the fuel used
according to the cost of having delivered the fuel to the point of use,
including an appropriate return on capital, etc., then fuel costs would
change substantially. This is especially true since three-quarters of
the gas use is at the liquefaction plant, and production and delivery
costs have already been seen to be low. Table 12 shows the results of
such a strategy, suggesting that any price over $0.25/Mcf of delivered
gas would be rent, not costs for the project, depending on the field
production costs and vintage and type of equipment. Naturally, if a
producer had a use for the gas that would yield a higher value than
selling it for a 15-20 percent rate of return, the gas would not be
available. At present, though, this does not appear to be the case in
DiNapoli (1984) pp. 49-50. Bonfiglioli and Cima are cited in
International Energy Agency, Natural Gas: Prospects to 2000, (1982) p. 125.
35 Mossavar-Rahmani, op. cit., p. 97.
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Table 12
Cost of Natural as Used as Fuel
if Priced at Cost at Points of Use
($/Hcf)
Production/gathering costs:
(and price to liquefaction plant)
Cost of fuel used in liquefaction:
Cost of liquefaction:
Price on board ship:
Cost of boiloff losses
(Indonesia to Japan)
Cost of shipment:
(Indonesia to Japan)
Price at regasification point:
Cost of fuel used in regasification
Reference
Case
$0.500
$0.075
$1.000
$1.575
$0.032
High
Production
Costs
$1.000
$0.150
$1.000
$2.150
$0.043
$0,700 $0.700
$2.307 $2.893
$0.035 $0.043
Efficient
Liquefaction
Drivers
$0.500
$0.045
$1.000
$1.545
$0.031
Low
Boiloff
Rate
$0.500
$0.075
$1.000
$1.575
$0.016
$0.700 $0.700
$2.276 $2.291
$0.034 $0.034
Total cost of fuel used if priced
at cost: (cents per Ncf of
delivered gas)
Fuel use and shrinkage assumptions
Reference Efficient
Liquefaction 15Z 9Z
Boiloff .25/day .125ZJ/day
Regasification 1.5 1.51
14.1 23.6 11.0 12.5
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any of the LNG exporters.
Inflation of Capital Costs for LNG
One phenomenon that has troubled the LNG trade industry has been the
rapid increase in costs for capital equipment associated with the
shipment of LNG. Cost inflation has been particularly evident in the
case of liquefaction plants, but also regasification facilities. Tankers
have not been affected to the same degree, and the reasons are both
important and revealing.
It can be seen from Table 13 that the capital cost for capacity,
when normalized for size, has increased dramatically since the early days
of the industry. Of course, the costs for plants of different sizes in
different locations are not strictly comparable, but the inflation can be
seen also by comparing plants built (or proposed) in the same country at
different times. As Table 14 shows, even here costs have risen far
faster than inflation.36 For Alaska, the real inflation rate between
1966 and 1982 was 5.0 percent,3 7 while Algeria experienced 7.4 percent
between 1974 and 1978. In Indonesia, the other country where plants have
been constructed over a period of time, the rate of inflation has been
tempered by economies resulting from existing infrastructure.
Of course, it will be argued that this does not take into account
economies of scale. The liquefaction plants proposed first by El Paso
and now for TAGS are twice as large as that built to export natural gas
36 References to the inflation rate always refer to the rate as
measured by the implicit price deflator of the U.S. Gross Domestic
Product, reported annually in the Economic Report of the President.
Based on 1966 estimates for actual costs, and 1982 estimates for
the proposed TAGS liquefaction plant. See Petroleum Press Service, 8/66,
p. 307, and Brown & Root, p. 33.
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Table 13
LNG; Plant Costs
Year Country Cost in Current Million $ Size (mcf/d) 106 1984 $/1 bcf/day
1965 Nigeria 50 100-200 1,123
Algeria 87 150 1,738
1966 United States 50 140 1,037
1970 Venezuela 215 500 1.047
Venezuela 159 450 861
1974 Abu Dhabi 300 435 1,336
Algeria 850 1500 1,098
1975 Norway 304 435 1,238
1978 Iran 500 630 1,176
Malaysia 1000 870 1,703
Iran 762 400 2,822
Algeria 1500 2300 966
1982 Malaysia 2000 870 2,476
1983 Canada 2000 435 4,751
Sources: Published reports; many were estimates for proposed plants.
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Table 14
Area-Specific Project Inflation
First Second
Estimate Estimate
(1984$/1 bcf/d capacity)
$1062
(1966)
$1098
(1974)
$2330
(1982)
$1462
(1978)
Inflation
per year
(percent)
5.0
7.4
Sources- Published reports.
Area
Alaska
Algeria
A_
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from Cook Inlet. Using DiNapoli's estimates for economies of scale, they
should be 2.5 times cheaper per unit than the small one, instead of twice
as expensive.
Beyond the question of economies of scale lies the question of
technological maturation. The Kenai plant was the second LNG plant built
anywhere in the world, yet instead of the technology becoming better
understood and more refined, lowering costs, they have continued to
rise.3 8 This suggests that inflation has been even more severe than
indicated in Tables 13 and 14. Even without the question of
technological maturation, real costs for an Alaskan liquefaction plant
have risen by a factor of 5, 10.6 percent per annum, versus (and on top
of) a general inflation rate in the United States of 6.4 percent over
the same period.
This is supported by several other observations. Mueller estimates
that costs for a typical 500 Mcf/d liquefaction plant increased 8 percent
per year from 1970 to 1982, and over 10 percent per year from 1975 to
1982.3 9 Inflation in the latter period was twice the U.S. inflation
rate.
For regasification plants, similar trends can be observed. Table 10
included a handful of estimates gathered over time, and real inflation is
definitely present. Another indicator would be two estimates by
DiNapoli, seen in Table 15, in which the cost of a regasification plant
increased by 20 percent per year over the course of the late 1970s.
38 Of course, given the small number of plants that have been
built, large generational advances in technology have not had time to occur.
Donald L. Mueller, "LNG: A Prince or a Pauper?"
presented to Canadian Energy Research Institute, 9/26/83, p. 4. The
dollars are presumably nominal.
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Table 15
Regasification Cost Inflation
Item
Site development
Marine and unloading
Storage
Vaoprization
Seawater
Gas-fired
Auxiliaries
3/13/78
35.0
40.0
27.6
2.4
20.0
4/4/83
20.8
41.7
80.0
85.0
12.5
75.0
Inflation(% p.a.)
n.a.
3.5
14.9
25.2
39.1
30.3
Total Direct Cost 125.0
Indirect, 25%
Bare plant Cost
Contingency, 10% in 1978,
15% in 1983
Total erected plant cost
31.3
156.3
15.6
171.9
315.0
78.8
393.8
59.1
452.8
20.3
20.3
20.3
30.5
19.7
Sources: Raw data from "Costs are Estimated for LNG
Terminals," Robert N. DiNapoli, Oil and Gas Journal,
3/13/78, pp. 83-84, and; "LNG Costs Reflect Changes
in Economy and Technology," DiNapoli, Oil & Gas
Journal, 4/4/83, pp. 138-143.
In calculating inflation on the total erected
plant cost, site preparation is excluded from 1983
estimate. Plant used in 1983 adjusted for size.
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This extraordinary cost inflation creates problems for analysts and
project planners alike. The prospect that future costs will continue to
accelerate affects the time when a project should be developed, or
whether it should be developed at all. Or, if a deceleration is
possible, will it enable marginal projects to become viable? For buyers,
especially with other sources of energy becoming more competitive, future
cost trends are very important. How does one predict costs for projects
with long planning and lead-times with any certainty?
Unfortunately, there has been little analysis of factor cost
inflation in the LNG industry, mainly due to the small number of projects
involved and the difficulty in comparing them. However, there are other
industries and large-scale capital projects with which they can be
compared, and a body of evidence to explain what has happened in the past
decade. We feel that some indication of future trends can be provided
from these examples.
LARGE-SCALE CAPITAL PROJECT INFLATION
History
In the first place, it must be admitted that inflation rates were
very high during the 1970s. As can be seen in Figure 10, most of the
developed countries experienced a substantial increase in domestic
inflation rates during this period, although both the absolute and
relative rates differed markedly depending on the nature of the domestic
economy, the policies followed by the governments, etc.40
The extremely high inflation rates of the 1970s were, if anything,
See Knut Anton Mork, ed., Energy Prices, Inflation, and Economic
Activity (Ballinger, 1981) for an explanation of the impact on inflation
of oil price shocks.
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Figure 10
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magnified in the construction industry. Examples abound: The
construction of nuclear power plants, industry construction, oil
development--all soared in costs. One study, commissioned to discover
the reason for the high cost escalation in North Sea development
projects, examined petrochemical and steel plants, among others, and
found that high inflation had occurred generally in projects with a high
development component, not just in the North Sea.4 1
Many reasons were given, some of which are most appropriate to the
North Sea. These include:
(1) Inaccuracies in cost input estimates for projects with
known scope but high development content;
(2) Technical changes in project scope; and
(3) Changes4 n project method arising from additional
regulations.
Fortunately, there are a number of inflators that can provide some
indication of the extent of cost escalation in large-scale capital
projects generally, as well as the nature of the trends. The
U.S. government collects data on inflation in non-residential structures
and equipment, the category that presumably includes liquefaction
plants. In addition, private groups provide inflation indexes for
pipeline and refinery construction, the latter in particular resembling
an LNG plant in size and nature, though with important differences.
However, examining them can give us some direction for the impulses
41 See North Sea Costs Escalation Study, Part II, Peat Marwick
Mitchell & Co. and Atkins Planning, Energy Paper Number 7, Department of
Energy, London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 12/31/75, especially
page 35. Such problems are not limited to the OECD countries. Prime
Minister Ryzhkov of the Soviet Union recently complained that costs of
current construction projects were running 24 percent over estimates.
See "Soviet Premier, in Congress Talk, Criticizes Economy," New York
Times, 3/4/86, p. A6.
42 North Sea Costs Escalation Study, Part I, Department of Energy
Study Group, pp. 3-4.
51
behind LNG capital cost inflation.
Figure 11A shows the indices for non-residential structure, oil
pipeline construction, and refinery construction (materials only).4 3
Obviously, substantial inflation has occurred, but mainly resulting from
general inflation, as can be seen in Figure 11B, which shows the indices
corrected for inflation.4 4 Although the cost escalation of the 1970s is
readily observable, the fact remains that over long periods of time, real
inflation in capital costs has not been the norm. Periods of inflation,
although sometimes intense, have alternated with periods of deflation.
As Figure 11C shows, these periods have frequently coincided for the
different indices, with stretches when all three indices have moved
largely in the same direction. Table 16 lists these periods, their
duration, and the extent of the accompanying in(de)flation.
Certainly, the aforementioned factors which created the high cost
inflation for development in the North Sea had some impact on inflation
in other spheres, such as refinery construction, but there are obviously
other causes as well. These include:
(1) Lower productivity growth rates, resulting from:
(a) entry into the work force of larger numbers of new
workers, who were less well trained; and
(b) excessive rates of growth in a particular sector,
outstripping its ability to smoothly absorb and train new
workers;
(2) Learning curve effects, as unanticipated problems became
apparent and had to be resolved;
(3) Labor inflation, feeding back from economy-wide
inflation;
The refinery construction index includes a labor component,
which we have disregarded due to the fact that labor costs behave
differently from capital costs, and the foreign location of liquefaction
plants means that U.S. wage and productivity trends are not particularly
meaningful in this instance.
That is, divided by the U.S. implicit price deflator, yielding
the rate of change relative to the inflation rate.
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Period
Nelson Refinery 1930-37
Index (Materials) 1937-46
1946-57
1957-69
1969-81
1981-84
Non-Residential 1939*-57
Structures 1957-65
1965-81
1981-84
Morgan Oil 1960*-70
Pipeline Index 1970-81
1981-84
*First year of consistent data.
Sources: Oil and Gas Journal, and Economic Report of the President.
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Table 16
Duration
(Years)
8
9
11
12
12
3
18
8
16
3
10
11
3
% p.r.
+3.4
-2.9
+2.9
-1.2
+2.3
-2.6
+1.2
-1.4
+2.4
-3.3
-2.0
+2.8
-2.5
IPD
-1.5
+4.5
+3.6
+2.4
+7.0
+4.6
+4.7
+1.7
+6.2
+4.6
+2.9
+7.1
+4.6
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(4) Higher interest expense, as a result of:
(a) Higher interest rates; and
(b) Longer delays, due to public opposition and legal
challenges, and more regulatory interference, as
agencies responded to public interests changing from economic
growth and progress to more emphasis on safety and
environmental protection; and
(5) Demand-driven inflation, as the number of liquefaction
plants that were planned, ordered, and under construction
soared beyond the ability of the industry to meet them,
resulting in less efficiency, as well as higher prices simply
reflecting market pressures, and rent-capturing by groups at
all levels.
The first three effects are fairly general, and need not be
addressed here. However, the last two require more detailed attention.
Interest Expense
Throughout this analysis, real costs and interest rates have been
used, with the assumption that real interest rates, at least, do not
change. In fact, this has not proved to be the case in recent years, as
demonstrated in Figure 12. Real interest rates, defined here as the
corporate bond rate for Aaa rated issues minus the inflation rate as
represnted by the implicit price deflator for the U.S. gross domestic
product, were approximately 2 percent when the early LNG projects began,
but have recently risen to levels roughly four times higher as inflation
has fallen faster than interest rates.4 5 Nominal interest rates, those
charged to a given project, have also risen sharply, from 4.49 percent in
1965 to 12.71 percent in 1984.
Capital-intensive projects like LNG have been affected by this. As
it happens, the construction period for liquefaction plants is only about
Foreign interest rates do not correlate perfectly with those in
the United States for a variety of reasons, but have generally risen also
as a result of higher U.S. rates.
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two years,4 6 so the effect is less than for other projects, e.g., nuclear
power plants.47 Still, interest expense has grown to over 10 percent in
some cases, especially during the early 1980s, when nominal rates were at
a peak. When the TAGS report was published, an interest rate of 14
percent was assumed, which was roughly the prevailing Aaa corporate
rate. Since that time, however, nominal rates have dropped approximately
4.5 percent,48 meaning that interest expense for a liquefaction plant
would drop by about one-third, such that the final costs of building the
liquefaction plant would be $41 million cheaper (about 2 percent), all
else being equal. Since the price of LNG is not a function of the
prevailing interest rates, the cost of capital over the life of the
project would also be lowered under current interest rates than those
prevailing in the early 1980s. Since interest rates and discount
rates are closely related, net present value should be independent of
changes in the prevailing interest rate.
46
Brown & Root report, Exhibit A2. The total lead-time is
longer, but the pre-construction phase involves relatively small
expenditures.
As an example, the Brown & Root report estimated interest and
financing costs on the Phase I liquefaction plant at 12.2 percent of the
total nominal cost of the project. For nuclear power plants, a recent
OECD report put interest costs at up to 32 percent in the United States,
but only about 15 percent for most European countries. See Nculear
Energy Agency, Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, The
Costs of Generating Electricity in Nuclear and Coal Fired Power Stations,
p. 27.
As of March 14, 1986, rates had reached 9.53 percent, according
to the Wall Street Journal, but the short-term future remains
unpredictable.
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Demand-Driven Inflation
In the report on North American natural gas trade prospects,4 9
substantial attention was paid to the role of demand pressures on
drilling costs (rigs, services, etc.). Figure 13, showing the level of
liquefaction construction activity worldwide for the last two decades,
indicates a strong peak in the early 1980s. Whether or not this level
continues depends on the fate of a number of proposed projects.5 0
Demand-driven inflation is aggravated by the fact that relatively
few companies are involved in the building of liquefaction plants,
compared to other industrial ventures, and the plants are not
transferrable. That is, once a company has begun construction, everyone
is locked in. The plant cannot be taken out or moved, resold or traded.
The best indicator of this effect is the difference in cost
inflation for nonresidential structures versus durable equipment, as
shown in Figure 14. Since equipment can be imported, traded, etc., much
more readily than buildings and plants, the market is more competitive
and inflation is more moderate.5 1 The same phenomenon appears in the LNG
industry, where fixed assets (i.e., liquefaction and regasification
plants) have inflated in cost much more than non-fixed assets (i.e.,
tankers). The costs for tankers appear to have held steady for a
See especially pages 36-40.
The figure includes the North West Shelf project. Possible
expansion includes Thailand, Qatar, and the TAGS project in Alaska. A
two-year lead-time is assumed in the figure, as shown in the Brown & Root
report, although confidential materials on another project suggests a
three-year lead-time. This would not change the nature of the graph,
only the absolute level of the peak.
51 Of course, the construction industry is becoming more
competitive in the United States, with increasing examples of foreign
competition. See Fred Moavenzadeh, "Construction's High-Technology
Revolution," Technology Review, 10/85, p. 34.
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number of years, as was shown in Table 9.52
If demand-driven inflation simply meant that prices for plants went
up while costs stayed constant and profits increased, then prices would
easily fall back when demand was reduced. In fact, however, the rents
represented by those profits are likely to be captured at various points
and by different actors, from producer to builder, from worker to manager
to government official.
First, it must be pointed out that "rent-capturing" is not a simple
concept. There is no line item that represents rent-capturing by
contractors, regulators, suppliers, etc., in a project's budget. The
term rent-capturing includes such things as:
o Padding expenses, including transferring expenses from
other projects to a lucrative one, or having that project bear costs that
are not directly attributable to it.
o Corruption, including payoffs to local officials, as well
as skimming of funds within the project by officials of the operator.
o Less efficiency in terms of allowing payrolls to grow.
o Less resistance to wage demands from labor.
o Higher payments for royalties and land acquisition.
Before describing specific examples of rent-capturing, it must be
acknowledged that it is not necessarily illegal or even unethical. If an
LNG supplier provides LNG to a buyer at a fixed price, it is immaterial
to the buyer if the supplier uses the profits to offset other expenses.
In such instances, the parties injured are the poor analysts who see
inflated project cost estimates.
Another form of rent-capturing is, of course, corruption.
Naturally, there is little or no data on this aside from occasional cases
that have been prosecuted in the United States, or scandals where a
specific payment made for preferential treatment may come to light. It
52 Based on a variety of published reports.
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has been said publicly that kickbacks in the U.S. oil-field supply
industry have inflated drilling costs 30 to 40 percent in some cases.53
While it would be chauvinistic to assume that corruption is worse
in Third 'World countries, it would be foolhardy to assume that it
is less than in the United States. One benchmark is a recent comment by
a Pemex official, who ascribed 15 percent of Pemex's costs to union
malpractices, which are institutionalized in the Mexican system.5 4 Since
"malpractices" are hardly confined to the union, then management
corruption could easily double this. While it is difficult to compare
Mexican corruption in a quantitative manner to the countries under study,
it suggests that, at the least, a fraction of the reported costs of a
liquefaction plant is probably due to payoffs and kickbacks, the share
being larger during boom times than during the current lean times.
Inattention to inefficiencies is another problem. As one official
put it recently, "During the boom, everybody had a lot of money and
really didn't pay much attention to drug and alcohol abuse. Now,
everybody has to tighten up and it's starting to attract a lot of
attention. Everyone is looking at the bottom line."5 5
At the same time, costs might be unintentionally increased by
cutting back on things like safety and maintenance. One recent story
reported that, in order to cut down on drilling time, at least one
See "Oil-Field Investigators Say Fraud Flourishes, from Wells to
Offices," Wall Street Journal, 1/15/85, p. 1. The citation is from a
U.S. attorney in Oklahoma City. It was also suggested by an industry
official that efforts to end corruption were just beginning.
See "Mexico Suffers Greatly as Oil Prices Decline but Debts
Linger on," Wall Street Journal, 10/9/85, p. 26. The official was
actually arguing that 5 percent was too small to clean up, given the
political costs.
From "Drugs Offshore," Offshore, 1/86, p. 31.
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operator had illegally conducted certain operations at night, resulting
in an accident that took the life of a driller. 5 6
When analyzing costs for a project, this type of cost must be
considered a transfer payment, much like land bonuses. They will always
exist, and will expand and contract with the level of rents to be had.
EXPECTATIONS OF FUTURE COST INFLATION
Trends
A number of the factors driving costs up in the 1970s were
temporary. For example, with lower interest rates, the interest costs
for a lengthy construction project will be diminished. Also, the work
force is growing older and should show better productivity in the future,
at least in the United States. For the present, regulatory impact seems
to have levelled off in most countries, either because of a political
backlash against regulatory agencies or because the particular
technologies have reached an "acceptable" level of control or
understanding.57 All of the indexes for the large-scale capital projects
shown earlier (Figures 11A-C) have turned downward since their 1981
peak. This suggests that a period of deflation is ahead, which could
last a decade and see real costs fall by a total of 20 percent.
More important for near-term behavior is the lack of demand-driven
inflation and the return of what can only be described as severe
56 See "Safety Last: Job Deaths and Injuries Seem to be Increasing
After Years of Decline," Wall Street Journal, 3/18/86, p. 1.
Of course, since political attitudes affect this very strongly,
regulatory pressures could once again become a major force.
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competition in the construction industry.5 8 While the pipeline cost
index has flattened out in the last few years, reported project costs
have fallen substantially, as Table 17 shows. Although the number of
companies that can build a liquefaction plant is smaller than those that
can build, say, a bridge, the deflation that has occurred in other
large-scale capital projects should also become visible for liquefaction
plants.5 9 This could result in sharp, near-term decreases in costs for
new projects. Certainly, the world surplus of LNG tankers should hold
those prices down. At worst, cost trends will be moderate, and at best
they will move downward sharply.
In our survey of Japanese companies involved with LNG, the
expectations were for the opposite. Although a few foresaw short-term
decreases in costs, most expected real long-term costs, at all phases of
LNG projects, to be 5 to 15 percent higher than at present.
Impact of Technology
In our previous paper, the role of advancing knowledge and
technology in preventing the rise of mineral costs due to resource
depletion was mentioned extensively. LNG projects, viewed as
58 Note that little effort is made to address the impact of
exchange rate fluctuation on costs for overseas construction projects.
Given a liquefacation plant built in Malaysia by a team of
American/Italian/Japanese contractors, for example, the effect is
difficult to measure. However, with prices for the output in
U.S. dollars, and plants built (potentially or actually) by foreign
contractors, costs should be moderated by a strong U.S. dollar, as was
observed in the past several years. The weaker U.S. dollar should reduce
the expected moderating cost trend, but the extent is difficult to gauge.
59 Examples include a Thai petrochemical plant, for which the final
bid for a series of contracts was less than half the projected amount
(Oil and Gas Journal, 10/14/85, p. 64) and the Bosporus bridge project,
which came in 15 percent below the expected level. Wall Street Journal,
5/29/85, p. 18.
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Table 17
Trends in Pipeline Construction Costs
A. 1983
Length Diameter
(mi 1 es)
48.6
74.1
158.0
58. 6
60.6
10.5
3560.0
23.0
B. 1984
(miles)
22.5
217.6
155.3
29.6
86.5
112.0
23.8
C. 1985
(mi 1 es)
5.4
4.1
81.0
11.1
322.5
(inches)
48
42
42
42
42
36
36
36
(inches)
42
42
36
36
30
30
30
(inches)
42
36
36
36
36
Cost
(million $)
135.0
131.2
313.0
68.2
129.0
7.9
536.0
20.0
(million $)
21.4
291.2
157.1
30.8
79.2
73.8
15.1
(million $)
6.6
10. 1
51.0
8.5
251.7
($/inch/mile)
57,870
42,157
47,167
42,068
50,684
20,999
41,358
24,155
($/inch/mi le)
22,686
31,863
28,100
28,953
30,510
21,964
21,184
($/inch/mile)
28,887
67,931
17,476
21, 154
21,680
Source: Oil and Gas Journal, Pipeline Economics
issue, various years.
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manufacturing processes rather than as resource exploitation, should see
the down pressure of technical advance and increasing productivity
without the upward pressure due to depletion.6 0 Certainly, moves such as
increased efficiency of fuel use in liquefaction plants should bring
noticeable cost savings, but it is difficult to point to specific design
changes and technical advances that will become important in the next
decade or two.6 1
To date, most of the research seems to focus on making small or
inaccessible fields viable. With oil fields, ships are now available
that can dock at a mooring point and allow the undersea facility to
produce directly into their tanks. Some efforts have been made to do the
same for natural gas fields, in one instance suggesting floating methanol
plants.6 2 There has also been the suggestion that the offloaded LNG
could be used to create liquid nitrogen, which could be loaded into the
tanker and used to liquefy gas at the field without requiring a separate
liquefaction plant.6 3
However, these innovations are not useful in the Pacific Basin,
where the fields tend to be large and cheap to produce. Advances
applicable to them, i.e., more efficient liquefaction technology, and
60 The cost pressure from depletion comes at the natural gas
production stage and was discussed in the section on production costs.
61 It might be easier for an engineering/construction firm to point
these out, however.
62 See Magne Ostby and Arild N. Nystad, "Floating Plant Could
Convert Gas to Methanol Economically," World Oil, April 1980, pp. 49-53.
The plant was intended to float off an oil production platform and use
associated gas that would otherwise be flared.
63 Obviously, there would be thermal losses, which would be
an added cost. Most Japanese LNG importers currently utilize the
cold energy derived from regasification.
-
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cheaper construction or insulation, are not currently known.
Since a number of companies which received our survey are involved
with the development of equipment used in the LNG industry, it seemed
only natural to survey them regarding technological advances whose
introduction they anticipated. Naturally, no company is likely to
release trade secrets, but given the lead time on developing this type of
equipment, even such items as were publicly known would have an impact
only over the next decade.
In fact, there was little to suggest major cost breakthroughs. The
main item mentioned was a plan to recapture boiloff gas from tankers and
either reliquefy it or burn it as fuel. However, the cost savings for
the delivered LNG do not promise to be great.
Appendix A
REPORTED GAS FLOWRATES BY COUNTRY
(MMcfd)
A. Indonesia
nonassociated gas
29.4
24.0
23.9
20.8
19.0
12.5
10.4
7.1
6.1
4.0
3.28
2.2
condensate gas
39.5
28.7
27.8
22.7
19.3
15.5
10.0
9.7
7.0
6.0
nonassociated and
condensate gas
39.5
29.4
28.7
27.8
24.0
23.9
22.7
20.8
19.3
19.0
15.5
12.5
10.4
10.0
9.7
7.1
7.0
6.1
6.0
4.0
3.28
2.2
associated gas
22.5
21.2
10.0
9.6
7.1
3.1
2.5
1.6
1.5
1.5
1.5
-
A-2
B. Thailand
nonassociated gas
76.0
34.6
27.6
27.6
18.0
15.7
14.0
9.3
condensate gas
68.8
37.0
30.1
30.0
28.6
28.0
26.0
18.7
12.0
10.8
9.4
3.5
nonassociated and
condensate gas
76.0
68.8
37.0
34.6
30.1
30.0
28.6
28.0
27.6
27.6
26.0
18.7
18.0
15.7
14.0
12.0
10.8
9.4
9.3
3.5
associated gas
2.0
A-3
C. Australia
nonassociated gas
65.2
57.0
34.4
32.3
22.7
18.7
16.3
11.3
11.0
11.0
11.0
9.5
9.5
9.3
8.5
8.5
8.0
7.7
7.6
7.5
7.2
6.9
6.6
6.33
6.1
6.0
6.0
6.0
6.0
5.5
5.4
5.4
5.0
4.1
2.0
1.7
0.8
condensate gas
39.2
27.0
15.4
8.22
7.4
4.7
1.06
0.9
nonassociated and
condensate gas
65.2
57.0
39.2
34.4
32.3
27.0
22.7
18.7
16.3
15.4
11.3
11.0
11.0
11.0
9.5
9.5
9.3
8.5
8.5
8.22
8.0
7.7
7.6
7.5
7.4
7.2
6.9
6.6
6.33
6.1
6.0
6.0
6.0
6.0
5.5
5.4
5.4
5.0
4.7
4.1
2.0
1.7
1.06
0.9
0.8
associated gas
7.9
3.9
2.9
2.2
2.0
1.2
1.0
A-4
D. Aggregate Flowrates
INDONESIA
Mean Flowrate
Standard Deviation
21.3
25.6
AUSTRALIA
13.7
19.1
THAILAND CONSOLIDATED
29.6
37.1
19.6
26.8
Source: Calculated from Tables A-C. Original data from World Oil and
Petroleum Economist, 1980-85.
Appendix B
DEVELOPMENT COSTS
Malaysia
Central Luconia Field
announced development cost
Development Cost
1. development cost 1.5
2. reserves 13
3. production rate 650
4. equivalent annual operating cost 330
5. development cost in ground 0.115
6. developing-operating cost as sold 0.508
($B)
(Tcf)
(Bcf/year)
($MM)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
Sources:
1. total cost (development and LNG plant): International Petroleum
Encyclopedia, 1984; cost of LNG plant: Petroleum Economist, 4/1982;
development cost escalated from $82 to $84 using IAAP drilling index; LNG
plant cost not escalated.
2. Petroleum Economist, 2/1982.
3. Q = aR assume a = .05
4. 22 percent of development cost (i = .12 + a = .05 + op = .05).
5. c = development cost/reserves.
6. operating cost/production rate (line 4/line 3).
NOTE: Data n.a. to calculating theoretical development cost.
B-2
China
Yacheng Field
announced development cost
1. expected development cost 400 ($MM)
2. reserves 3000 (Bcf)
3. production rate 127.75 (Bcf/year)
4. depletion 0.016
5. annual development-operating cost 74 ($MM)
6. development cost in ground 0.133 ($/Mcf)
7. development-operating cost as sold 0.579 ($/Mcf)
Sources:
1,2,3 from Wall Street Journal, September 30, 1985, p. 25.
4. a = 0.016 to satisfy equation Q * (1-exp (-aT)) = aR and Q = 127.75,
T = 30 T = 30 from Wall Street Journal
5. 18.6 percent development cost (1 = .12 + a = .016 + op = .05)
6. c = development cost/reserves
7. operating cost/production rate (line 5/line 3) * developing-operating
cost as sold = 0.587 $/Mcf a = .05 Q = ar
calculated development cost
1. well depth 13000
2. average cost/well 13000 off La. 4.2 ($MM)
3. number of wells 12
4. total well cost 50 ($MM)
5. dryhole and nondrill cost 50 ($MM)
6. pipeline cost 30" 65 miles 77 ($MM)
7. total development cost 177 ($MM)
8. depletion rate 0.016
9. annual development-operating cost 33 ($MM)
10. development cost in ground 0.059 ($/Mcf)
11. developing-operating cost as sold 0.258 ($/Mcf)
Sources:
1,3. Wall Street Journal, op.cit.
2. Joint Association Survey, T-84.
5. Adelman and Ward.
6. Adelman and Ward, pipeline costs. Adjusted to $84 using Morgan
pipeline costs indices dimensions in Wall Street Journal, .cit.
8. a = 0.016 to satisfy equation Q * (1-exp(-aT)) = aR and Q = 127.75.
T = 30 T = 30 from Wall Street Journal.
9. 18.6% development cost (1 = .12 + a = .016 + op = .05)
10. c = development cost/reserves
11. operating cost (line 9)/Q Q = 127.75 Bcf/year * development-operating
cost as sold = 0.260 $/Mcf with a = .05 Q = aR.
B-3
Thailand
"B" STructure
announced development costs
1. development cost 536 ($MM)
2. reserves 5.8 (Tcf)
3. production rate 290 (Bcf/year)
4. annual development-operating cost 118 ($MM)
5. development cost in ground 0.092 ($/Mcf)
6. developing-operating cost as sold 0.407 ($/Mcf)
SOURCES:
1. International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1980, adjusted to 1984 $ with
IAPP index.
2. International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1980.
3. Q = aR, assume a = .05.
4. 22 percent of development cost (i = .12 + a = .05 + 0- = .05).
5. c = development cost/reserves
6. operating cost/production rate (line 4/line 3).
calculated development cost
1. well depth 8000
2. average cost/well 8000 off La. JAS 2.5 ($MM)
3. total # of wells 40
4. total well cost 100 ($MM)
5. pipeline cost at 32", 115 miles 144 ($MM)
6. dryhole and nondrilling costs 100 ($MM)
7. total development cost 344 ($MM)
8. annual developing-operating cost 76 ($MM)
9. development cost in ground 0.059 ($/Mcf)
10. development-operating cost as sold 0.262 ($/Mcf)
Sources:
1,3. International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1980, maximum well depth.
2. Joint Annual Survey, 1979, adjusted to 1984 $ by IAAP index.
5. Adelman and Ward pipeline costs adjusted to 1984 $ by Morgan pipeline
cost index dimensions in International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1980.
6. Adelman and Ward.
8. 22 percent total development cost (1 = .12 + a = .05 + op = .05)
assume a = .05
9. c = total development cost/reserves
10. c = operating cost (line 8)/Q Q = aR = 0.05 * 5800 = 290 Bc/year.
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Appendix C
PRODUCER COUNTRY OVERVIEWS
This appendix provides a brief description of the situation in
the different producer countries, in order to allow for a more complete
analysis of the potential for future gas exports. In the instances where
information on specific proposed projects is available, some analysis of
the viability will be performed.
Potential future consumption in producing countries is difficult to
analyze, because much of it depends on the level of investment undertaken
to displace oil consumptioon. Converting a power plant, refinery, or
cement plant can result in a large, sudden increment to consumption, so
that past demand trends are not particularly useful in analyzing future
trends. However, given the desire to find some means of using the gas
without incurring the large transportation costs of an LNG project, most
countries are examining various forms of domestic utilization. For the
nations with small reserves, this will affect their ability to export LNG
in the future.
Even so, small nations like Qatar are limited in their ability to
absorb gas domestically, poor nations like Thailand are unable to make
massive investments in energy-intensive export industries, and diverse
nations like Indonesia will find it uneconomic to develop a residential
distribution network, given the low level of consumption per household
and the high capital costs. This sort of information is useful in
describing the potential for natural gas exports.
C-2
In discussing the various projects, costs must, of course, play a
prominent role. Unfortunately, as mentioned in the main body of this
report, so few liquefaction plants have been built, at widely different
times and places, that definitive estimates are not possible. The
uncertainty is enhanced by the current highly competitive market for the
construction of such projects, which could lead to lower costs in the
short run.
Thus, the capital and unit costs for delivered natural gas should be
considered indicative, rather than definitive. This project has relied
heavily on reports in the trade press, as well as confidential feedback
from those in the industry, but these have varied widely. In addition,
given the effect of differences in the amount of development time needed,
interest rates paid by participants, liquids production,1 savings from
existing infrastructure, and similar factors, a large degree of
uncertainty is present. Since the margin for error on capital costs are
so uncertain, this appendix does not employ rigorous project analysis
techniques. Instead, cost per Mcf in a given project are determined
using the shorthand method described in the North American report, which
yields a good approximations.2
Alaska
In our previous report on the subject, it was estimated that
1 In a few cases, the projected level of liquids to be produced are
known, but in most instances they are not.
This method is translated as:
Cost per Mcf = C(d) * (i+a+C(o))
where C(d) is total capital costs, i is the interest rate, a is the
depletion rate, and C(o) is the operating cost factor. Throughout, we
have assumed i at 12%, a at 5, and C(o) at 5%. Thus, the cost per Mcf
is 22% of the capital cost.
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the cost of delivering natural gas from the wellhead at Prudhoe Bay to
the citygate in Japan, i.e., including regasification, was between
$2.55/Mcf and $4.60/Mcf, with a bias toward the low end. Since that
time, there has unfortunately been no new information concerning project
costs,3 although feedback from the report has tended to be positive.
The question now becomes: Will the price of oil be high enough to make
this project viable, especially if price discounts are necessary to
increase market penetration in Japan? Given the quantities of LNG
involved, optimism about the level of demand in the Asia-Pacific region
is necessary. These questions are addressed in further detail in
the section on demand.
Australia
For this report, the domestic gas industry will be essentially
ignored and the focus instead centered on the North West Shelf project,
especially its plans to export LNG to Japan beginning in 1989. The
domestic gas industry involves a large number of relatively small
deposits in the south and east, which supply the population centers
there. The local surplus appears to be small relative to other producing
areas in Asia, although depressed prices have acted to reduce drilling.
However, the main consuming centers of the country are in the
southeastern corner of the continent; the distance to them and the lack
of any developed areas in between has meant that this gas could not be
commercially exploited until the oil price increases of the 1970s, and
particularly the development of the LNG market. In order to access a
3 A number of studies are underway at the present time, but
nothing has, as of yet, been reported.
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domestic market large enough to use even a fraction of the gas to be
produced,4 a 1500 kilometer pipeline had to be built. The relatively
small volumes being shipped result in higher per-unit costs than for a
similar transportation distance in, for example, North America.
With approximately 10 Tcf of reserves available and a small domestic
market, it seems only natural that an LNG project would be developed. As
of late 1985, a contract was signed calling for 5.8 million tonnes per
year (290 Bcf) of LNG to be shipped to Japan beginning in late 1989, and
plateauing in 1995. The cost of the project has been put at as much as
A$8.5 billion (about US$6 billion), including production, liquefaction,
and shipping.5 Other sources suggest that the cost will be somewhat
higher, but include capital expenditures on fields that will occur in the
latter half of the 1990s.6 These sources put the cost of building the
liquefaction plant at $2.7 billion, substantially higher than our "base
case," and attribute the difference to the addition of supporting
infrastructure for the local area.
Although these costs are rather high, especially relative to
projects established in the 1970s, the project has the potential to be
quite profitable. Partly this is due to the associated production of 1.5
million tonnes of condensate, which consists of one-quarter the volume of
the LNG, but a higher fraction of the revenues of the project, due to the
The contract called for 400 MMcf/d to be delivered, but the
demand estimates turned out to be optimistic, partly due to the
subsequent failure to attract energy-intensive industry to the area. At
present, the amount consumed is only about 250 MMcf/d (according to
Financial Times Energy Economist, June 1985, p. 2.
Oil and Gas Journal, 12/19/83, p. 67.
6 Industry sources.
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lower transportation costs for condensate.7 Naturally, the price of oil
will determine the profitability, but even at $3/Mcf for landed LNG,
($18/barrel for crude oil) the project appears profitable.8
In fact, profitability may be enhanced by a recent discovery
off the North West Shelf, which indicates a high level of condensate.
The well tested at 38 MMcf/d of gas and 4,670 b/d of condensate, four
times that of any other discovery in Woodside's concession area.9 If
this field is brought on line as part of the LNG export project, then
condensate production would be on the order of 5 million tonnes per year,
rather than 1.5. Although the relative costs are not available at this
point, from a standpoint of relative profits, the project could become a
condensate field with LNG exports as a byproduct. Figure C-1 shows the
relative level of revenues for LNG and condensate depending on the two
possible levels of liquids production.
Brunei
Possessed of small reserves (7.4 Tcf) and little opportunity
for domestic consumption, Brunei turned to LNG exports very early. With
low production costs and a presumably cheap liquefaction plant, delivered
cost to Japan is probably on the order of $2/Mcf or less. Expansion is
unlikely without major new reserve additions, and since current
7 In fact, in most markets condensate is worth about the same as
oil, since it can be used as refinery or chemical feedstock, but in the
Asian market, delivered natural gas is also worth as much as oil
(roughly). If the project were aimed at the U.S. or European markets,
the liquids would become much more important. Information on the cost of
extracting the liquids is not available, however.
8 Ignoring taxes, royalties, and other transfer payments, and
pricing the condensate accordingly.
9 International Gas Report, 11/8/85, p. 10.
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REVENUE
1.2
1.1
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
FOR THE NORTH
(BY PRODUCT)
WEST SHELF
1989 1994 1999 2004 2009
+ CONDENSATE (LOW)
Z0
_1
m
_1
0 CONDENSATE (HIH)0 LNG
C-7
exploration is limited, this is unlikely in the near future.
Canada
The Canadian natural gas supply situation was discussed at some
length in the previous report, along with the Western Canada LNG export
project. Since then, the LNG export project has been cancelled, due to
pricing uncertainties resulting from the recent plunge in oil prices.
Inasmuch as our last estimate of costs showed the project to be marginal
at $28/barrel for oil prices, lower prices certainly would be damaging to
its prospects, even with lower, reestimated costs.10
Indonesia
With its exports currently running at 700 Bcf/yr. (with an
additional 100 Bcf/yr. to Korea coming onstream later this year),
Indonesia is by far the largest LNG exporter in Asia. Highly productive
gas fields, (Arun wells produce at 170 mcf/d,1 1 n times our reference
cost case shown in Table 5), and existing infrastructure (production
capacity exists to add 300 Bcf/yr. of production without significant
expenditures1 2 mean that capacity additions will be among the cheapest
sources of LNG in the world. Mlotok estimates that the original Arun
plant delivers LNG to Japan for a cost of $1.40/Mcf 1 3, and the recent
10 An industry source recently suggested that the pipeline and
liquefaction costs would be on the order of $2.50/Mcf. Production and
shipping would add about another $2/Mcf.
Paul Mlotok, "The Oil Industry in the Far East: Indonesian Oil
and Gas," Salomon Brothers, Inc., October 1984, p. 7.
Industry sources.
3 Ibid., p. 6. Excluding regasification.
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expansion, while undoubtedly more expensive for reasons discussed in the
main body of this report, will remain relatively cheap, on the order of
$2/Mcf. New capacity might cost as much as $3/Mcf, including shipping
and regasification and depending on construction costs.
With 40 Tcf in natural gas reserves, little potential for domestic
utilization, and talk of another 150 Tcf in the Natuna field,14 Indonesia
is still actively seeking to increase its production and exports of LNG.
Malaysia
With approximately 10 Tcf of associated gas reserves and 43 Tcf of
nonassociated gas reserves,1 5 Malaysia has limited options beyond LNG
exports. Although Malaysia has been attempting to encourage exploration
and development of its oil resources, it has been hindered by an apparent
desire to cooperate with OPEC in holding down production to help
stabilize prices. This could have an impact on foreign oil companies'
future drilling, reducing the unintentional discovery of natural gas.
Even so, current reserves would support a substantial increase in
consumption. Production costs appear low, and the liquefaction plant, at
about $2 billion,1 7 was not cheap, although well within reason. The
result is an estimated cost of delivered natural gas to Japan of about
14 See International Petroleum Encyclopedia 1985, p. 96.
15 See "Gas Opens a New Era," Petroleum Economist, 2/83, p. 47. In
addition, 25 Tcf of probable gas reserves are listed, with a 50 percent
probability basis. Reserves have changed little since.
16 Discovery of gas in the search for oil has been quite common in
Malaysia, with Esso Production Malaysia Inc. hitting gas in 65 percent of
the structures it has drilled. See International Petroleum Encyclopedia
1985, Pennwell Publishing, p. 102.
17 Oil and Gas Journal, 2/14/83, p. 82.
0W
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$2.75. With existing infrastructure in place, future expansion should be
cheaper, making new projects quite competitive.
Current government plans include the intent to increase gas
consumption significantly, in three phases, to replace as much as
190,000 barrels per day of oil consumption.18 The Trengganu Gas Project
involves the production of 150 Bcf/year of mostly associated gas for
domestic consumption, peaking in 1989, and another 50 Bcf/yr. is to be
sent via pipeline to power stations in Singapore.1 9 While this will
increase marketed production by two-thirds over the LNG project, it will
still leave the depletion rate at about 1 percent. Plans to increase the
amount of energy-intensive industry such as petrochemicals or even
establish a gas-fired synthetic fuel plant, even if brought to fruition,
would increase consumption, but only slowly and at a small rate relative
to gas reserves.
Thailand
Given the current reserves level of 5.4 Tcf2 0 and domestic
consumption level of 350 mcf/d, it might seem odd that a consortium has
been formed to analyze the feasibility for LNG exports to Japan. In
reality, Thailand's reserves are understated by pricing and development
disputes with the operators. For example, Exxon has an undeveloped
onshore field with 1.6 Tcf of estimated reserves, with no market, and
Texas Pacific's holdings include only 1.9 Tcf of proved reserves, but
18 Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 5/28/84, p. 7.
19 See "Gas Opens a New Era," Petroleum Economist, 2/83, p. 47, and
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 1/13/86, p. 8.
20 Oil and Gas Journal, 12/30/85, p.66.
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5.4 Tcf of probable reserves.21 The government's indecision over
whether to keep its natural gas reserves for domestic consumption
or export them as LNG, and its perceived uncooperative attitude toward
the foreign oil companies, has resulted in long delays in field
development and reduced commitments from oil companies. Texas Pacific,
in fact, is now seeking to sell its acreage and deposits to the
government.2 2
23
The existing surplus of natural gas, combined with the existence
of a number of gas fields that could be exploited, has led to the
formation of a consortium to consider a small-scale LNG export project.
The members are Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Marubenu on the
importing side, and Thai LNG Co., a government promoted Thai firm, on the
domestic side.2 4 The project is still in the exploratory stages, and
although $9 billion has been mentioned as the possible cost, the amount
and source of the gas to be committed has not yet been mentioned.
Inasmuch as previous projects were on the order of two to three million
tonnes of LNG per year, with cost estimates of $3 billion, give or take
$500 million, the new consortium apparently has something more grandiose
in mind.
The costs of natural gas production for offshore Thailand, based on
initial reports of the Erawan field, are shown in Appendix B. Subsequent
problems with the field, reflected in the downward revision of reserves
21 Oil and Gas Journal, 9/2/85, p. 36.
22 Wall Street Journal, 9/5/85, p. 36.
23 Union's fields are operating at 78 percent of capacity, due to
constraints on processing plant capacity.
4 Oil and Gas Journal, 11/25/85, p. 51.
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by two-thirds, resulted in the need for additional drilling and raised
costs, although reports on the exact amount vary from "more than $1
billion" to $2.1 billion.2 5 At those levels, the delivered costs of the
gas to shore would be on the order of $1 to $2/Mcf. Since the gas
separation plant cost $320 million and delivers 770,000 tonnes of liquids
a year, it is obviously quite profitable.2 6
On the other hand, the suggested LNG project capital costs are quite
high. Assuming $3 billion for a 3 million tonne project leaves the cost
of delivery at $4-5/Mcf.2 7 Also, given a perception in the oil industry
that the government of Thailand has been less than accommodating, the
risk factor on this project may be viewed as higher than in other areas.
With weak oil prices, and high costs and risks, this project does not
appear strong.
Qatar
The North Dome natural gas field is the largest field known outside
of the Soviet Union, with an estimated 150 Tcf of reserves. In fact, the
field is so large it dwarfs any potential use for it, even ignoring the
fact that the region is awash with unused natural gas. As a result,
exports offer the only hope for realizing the major portion of the value
25
See Oil and Gas Journal, 8/26/85, p. 37, and Petroleum
Intelligence Weekly, 12/10/84, p. 11. The discrepancy could include
differences in whether or not exploration expenditures and the gas
separation plant are included. The reports are not specific enough to be
enlightening about this.
26 Assuming that annual capital and operating costs are 25 percent
of total capital costs, the cost per tonne is roughly $100, less than
half of 1985 prices for LPGs.
27 If field development costs are not included in the capital cost
figure, then $1/Mcf must be added.
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of the field.
Unfortunately, Qatar is as far from the major natural gas consuming
markets as possible.2 8 On top of that, construction costs in the Middle
East are among the highest in the world.2 9 As a result, the project
costs are put at $6 billion by most observers, although this includes a
large quantity of liquids production.30 No publicly available breakdown
of costs is available at present, partly because the project is still in
early planning phases, but at least a portion of the project costs are
for the initial phase of the project, which involves production for the
domestic market.
The cost of producing 300 Bcf of natural gas has been put variously
at $500 million to $1.5 billion.3 1 Production costs appear to be on the
order of $0.50/Mcf, and liquefaction about $1.75/Mcf (including fuel).
At the same time, the 1.75 million tonnes per year of condensate and .7
million tonnes per year of LPG should yield revenues equating to about
$0.20-$0.40/Mcf, depending on the level of oil prices. However, given a
28
The potential for exports to Europe will be dealt with in the
next phase of this project.
29 For example, the cost of building some of the petrochemical
plants in Saudi Arabia has been described as twice as high as in Western
Europe or Japan. See John Cranfield, "Downstream Ventures Face the
Test," in Petroleum Economist, 12/85, p. 445. In our survey of Japanese
companies, respondents suggested that costs in Qatar would be 20 percent
higher than average.
30 It should also be noted that, to the extent that OPEC members
are faced with production quotas, LNG provides an outlet for hydrocarbon
production, even if with much lower profit margins, and the associated
liquids are not covered by quotas.
31 Unfortunately, neither source can be cited, but the latter
source appears to be more credible, while the former number seems to be.
Given the size of the field and the shallow waters involved, production
costs should be very low. The two estimates suggest roughly $0.40/Mcf to
$1.20/Mcf.
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shipping distance of about 7,800 miles, shipping costs will be about
$1.60/Mcf. Thus, delivered costs will be between $3.50/Mcf and
$4.50/Mcf, depending on the offset from sale of liquids, etc.
While it might be possible to reduce some capital costs in the
prevailing competitive construction environment, Qatar cannot be moved
any closer to markets. Thus, it will remain at a cost disadvantage to
the other low-cost producers for some time to come. Strong oil prices
would render this unimportant, but such a scenario is difficult to
predict at present.
U.S.S.R. (Sakhalin)
In 1977, a Japanese consortium found oil and gas off Sakhalin
Island, and plans to export the natural gas to Japan have been under
consideration since then. (The U.S.S.R. has little domestic need for the
gas. For the purposes of this report, potential gas exports to Asia from
new deposits or from inland areas will not be considered.) The project
would involve the export of 3 million tonnes of LNG (150 Bcf) per year,
and the overall costs have been put at about $4 billion.3 2
The resulting costs are higher than the Thai project, and the
harsher environment and lower level of operations suggests a potential
for more uncertainty about costs, as well as higher operating costs.
Whether or not the Soviet government is considered more benign to
32 At present, a definitive project plan does not exist, but
various estimates range from $3 billion (Jonathan P. Stern, Natural Gas
Trade in North America and Asia, Gower Press, 1985, p. 201), to more than
$3.3 billion, from Tadahiko Ohashi, "An Analysis of the Future of Natural
Gas in Japan," to $3.8 billion (confidential academic sources) and $4.5
billion in a confidential industry memo, which was drawn from open press
sources. It is interesting that the Japanese estimate is one of the
lowest, given the reported reluctance of Japanese gas companies to
participate in this project.
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resource development is a question for the importers to answer.
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INTRODUCTION
This is a brief description and overview of the Pacific Basin
liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade model which has been developed as part of
the M.I.T. Center for Energy Policy Research (CEPR) project on
international gas trade. The primary purpose of the model is to provide a
consistent framework for determining the least-cost program of meeting
alternative projections of LNG demand in the Pacific basin. Here, a
program refers to the time pattern of production, exports, and investment
in extraction and liquefaction capacity in each of the producing countries.
Another objective of the model is to help determine the financial flows to
and from buyers and sellers associated with particular programs and price
projections. In the future, it may be possible to extend the model to
examine the question of what would be the optimal level of LNG demand for
Japan or other regional purchasers. But the feasibility of this extension
will depend on data availability, from which explicit price-sensitive
demand functions could be estimated.1
As presently formulated, the model does not determine the time path
of LNG demand itself. Rther, these are taken as projections derived as
part of the demand study of this project. Of course, the model can be
solved repeatedly to investigate what would happen if demand grew more or
1 This was the procedure used for the North American model, which attempted to
simulate market behavior using functions representing U.S. demand for Canadian
exports as a function of price, and various parameters about Canadian costs,
reserves, and tax policy.
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less rapidly. The model then examines all possible means for meeting these
LNG demands, and then selects the one which has the lowest present value
cost.
Collectively, the set of possible programs is referred to as the
feasible set. The constraints given to the model determine which programs
are and are not feasible. Some constraints are technical, such as those
related to reserve size or technical limits to production in different
areas. Other constraints might represent policy interventions on the part
of one or another government in the regions. These would include possible
upper or lower bounds on production or exports. There also may be
contractual constraints representing commitments to deliver or buy from a
certain country, even though that may not be the least-cost source. While
it may be assumed that the technical constraints are fully predetermined,
the others are subject to public and private policy and might vary from run
to run of the model.
The costs associated with each program are calculated on the basis of
cost estimates developed as part of the project. These include investment
in extraction capacity, extraction operating costs, liquefaction operating
costs, investment in new liquefaction plants, LNG transportation costs, and
operating and capital costs of regasification. These are discounted and
summed to derive the present value cost of each program for meeting demand.
A linear programming algorithm is used to find the least-cost program.2
There is no presumption that the least cost solution is the most likely to
emerge in the future. Rather the purpose is to ascertain the cost of
deviations which may be due to government interventions, diversification
objectives, pre-existing contractual relationships, taxation policy, etc.
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In addition, the model includes various accounting identities used to
determine the net financial flows of each program as a function of the
price for LNG which the purchasers pay, as well LNG project financing
arrangements. The purchase price can be different for exports from
different countries to different destinations. These differences would
result from contractual arrangements that utilize different pricing
formulas.
LNG production and exports and required new investment levels are
calculated at periodic intervals beginning in 1985 and continuing until
2015. In the earlier years, the time intervals are shorter (three years in
length), while five-year intervals are used for the later years.3 This
long time horizon is required to account fully for the long investment lags
and long operating lives of major capacity expansion projects. Dynamic
relations are also important because production in earlier periods affects
marginal production costs in the future. Because of well-known and
inevitable problems with terminal conditions, we report results only
through 2006.
The remainder of the paper is divided into three sections. In the
next section, the algebraic formulation of the model is presented and
discussed. The internal pricing structure of the model is reviewed in the
following section. The final section reviews illustrative results.
MODEL FORMULATION
In technical terms, the model is formulated as a mathematical
programming problem in which a computer algorithm is used to find the
This is a convenience adopted to save on computer time.
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optimal time path of the values of the endogenous variables (e.g., exports
from each country, investment in new liquefaction plants, etc.). We report
on the present formulation of the model. It should be understood that this
modelling framework is considerably more flexible in the sense that
additional constraints, projects, producing regions, policy interventions,
etc. could be added. Indeed, as the model is used, it will be important to
make modifications based on initial results and enhanced perceptions of the
issues that need further investigation.
The model includes eight supplying countries that could supply the
Pacific market with LNG. These are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Gulf countries, Thailand, and Alaska. When required, the
model can differentiate between more than one supply region in a particular
country. Thus, on the supply side it is important to keep track of what is
occurring at both the country and regional levels; the latter is a finer
breakdown. Table I presents a full list of supply regions, existing
capacity for gas production, and relevant costs data which are used in the
simulations. LNG demand arises from two possible sources: Japan and an
aggregation of other countries such as South Korea and Taiwan. The model
also keeps track of other (non-LNG) demands for gas.
The model is described in more detail in the following sub-sections.
The format in each section will be to provide the underlying motivation of
the constraint and describe it specifically in words and algebraic
equations. In general, endogenous variables are represented by capital
letters and parameters by lower-case letters. Bars over letters indicate
exogenous variables. The subscripts "i","j", "m", and "t" refer to the
producing regions, producing countries, export markets, and the time
period, respectively. All quantities are in Bcf units, except where noted.
W4-
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Supply-Demand Balances
We begin with the identity that total gas production in each
producing region is used either for export in the form of LNG or for
deliveries to the local market of that country. These supply-demand
balances are expressed in the following relationship:
Total Domestic Total
Production = Deliveries, + Exports,
Region i from Region i from Region i
Let X i t represent annual production in region i in year t; DS ij t
represent deliveries to the domestic market in country j; and EX. standit
for total gas exports from region i in period t.4 Algebraically, we have:
(1) Xi t = DSi.j t + EXi t
For each country, j, we require that total deliveries of gas from
each of the producing regions equal total domestic demand for gas. That
is:
Domestic Sum of 1
Demand, Deliveries, from
Country, j All Regions i, in country
Note that these domestic demands for gas are projected exogenously, and
could in many cases be zero. Defining total domestic demand as Dj,t, the
following equation is used, where the summation includes only those
producing regions i which are in country j:5
4
Gas is exported as LNG after going through a liquefaction process.
5 We also allow the possibility that some regions, perhaps for location
reasons, cannot supply the domestic market at all. In those cases, all output
is dedicated to LNG exports. In all cases, production and delivery variables
are constrained to be non-negative.
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j,t = ZDSi,t
i
Supply-Demand Balance of Export Markets
In addition to satisfying domestic gas demand, the model has the
following constraints that insure there are sufficient LNG exports, from
all the supplying regions together, to meet projected demands in Japan and
the "Other" Asian markets. That is:
Total LNG Deliveries
to Market m
year t
m,]
Now we define a new export variable E t to be the LNG exports
originating from all regions i and being delivered to market m in year t.
The total demand for natural gas in market m is given by D t.
Algebraically:
(3) EEim,t Dm,t
i
To insure that everything balances, we specify that that the sum of
deliveries to all markets from region i equals total total LNG exports from
that regions. That is:
(4) CEi,m,t = EXi,t
m
For each country, the following two equations determine total LNG exports
to each market m, Ej m,t, and total LNG exports, EXjt.
(5) Ejmt = Ei,m,t
i
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(6) EXjt = EEXit
i
Note that in equations (5)-(6), the summation includes only those regions i
which are in country j.
Production-Reserve Relationships
There is a recursive relation between production in any one period
and remaining reserves in the next period. That is:
Region i at = Region i at - of Years -
Start Period t Start Period t-l per Period
_~e~ion air
n
in
Defining R i t as reserves in region i at the start of period t and
remembering that periods are n years in length, the equation form is6:
(7) Ri t = Ri,t-l nt Xi,t-l
The following constraints represent a simple approximation to the
limitations on annual production imposed by the level of remaining
reserves. That is, production in each region can be no greater than an
exogenously specified fraction of reserves left in that region.7
Region
of
Annual
Production
in Region i, <'
Period t-1
6 The number of years in a period can vary. Balances are computed more
frequently in the early years.
We recognize that the technical relationship between production and reserves
is more complicated, but have adopted this formulation for its simplicity. If
data were available, it would not be difficult to substitute more complex
equations.
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These maximal rates, apt' can represent technical/engineering limits or
more restrictive policy interventions. Initially, technically imposed
bounds are assumed.
(8) Xit i< ai Ri,t
Production-Investment Relationships
Annual production in each region is also constrained by available
productive capacity, which in turn depends on previously undertaken
investment projects. 1985 extraction capacity is predetermined, but
endogenous investment activities allow that to be augmented at constant
capital costs per unit production in each region. That is:
[
Annual
Production
in Region i,
Period t
I
Production
Capacity
in Region i
Period t-1
Let Ki t stand for capacity to produce in re
stand for new capacity introduced in period
relationships:
Capacity
+ Created
in Region i,
Period t
gion i in year t, and 4Ki t
t. We then have the following
M"
Xi,t < Ki t
Kit +AKit
Liquefaction Capacity Constraints
LNG exports from each region must go through a liquefaction process,
which implies that existing capacity in any period puts an upper bound on
total exports from that LNG region. In addition to what exists in the base
year, new capacity can be created through investment activities. That is:
(9)
(10)
0-
Ki t-
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Annual LNG
Exports
from Region i,
Period t
Li
< i
Capacity
+ Created
in Region i,
LPeriod tCaact
Defining KLi t andAKLt t as liquefaction capacity and additions in region
i in period t, we have the following relationships which are akin to (9)
and (10):
(11) EXi,t < KLi,t
(12) KLi,t +AKLit
However, in contrast with expansion of extractive capacity,
liquefaction plants are subject to economies of scale. That is, larger
plants have lower unit capital costs. But, taking advantage of these may
imply excess capacity in some periods, which also has a cost. Here, we
assume that each region can invest in plants that come in only two sizes, a
"large" plant capable of producing 6 million tons (300 BCF) per year and a
"small" plant half that size. Capacity expansion is expressed in the
following relationship:
Capacity
Created
in Region i,
Period t
Number Number
of Small Size of of Large Size of
Plants * Small + Plants * Large
Installed, Plants Installed Plants
Period t Period t
·.~ r ,mii
Defining NSi,t and NLi,t as the number of small and large plants installed
in region i in year t, and ss and sl as their respective sizes, we have the
following algebraic relationship:
KLi,t = ss NS , t + sl NLi t
= KLi~-
(13)
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Regasification Capacity Constraints
Finally, the model also has constraints that insure there are
sufficient regasification facilities available in each market to meet the
total LNG imports in each period. These constraints are fully symmetric
with those for gas production. New investment activities are chosen to
insure that these constraints are met. That is:
Annual Regasificationl Capacity
LNG Imports < Capacity !+ Created
in Market m, in Market m, in Market m,
Period t Period t-1 Period t
Let KGm t stand for regasification capacity in market m in year t, and
AKGm t stand for new capacity introduced in period t. We then have the
following relationships:
(14) D t < KG t
(15) KGm,t = KGm,t_1 + AKGmt
Cost Calculations
The model considers three types of out-of-pocket costs. These are:
(1) the operating (or current) costs of gas production, liquefaction, and
regasification; (2) the capital costs associated with investment and
capacity expansion in extraction, liquefaction, and regasification; and (3)
shipping costs of taking LNG from a producing region to market. The unit
costs of each of these are projected exogenously. First consider operating
costs.
Extraction 
Operating
Costs, =
Region i
Period t
Total 
on Annual
ng * Production
Region i,
I i Period t
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Liquefaction Unit Total
Operating iquefaction Annual LNG
Costs, = Operating ! Exports
Region i Costs, Region i,
Period t Region i Period t
Regasification Unit
Operating Regasification
Costs, Operating
Market m Costs,
Period t Region i
m.II· ·
Total
Annual LNG
. Imports
Market m,
Period t
Define OCt as total operating costs in year t, ocp i as unit operating
costs of gas production in region i, OCf i as unit operating costs of
liquefaction plants in region i,8 and ocrm as unit operating costs of
regasification plants in market m. The following equation defines total
operating costs:
OCt = 2ocp,iXi,t
i
+ Ecf,iEXi,t
I·
+ -OCr,mDm,t
m
Similarly, shipping costs are determined as linear functions of
exports from source i to market j. That is:
Shipping
Costs,
from Region i
to Market m,
in Period t
Unit LNG Exports
= ~Shipping from Region i
Costs, · to Market m,
from Region i Period t
to Market m
-~~~~ Peio
Total shipping costs are the sum of the costs from each producing to each
consuming area. SCt is defined as total shipping cost in period t and
sci m is the unit shipping cost to market m from region i. That is:
8 We assume here that large and small plants have identical unit operating
costs. The model can be run with different assumptions.
(16)
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(17) SCt = EESCimEimt
m i
Annual capital costs are a function of the three types of investment
that occur: extraction, liquefaction, and regasification. The unit costs
are projected exogenously, and the investment levels are endogenous.
Extraction Unit Increased
Capital Extraction Production
Costs, = Capital * Capacity
Region i Costs, Region i,
Period t Region i LPeriod t
Liquefaction Small Unit Number of Small 
Capital Liquefaction Liquefaction
Costs, = Capital * Plants added
Region i Costs, Region i,
Period t Region Period t
Large Unit Number of Large
Liquefaction Liquefaction
+ Capital Plants added
Costs, Region i,
Region i Period t
Regasification Unit Increased
Capital Regasification Regasification
Costs, = Capital * Capacity
Market m Costs, Market m,
Period t Region i Period t
Define INt as total investment costs in year t, ccp i as unit capital
costs of gas production in region i, clf i as the cost of a large
liquefaction plant in region i, csf, i as the cost of a small liquefaction
plant in region i, and ccr,m as unit capital costs of regasification plants
in market m.9 The following equation defines total investment costs:
To account for terminal conditions and the long life of investments, the
capital costs near the end of the planning horizon are truncated.
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(18) INt = ccp, Kit + clf,iNLi,t + Ecsf NSit+ Eccr m KG, t
i i m
Objective Function
The objective function represents what the model is attempting to
achieve, or how it selects among alternative programs that are feasible in
the sense that all constraints are satisfied. Here, the model is asked to
find the feasible program with the lowest discounted present value cost.
Define TDC as the total discounted costs of any solution, and kt as
the discount factor applicable to period t.1 0 This total is calculated
using the following equation:
(19) TDC - ktOC t + SCt + INt ]
t
PRICE STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL
In technical terms, the model is formulated as a mathematical
programming problem in which a computer algorithm is used to find the
optimal time path of the values of the endogenous variables (e.g., exports
from each country, investment in new liquefaction plants, etc.). We report
on the present formulation of the model. It should be understood that this
modelling framework is considerably more flexible in the sense that
additional constraints, projects, producing regions, policy interventions,
etc. could be added. Indeed, as the model is used, it will be important to
make modifications based on initial results and enhanced perceptions of the
issues that need further investigation.
10 In principle the discount rate need not be constant over time. Also,
different discount factors could be applied to different flows if these
differed substantially in their risk characteristics.
m
-
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In addition to solving for the endogenous variables described above
(technically called primal variables), the programming algorithm also
calculates a set of implicit or "shadow" prices (dual variables). Each
constraint or equation has a shadow price associated with it that
represents the marginal cost, in terms of whatever objective function is
being used, of that constraint. These are calculated based on the model's
internal cost structure and are used in determining the optimality of any
intermediate solution. In effect, the model knows that an optimal solution
is found when: (a) all variables that are positive in the solution have the
property that the marginal benefits (MB) from increasing that variable by a
little bit exactly equal the marginal costs (MC) of doing so, and (b) there
are no variables for which marginal benefits exceed marginal costs."l
These costs and benefits are calculated using the shadow price structure.
The shadow prices also have the useful property that they can be used in
evaluating specific projects outside the model itself, so long as those
projects are not too large.
By way of illustrating how the shadow price structure works, here we
examine the interrelations among a few key prices and variables. Consider
first the costs and benefits of exporting a small additional amount from
region i to market m, that is, variable E im t. This variable appears in
equations (3), (4), and (17).12 The shadow prices associated with each of
these equations or constraints can be used to perform a cost-benefit test
on whether this variable should be increased or decreased. The cost of the
These are known as the complementary slackness conditions and hold for all
constrained optimizing problems.
12 Equation (5) is merely an accounting identity and does not have a shadow
price here so it is ignored.
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LNG is the shadow price of equation (4). To this must be added
transportation costs, which are sci m times the shadow price of the
shipping cost equation (17). This must be compared with the implicit value
of gas exports to market m, which is the shadow price of equation (3). If
the total cost of increasing Em t , calculated this way, is less than the
marginal cost elsewhere, then the model will choose to increase these
exports and reduce them elsewhere.
The next step is to see what determines the marginal cost of LNG in
region i. Here we examine the equations where EX.it appears. Natural gas
is purchased implicitly at the shadow price of equation (1). To this are
added the operating costs and capital rental charges of liquefaction, from
equations (16) and (11) respectively. 1 3
The cost of gas delivered to the liquefaction plant (Xi,t ) can also
be derived. Here equations (1), (7), (8), (9), and (16) are used.
Marginal operating costs of extractions are ocp i times the shadow price of
equation (16). Annual capital rental charges for equipment are the shadow
prices associated with equation (9). Together these form total out-of-
pocket marginal production costs. In addition to these, there are "user"
costs related to resource depletion. These appear as the shadow prices of
constraints (7) and (8). The shadow price of (8) is the value of being
able to produce one more unit from a low-cost reserve in which production
is constrained by an upper limit related to remaining reserves. The shadow
price of (7) represents the cost of limiting future production from the
13 Because we allow for economies of scale in liquefaction investment, there
may be excess capacity in some periods, implying no capital rental charge.
This is consistent with the "sunk cost" rule. As with any economies of scale
model, frequently not all capital charges can be explicitly allocated.
Technically, there are shadow prices associated with the constraints that
liquefaction plants are added only in integer units.
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reserve because depletion now decreases the upper bounds on possible
production in later years.14
If any of these constraints are not binding, the shadow prices of
those constraints of course are zero. In general, low-cost reserves will
have relatively high user costs to the extent that production and exports
from them are limited. At the other extreme, truly marginal producing
regions will have zero user cost.1 5
In a similar way, the full price structure of the model can be
readily analyzed. Using the shadow price structure, it is possible to
evaluate the economics of alternative investments, cost structures, or
export possibilities not included in the model itself, by using the model's
shadow prices as inputs in a discounted cost-benefit calculation.
RESULTS
In this section, we illustrate how the model can be used to analyze
the factors determining least-cost supply patterns and marginal costs of
delivering LNG. In particular, we review six cases designed to highlight
the effects of changes in demand growth, pre-existing contracts, and
diversification strategies.
The simulations utilize data developed as part of the supply and
demand parts of this study. Table 1 summarizes the cost data for each of
the potential producing regions. Operating and shipping costs are annual
charges per Mcf, while the capital costs for gas extraction and
14 In the marginal cost-benefit test, this shadow price is multiplied by the
number of years in a period.
15 The output of the model also includes implicit costs of production for
regions which are not producing because their marginal costs exceed those of
other regions. This allows the user to examine questions of competitiveness.
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liquefaction represent to total cost of the equipment required to produce
at the rate of one Mcf per year. These data do not always correlate
exactly with the analysis in the supply chapter for several reasons,
including differences in format. For instance, pipeline costs are included
as part of extraction costs rather than as a separate item. Where liquids
are produced as a byproduct of an LNG project, the expected profits are
subtracted from liquefaction or extraction costs, and are not included in
the numbers shown in Table 1.
Where actual data exist on projects under consideration or in
operation in particular regions, they have been used. But much of this
data is confidential and cannot be cited extensively. In other cases,
published data have been used, although sometimes in modified form. Where
neither published nor unpublished data for a specific region were
available, costs were estimated subjectively on the basis of similarities
with similar projects elsewhere.1 6
A final word of caution on the data: There is great uncertainty about
costs for projects in newer areas that have not been developed. Not only
can capital costs diverge from predicted values, but the data available on
the amount of liquids in some fields or the development costs for fields
that are not fully delineated (Thailand being a perfect example) are very
poor.
Tables 2-5 illustrate how the model can be used to investigate the
sensitivity of supply patterns and the marginal cost of LNG to faster or
slower rates of demand growth. Case A, which we use as a reference case,
corresponds to the demand projections made by MITI in 1983. Here, LNG
16 For details, refer to discussions in the supply chapter.
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demand rises from 1482 Bcf in 1986 to 2000 Bcf in 1995 and 2483 Bcf in
2010.17 The total discounted value of the investment, operating, and
transportation costs associated with meeting these levels of demand most
efficiently comes to $13.7 billion.
In this case, increased LNG demand is met first by shipments from
Malaysia, which is the lowest cost marginal supplier.1 8 After 1995,
Indonesian production and exports begin to expand as Malaysian output
reaches limits imposed by availability of reserves. It is only in 2010
that additional LNG from outside the region (from the Gulf and Canada)
become economic to exploit. The last box in Table 2 presents the time path
of the shadow price of LNG delivered to Japan and regasified. This price
includes shipping costs, operating costs of extractions and liquefaction,
annualized capital charges, and user costs.1 9 These latter represent the
costs of having to move from lower- to higher-cost reserves. We see that
for Case A the marginal cost of gas to Japan starts in 1986 at $2.35 per
Mcf and increases quite slowly until the late 1990s. Between 2000 and
2010, the marginal cost would increase by 50 percent as LNG from more
expensive locations such as Canada come on stream.
17 In addition, all cases specify LNG demand in Korea and Taiwan increasing to
250 Bcf by 1989 and then remaining at that level.
18 Extraction and liquefaction costs are assumed identical in Brunei,
Indonesia, and Malaysia. However, Brunei does not have the reserves to expand
current production, and Malaysia has a slight shipping cost advantage over
Indonesia.
This cost is not necessarily the same as the price that Japanese consumers
actually pay since it does not include any taxes, subsidies, or pure profits.
Instead, it represents a measure of the true opportunity cost of the gas
delivered to Japan.
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Cases B, C, and D represent higher and lower levels of LNG demand
growth in Japan. The effects of slower demand growth, as forecast by the
Petroleum Association of Japan in 1985, are shown in Table 3. In this
case, demand grows so slowly that all increments through 2010 can be met
from the lowest-cost marginal source, Malaysia. However, from 1995 on, the
shadow price of gas begins to rise because the model sees beyond 2010 when
additional increments can no longer come from Malaysia.
If demand were to grow more rapidly, higher-cost sources would be
needed sooner, and marginal costs would rise correspondingly. Demand
levels for Case C are assumed to be 20 percent higher than in Case B.
Although Malaysia remains the marginal supplier initially, additional
Indonesian production is required in 1992. After 1995, the Gulf region is
the marginal supplier, with Canada beginning to export in 2010. Case D
represents a "super-optimistic" scenario, with LNG demand increasing by 7
percent annually until 2000 and afterward by 3 percent a year. This has
the effects of moving up in time the increased production from Indonesia,
the Gulf, and Canada. Australian production is required by 2010.
In Cases A-D, the model is allowed to find the least-cost pattern for
meeting the required demand without any constraints on how much or how
little should be delivered from any one region. Cases E and F are meant to
illustrate how the model can be used to estimate the costs of any
deviations from the unconstrained outcome. Using the same levels of LNG
demand as in Case A, Case E simulates the impact of forcing the model to
honor all existing contracts, which includes delivery of 300 Bcf per year
from Australia beginning in 1989. We know this has to be more costly,
since these deliveries were not chosen in Case A. As shown in Table 6,
this results in a $1000 million increase in total discounted costs because
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higher-cost Australian LNG is used at the expense of exports from first
Malaysia and later Indonesia. Note, however, that the rate of increase in
the marginal cost of gas is slower than in Case A because lower-cost
reserves are available for use at a later date.
The potential costs of a supplier diversification strategy are
summarized in Table 7. In this case, we specify that no country can expand
LNG deliveries to account for more than 25 percent of the Japanese market.
This has the effect of slowing the rate of increase of exports from
Malaysia in the near term and from Indonesia later on. The exports lost by
these countries is made up for by deliveries from first the Gulf and later
Canada. The additional costs of this strategy are quite modest, in the
range of $700 million, because the cost differences between the lowest-cost
areas (Malaysia) and others is not very large.
In closing, we again caution that these results are meant to be
illustrative of the model's workings. They are highly sensitive to the
specific cost data for each region and to the exogenous demand projections.
These data indicate that marginal costs do not rise very sharply unless
demand grows extremely rapidly. Different results would result if the data
contained in Table 1 were revised substantially with wider differences
across regions.
_F
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Table 1
Pacific Region LNG Trade Model: Cost Data
Initial Gas Extraction Liquefaction Shipping
Reserves Capacity Capital Operating Operating Capital to Japan
(TCF) (BCF) ($/MCF) ($/MCF) ($/Ton) ($/Ton) ($/MCF)
INDONESIA 40.0 700 1.75 .08 17.5 400 300 0.80
BRUNEI 7.3 260 1.75 .08 17.5 400 300 0.63
MALAYSIA 50.0 300 1.75 .08 17.5 400 300 0.75
THAILAND 6.0 4.75 .20 25.0 500 375 0.75
ALASKA 2.0 50 6.00 .30 17.5 800 350 0.83
CANADA 3.6 4.75 .20 27.5 600 400 0.83
AUSTRALIA 15.0 3.25 .15 22.5 600 450 0.83
GULF 150.0 103 1.76 .10 20.0 465 350 1.65
NOTE1: Capital cost refers to upfront investment charges per unit of
annual productive capacity installed.
NOTE2: Operational and shipping costs refer to annual charges incurred
per unit of output.
NOTE3: For Liquefaction Costs, the first amount is for plants with
3MT capacity; the second term is for plants with 6MT capacity.
-
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Table 2
Pacific Region LNG Trade Model: Case A
SCENARIO ASSUMPTION
MITI83 DEMAND
Discounted Costs of Scenario =
(Billions of $)
Total LNG Exports
(BCF per Year)
1986
INDONESIA
BRUNEI
MALAYSIA
ALASKA
CANADA
GULF
Total
Shipments
- JAPAN
- KOREA
& TAIWAN
700
260
469
50
103
1582
1482
100
1989
700
260
869
50
103
1982
1732
250
1992
700
260
1030
50
103
2143
1893
250
1995
700
248
1149
50
103
2250
2000
250
Shadow Price of Regassified LNG Delivered in Japan
($ per MCF)
1986 1989 1992 1995 2000 2005
3.01 3.13 4.18
$13.7
2000
822
186
1238
50
103
2399
2149
250
2005
1029
140
1238
50
103
2560
2310
250
2010
1047
105
1238
40
110
193
2733
2483
250
2010
2.35 2.38 2.42 2.92
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Table 3
Pacific Region LNG Trade Model: Case B
SCENARIO ASSUMPTION
PAJ85 DEMAND
Discounted Costs of Scenario = $10.8
(Billions of $)
Total LNG Exports
(BCF per Year)
1986 1989 1992 1995 2000 2005 2010
INDONESIA 700 700 700 700 700 700 700
BRUNEI 260 260 260 248 186 140 105
MALAYSIA 409 702 797 879 968 1041 1114
ALASKA 50 50 50 50 50 50 40
GULF 103 103 103 103 103 103 103
Total
Shipments 1522 1815 1910 1980 2007 2034 2062
- JAPAN 1422 1565 1660 1730 1757 1784 1812
- KOREA 100 250 250 250 250 250 250
& TAIWAN
Shadow Price of Regassified LNG Delivered in Japan
($ per MCF)
1986 1989 1992 1995 2000 2005 2010
_________________________________________________________________________
2.35 2.37 2.832.33 2.85 2.87 3.23
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Table 4
Pacific Region LNG Trade Model: Case C
SCENARIO ASSUMPTION
OPTIMISTIC DEMAND: 1.2 * PAJ
*********+**4*****.***4.4**..s& 4.ssi
Discounted Costs of Scenario =
(Billions of $)
$17.6
Total LNG Exports
(BCF per Year)
1986
INDONESIA
BRUNEI
MALAYS IA
ALASKA
CANADA
GULF
Total
Shipments
- JAPAN
- KOREA
& TAIWAN
700
260
561
50
103
1674
1574
100
1989
700
260
1154
50
103
2267
2017
250
1992
813
260
1296
50
103
2522
2272
250
1995
953
248
1296
50
103
2650
2400
250
2000
953
186
1296
50
344
2829
2579
250
Shadow Price of Regassified LNG Delivered in Japan
($ per MCF)
1986
2.40
1989
2.43
1992
2.50
1995
3.09
2000
3.56
2005
3.70
2005
953
140
1296
50
583
3022
2772
250
2010
953
105
1077
40
131
924
3230
2980
250
2010
5.04
ow
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Table 5
Pacific Region LNG Trade Model: Case D
SCENARIO ASSUMPTION
SUPER OPTIMISTIC DEMAND: ***
1986-1999: 7% A YEAR
2000-2010: 3% A YEAR
Discounted Costs of Scenario =
(Billions of $)
Total LNG Exports
(BCF per Year)
1986 1989 1992 1995
$23.7
2000 2005
INDONESIA
BRUNEI
MALAYSIA
ALASKA
CANADA
AUSTRALIA
GULF
Total
Shipments
- JAPAN
- KOREA
& TAIWAN
700
260
515
50
103
1628
1520
100
700
260
1009
50
103
2122
1872
250
754
260
1377
50
103
2544
2294
250
943
248
1377
50
443
3061
2811
250
1153
186
1377
50
83
1343
4192
3942
250
1153
140
1377
50
865
105
1032
40
83 111
477
2017
4820
4570
250
2917
5547
5297
250
Shadow Price of Regassified LNG Delivered in Japan
($ PER MCF)
1986 1989 1992 1995 2000 2005
2.47 2.55
2010
2010
3.18 4.05 3.29 5.332.43
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Table 6
Pacific Region LNG Trade Model: Case E
*** SCENARIO ASSUMPTION
MITI83 DEMAND
EXISTING CONTRACTS
************************************************
Discounted Costs of Scenario =
(Billions of $)
$14.7
Total LNG Exports
(BCF per Year)
1986
INDONESIA
BRUNEI
MALAYSIA
ALASKA
AUSTRALIA
GULF
Total
Shipments
700
260
469
50
103
1582
- JAPAN 1482
- KOREA 100
& TAIWAN
1989
700
260
569
50
300
103
1982
1732
250
1992
700
260
730
50
300
103
2143
1893
250
1995
700
248
849
50
300
103
2250
2000
250
2000
700
186
1060
50
300
103
2399
2149
250
2005
709
140
1259
50
300
103
2561
2311
250
Shadow Price of Regassified LNG Delivered in Japan
($ per MCF)
1986 1989 1992 1995 2000 2005
2.20 2.12 2.69 2.40
2010
926
105
1259
40
300
103
-
2733
2483
250
2010
--------------------------------------------
-------- 
n A -nnnnn nn"
2.34 2.81 3.44
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Table 7
Pacific Region LNG Trade Model: Case F
SCENARIO ASSUMPTION ***
MITI83 DEMAND ***
SUPPLIER DIVERSIFICATION
Discounted Costs of Scenario =
(Billions of $)
$14.4
Total LNG Exports
(BCF per Year)
1986 1989 1992 1995 2000 2005 2010
_________________________________________________________________________
INDONESIA 700
BRUNEI 260
MALAYSIA 469
ALASKA 50
CANADA
GULF 103
Total
Shipments 1582
- JAPAN 1482
- KOREA 100
& TAIWAN
850
260
604
50
218
1982
1732
250
850
260
668
50
315
2143
1893
250
850
248
700
50
402
2250
2000
250
850
186
745
50
569
2400
2150
250
850 895
140 105
793 845
50 40
34 155
693 693
2560
2310
250
2733
2483
250
Shadow Price of Regassified LNG Delivered in Japan
($ per MCF)
1986 1989 1992 1995 2000 2005 2010
_________________________________________________________________________
3.13 3.18 3.782.36 3.84 3.85 4.23
r.
'I%
-
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INTRODUCTION
Our objective in this paper is to determine how important typical
take-or-pay contracts are likely to be to various producers in the East
Asian market under the current and impending market conditions. Are there
producers who can prudently look to relaxing the size of take or the degree
of stringency in take requirements as a means for expanding their position
in the Japanese market? What are the likely costs to a producer in a high-
cost project if it seeks to relax the standard portion of the capacity
committed in take-or-pay contracts before the project is finally approved?
Our results indicate that the opportunities available are strikingly
different for low-and-high cost producers in the East Asian markets. High-
cost producers face the usual pressure for strong take-or-pay contracts.
There are, however, several producers whose costs are low enough that they
face the opportunity to enjoy security without the high degree of take-or-
pay requirements that have been typical in LNG contracts.
The next section provides a brief overview in terms of cash flow of three
stylized LNG projects in the East Asian market. We will use this overview
and the present-value calculations as a benchmark against which compare the
importance of take-or-pay contracting for different projects under
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different price scenarios.l The third section discusses the primary
motivation for long-term take-or-pay contracts and illustrates the
importance of take-or-pay contracts to securing the producer's profits. In
related work we have developed a model for estimating the value of these
contracts. In this paper this model is applied to the sample LNG export
project and show that under current conditions these contracts may not be
as valuable as they have been in the past, or alternatively that greater
flexibility is warranted.
LNG PROJECTS: A DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW ANALYSIS
This section compares the present value and cash flow structure of
three stylized LNG projects--a low capital cost project, a high capital
cost project, and a project involving a marginal addition to existing
capacity. The low capital cost project would be representative, for
example, of some of the fields in Indonesia; the high capital cost project
would be representative of the Australian or Canadian operations; and the
marginal capacity additions would be more general, although again an
addition to current Indonesian capacity might be the most immediate
example.
The low-cost project involves the development of a 6 million ton per
year gas field and LNG facility in Indonesia intended to supply the
Japanese market. Table 1 sets out the specific quantities associated with
an LNG facility in that region under some general assumptions. Capital
expenditures constitute construction of 300 Bcf/year gas production
capacity, 6 million ton/year liquefaction and regasification plants, and
In this paper we sometimes refer to take-or-pay contracts as forward
contracts. The prices agreed to in the contracts we label forward prices.
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shipping capacity necessary to transport LNG to the Japanese market. Total
capital expenditures are $2.5 billion and are incurred over a 5-year period
in the pattern indicated in Table 1. The field has a 20-year projected
life. Operations begin in 1989 and rise to full capacity in 1993.
Operating costs are assumed constant at $0.55 per Mcf. If we assume that
the prevailing market price of gas will be $3.85/Mcf, Table 1 shows that
the project has a Net Present Value of $2.59 billion. The present value of
the capital expenditures is $1.86 billion; the net present value of total
expenditures, $2.6 billion. The per unit allocated capital cost is
$1.38/Mcf. The per unit total cost is therefore $1.93/Mcf.
Table 1
NPV FOR A LOW-COST PRODUCER
Capital Expenditure: $2.5 Billion
Peak Output: 300 Bcf/year
Operating cost: $O0.55/Mcf
Market Price: $3.85/Mcf
Capital Quant. Oper. Net Operating
Expenditure Sold Revs. Cost Cash Flow
Year ($ mil) (mil Mcf) ($ mil) ($ mil) ($ mil)
1985 75 - 75
1986 450 -450
1987 880 -880
1988 800 -800
1989 300 180 690 99 290
1990 0 210 810 120 690
1991 0 240 920 132 790
1992 0 270 1000 149 890
1993 0 300 1200 165 990
2005 O 300 1200 165 990
NPV 12 = $2.59 Billion
_ _
-
-4-
Table 2 presents comparable information for a field with the
characteristics of high capital cost development in Australia. This field
has production capacity of 7 million tons of LNG per year. Total fixed
cost expenditures of $5.82 billion over 10 years result in output that
starts in 1989 and rises slowly to capacity by 1993. Mean operating costs
are $.87/Mcf.
Table 2
NPV FOR A HIGH-COST PRODUCER
Capital Expenditure:
Peak Output:
Operating Costs:
Market Price:
Year
pre 1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
20)5
Capital
Expenditure
($ mil)
430
580
990
840
580
760
910
290
290
160
0
0
$5.82 Billion
365 Bcf/year
$0.87/Mcf
$3.85/Mcf
Quant.
Sold
(mil Mcf)
150
180
220
330
370
370
370
370
Revs.
($ mil)
560
700
840
1300
1400
1400
1400
1400
Oper.
Cost
($ mil)
127
159
191
286
318
318
318
318
Net Operating
Cash Flow
($ mil)
-430
-580
-990
-840
-150
-210
-260
690
800
930
1100
1100
NPV 12% $1.05 Billion
I
at
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At a market price of $3.85, Australia's NPV, although positive at $1.05
billion, is 60 percent lower than Indonesia's $2.59 billion. The present
value of the capital expenditures is $3.47 billion; the present value of
total expenditures is $4.79 billion. The per unit allocated capital cost
is $2.29/Mcf. Total per unit costs are therefore $3.16/Mcf.
Finally we present the data for a marginal addition of capacity to an
already existing facility. Reasonable estimates for a typical low-cost
addition project call for capital expenditures of $1.39 billion for 4
million tons per year, or 200 Bcf/year, added capacity. The market price
is again assumed to be $3.85/Mcf. Operating costs are the same as existing
Table 3
NPV FOR A MARGINAL CAPACITY ADDDITION
Capital Expenditure: $1.4 Billion
Peak Output: 200 Bcf/year
Operating cost: $0.55/Mcf
Market Price: $3.85/Mcf
Capital Quant. Oper. Net Operating
Expenditure Sold Revs. Cost Cash Flow
Year ($ mil) (mil Mcf) ($ mil)($ mil) ($ mil)
1985 42 - 42
1986 250 -250
1987 487 -487
1988 445 -445
1989 167 120 460 66 229
1990 0 140 540 77 462
1991 0 160 620 88 528
1992 0 180 690 99 594
1993 0 200 770 110 660
2005 0 300 770 110 660
NPV @ 12% = $ 1.93 Billion
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fields, $0.55/Mcf. This project has a NPV of $1.34 billion. The per unit
allocated capital costs are $1.15/Mcf and the total costs per unit are
$1.70/Mcf.
We have also calculated the Net Present Values for these three fields
under alternative assumptions about price, and we have summarized the
relevant comparative information in Table 4 below.
Table 4
SUMMARY OF COST/NPV DATA
Low Capital High Capital Marginal
Cost Cost Project
Capital Costs:
$ per Mcf 1.38 2.29 1.15
Present Value ($ Bill) 1.86 3.47 1.03
Operating Costs:
$ per Mcf 0.55 0.87 0.55
Present Value ($ Bill) 0.74 1.32 0.50
Net Present Value ($ Bill)
Price = $3.85/Mcf 2.59 1.05 1.93
Price = $3.35/Mcf 1.92 0.29 1.48
Price = $4.35/Mcf 3.27 1.81 2.38
OPPORTUNISM: THE ROLE OF LONG-TERM CONTRACTS
Long-term and strict take-or-pay contracts are a typical if bothersome
feature of LNG markets. These long-term contracts permit the producer to
lock in a rate of return or to avoid some of the risk associated with
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marketing the natural gas on the spot markets over the years after
installation of capacity. This section will discuss our method of analyzing
the value of take-or-pay contracts to the producers in each of the three
fields that we are considering and under various scenarios about market
conditions. We begin with a short review of the motivation behind these
contracts.
A potential producer of natural gas who is planning to install
capacity for export of LNG must accept an unusually large capital
expenditure for facilities that will be largely dedicated to a particular
buyer or at best to a market of very few buyers. This feature of the
market for LNG makes the marketing of LNG significantly different from that
of many other commodities. In many markets the producer invests in
facilities and subsequently sells its output at the best prices it can then
negotiate. In the LNG market the producer finds the buyers before it
installs the facilities. This is because the producer's capacity
installation decision will affect the prices at which it can sell its
product in future years, and in general it will lower the prices that the
producer will receive. The actual prices eventually received by the
producer without the take-or-pay contracts may sometimes be above and
sometimes below those agreed to by the producer in the take-or-pay
contracts. On average, however, they are below.
The reason for this is that the producer with installed and unused
capacity is in a significantly worse position for negotiating with
potential customers than is the producer bargaining a price prior to its
installation of capacity. For example, imagine a potential producer
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considering the installation of large-scale capacity for liquefaction and
currently bargaining with a potential customer over the delivery price. If
the current offer made by the customer is $3.00/Mcf, then the producer can
walk away from the table and give up the $3.00/Mcf, but also give up the
$2.64/Mcf capital and operating cost: a net loss of only $0.36/Mcf. Of
course, whether or not to reject this offer and what counter offer to make
depends critically upon the alternative uses for the gas, the other offers
which the producer imagines it can negotiate, etc. However, clearly the
per Mcf margin also factors into this decision. A producer that has
already installed capacity and that faces the same offer of $3.00/Mcf from
the customer faces a much more difficult decision. The $2.14/Mcf capital
charge has already been incurred, and cannot be avoided if the producer
rejects the customer's price offer. Instead what this producer sacrifices
if he rejects the offer is the price, $3.00/Mcf minus the operating cost,
$0.50/Mcf, or $2.50. This producer is going to be more reluctant to reject
the offer, that is, his bargaining position is weaker. The customer is
aware of this, and is more likely to make and stick to lower offers than he
would if he were negotiating against the producer seeking a take-or-pay
purchase contract.
Figure 1
Comparison of Forward and Spot Prices
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The role of take-or-pay contracts for securing better pricing terms to
the producer can be illustrated in the figure below. The figure depicts
the probable distribution of contract prices that a typical producer in the
EastAsian Market could expect to receive as a result of negotiations for
take-or-pay contracts, and it contrasts this distribution with the
distribution that the producer could expect to receive if he built his
capacity and then sought to arrange sales on a more short-term basis.
Obviously the lower anticipated prices will impact significantly upon
the present value of the project or on the company's ability to cover the
costs of construction and operation of the production and liquifaction
facilities. The primary objective of this paper is to present our analysis
of how significant this factor is for different LNG projects in the East
Asian market.
The importance of this bargaining power depends upon many factors. We
have constructed a computer model that simulates the bargaining process
that would arise in negotiating contracts prior to the installation of
capacity and of the likely price that the seller would receive in the event
that he first installed capacity and then attempted to market his gas. The
theoretical basis for this model is analyzed and explained in Parsons
(1986) and is included as an Appendix to this paper. A simple explanation
of the model and its use is given in Barudin and Parsons (1986). The
following section discusses the results of our use of this model to analyze
the value of take-or-pay contracts for the three East Asian projects
mentioned above.
CONTRACTS AND PROJECTS
One particular factor that determines the value of the take-or-pay
contracts appears to be of particular importance for the Japanese LNG
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market and differentiates it from other gas markets: the size of the
expected profit margin. When the profit margin inclusive of capital
charges is very small, then the producer who has not installed capacity
will be relatively willing to walk away from the table while the producer
with already installed capacity may not be willing to walk away. If the
margin is large, then neither producer may need to walk away from the
table: the additional bargaining power obtained by the producer without
previously installed capacity is not of much significance relative to the
bargaining power that the producer of both types already holds. Again, it
should be recalled that fiscal regimes are not included as cost elements in
this analysis. To the extent that taxes and royalties raise the per unit
costs closer to the expected price, the cost bargaining power will be
larger.
Table 4 above therefore summarizes some of the critical information
necessary for determining the importance of take-or-pay contracts for the
different projects. As one can readily see from Table 4, the profit margin
on the LNG export project for Indonesia, the low capital cost producer, is
large relative to the size of capital cost. The total operating costs are
$0.55/Mcf. The capital costs are $1.38/Mcf. The expected price is $3.85,
implying a total margin of $1.92/Mcf. The average price will have to drop
by 50 percent before the producer without take-or-pay contracts will feel
any sacrifice relative to the producer using take-or-pay contracts. We
have done some simulation of the take-or-pay contracting process and of
sales without take-or-pay contracts for the project presented in Table 1.
The expected distribution of prices with and without take-or-pay contracts
is exhibited in Figure 2.
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The distributions of prices with and without take-or-pay contracts are
almost identical. The results for this field are only slightly sensitive
to the specifications of the model: for some very extreme scenarios in
which the price might drop as low as $1.75 and $1.50/Mcf is the price
distribution for the producer without take-or-pay contracts slightly less
Figure 2
Take-or-Pay Contract Prices vs. Spot Prices: Low-Cost Projects
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than the distribution for the producer with take-or-pay contracts. For our
base-case analysis the abandonment of strong take-or-pay provisions leaves
the expected price and the net present value of the project unchanged: In
the extreme case the expected price without take-or-pay contracts drops to
$3.83/Mcf, and the net present value of the Indonesian project falls by
less than 1 percent or $25 million.
This is an extremely small figure with which to justify the decision to
require large and rigid take-or-pay contracts, and this is evidence that
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traditional reluctance to develop projects using more flexible forms or
even less secure forms is causing potentially valuable projects to be
sacrificed. However, this result is directly contingent upon the current
values used for costs and for expected prices. If these values are
significantly revised, then this conclusion will be similarly reevaluated.
These results should be contrasted with those for our high capital
cost project, the Australian project. In this case the total per unit
costs without taxes or royalties of $3.16 approaches the expected price of
$3.85. One can see from Figure 3 below that the pattern of prices from
Figure 3
Take-or-Pay Contract Prices vs. Spot Prices: High-Cost Projects
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spot sales is going to be significantly different from that for forward
contracts. On average the price will be 6.5 percent less. The results for
net present value are tremendous: an approximately 36 percent decline, or a
loss of $378 million, if stringent take-or-pay contracts are not completed
as a pre-condition to the installation of capacity.
For our marginal addition to capacity the results are comparable to the
results for the Indonesia project, as one would expect. The full set of
results for all three projects is summarized in Table 5 below.
Table 5
SCENARIO 1, p=3.85/Mcf
Low Capital High Capital Marginal
Cost Cost Project
Expected Contract Price $/Mcf
Forward Sales 3.85 3.85 3.85
Spot Sales 3.85 3.60 3.85
(3.83)
Net Present Value ($ Bill)
Forward Sales 2.59 1.05 1.93
Spot Sales 2.59 0.67 1.93
(2.57)
Difference 0 0.38 0
(0.02)
% Loss 0 36 0
(1)
Note: We have included in parentheses results for the low-cost
project under more extreme assumptions regarding the lower
bound for price.
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These results are very sensitive to the anticipated price for natural gas:
The importance of take-or-pay contracts is determined by the relationship
between the marginal costs of a project and the expected price. If the
expected price is much lower, then conceivably the contracts are more
important for even the low-cost projects than our information in Table 5
would indicate. In Tables 6 and 7 we present similar results for the cases
which the expected price for LNG is $3.35/Mcf and $4.35. It is important
to note that even at an expected price of $3.35/Mcf, the take-or-pay
contracts are relatively unimportant for the low-cost producer, and
certainly for the marginal capacity addition. At prices further below
$3.35 we would expect this to change. For the high-cost producer, a drop
in the expected price from $3.85 to $3.35 has dramatic influence upon the
importance of take-or-pay contracts: They make or break the project and
secure to the producer the full net present value. Without strong take-or-
pay contracts, a high-cost producer cannot contemplate construction of
significant capacity at prices below the $3.85 range. Table 7 shows the
results for a higher expected price. In this case the low-cost and the
marginal producer's can assuredly relax the take requirements they impose
before agreeing to install capacity. The high-cost producer is more
secure, but take requirements are still much more important to the high-
cost producer than they were to the low-cost producer at yet lower expected
prices.
n-r
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Table 6
SCENARIO 2, p=$3.35/Mcf
Low Capital High Capital Marginal
Cost Cost Project
Expected Contract Price $/Mcf
Forward Sales 3.35 3.35 3.35
Spot Sales 3.35 3.16 3.35
Net Present Value ($ Bill)
Forward Sales 2.59 1.05 1.93
Spot Sales 1.92 0.29 1.48
Difference 3.27 1.81 2.38
% Loss 0 100 0
Table 7
SCENARIO 3, p=$4.35/Mcf
Low Capital High Capital Marginal
Cost Cost Project
Expected Contract Price $/Mcf
Forward Sales 4.35 4.35 4.35
Spot Sales
Net Present Value ($ Bill)
Forward Sales 2.59 1.05 1.93
Spot Sales 1.92 0.29 1.48
Difference 3.27 1.81 2.38
% Loss 0 12 0
-16-
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Appendix A
A SIMULATION MODEL OF FORWARD CONTRACTING
AND SPOT SALES FOR LARGE INVESTMENT PROJECTS
by
Guy Barudin
and
John E. Parsons
INTRODUCTION
Capital investment decisions involve complex forecasts of market
conditions far into the future and often include difficult negotiations on
contracts to purchase or supply large quantities of goods or services over
long time horizons. A typical decision maker must balance the benefits of
locking in a profit by negotiating a fixed supply contract against the
price discounts required in a long-term contract and the possibility that
future prices may be better than those which can be negotiated in a long-
term contract. The buyer worries about the cost of taking on a long-term
rigid obligation and compares it with the possible benefits in terms of
price and in terms of a guaranteed source of supply.
CONTRACT is an easy-to-use personal computer program for decision
makers and researchers trying to assess the value or cost of locking in a
price through a long-term contract. It creates a framework for analysis of
capital investment and financing decisions by allowing the simulation of
the process of negotiation and its outcomes. Specifically, CONTRACT
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measures the annualized profit advantage of successfully contracting with
customers prior to investing in capacity, an arrangement known as forward
contracting.
For example, consider the decision whether or not to develop a natural
gas field. Suppose that the developer has identified three or four
prospective buyers for the gas. The potential producer is not certain of
the price that it could successfully negotiate, but must make some estimate
of that price. The producer can determine that each of the potential
buyers values the gas at somewhere between $2.90 and $4.00 per thousand
cubic feet (Mcf). Productive capacity and life of the field have been
estimated. Development costs are also known. CONTRACT will show the
expected profitablity of developing the field under forward contracting and
will compare that with the profits which the producer should anticipate
making if he were to develop the field without first signing supply
contracts. CONTRACT also allows repeated simulation of the inherently
nonrepetitive capital investment decision under various market conditions,
such as the number of buyers, buyer valuations, cost levels, et cetera.
TERMINOLOGY AND STRUCTURE
CONTRACT is most appropriate for modelling investment projects that
involve a relatively large initial investment in capital equipment that
will be irrevocably dedicated to a particular use or dedicated to a small
set of users. For projects fitting this description, the price that the
producer can negotiate through long-term forward contracts may be
significantly higher than the price that the producer should anticipate
negotiating if it proceeds to install its capacity in the absence of
signing such contracts. CONTRACT allows the decision maker to estimate
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this difference.1
Projects modelled with CONTRACT are analyzed in terms of the following
elements:
- THE CHARGE-UNIT: Prices and marginal operating costs associated
with producing the output are measured in some specific, consistent, and
familiar unit such as million cubic feet, board feet, acres, or gallons.
This unit is called the charge-unit;
- PRODUCTION CAPACITY: A fixed amount of annual production capacity
is installed as the result of a given fixed investment. The capacity is
given in terms of charge units;
- UNIT CAPITAL COST: The user determines the appropriate allocation
of this fixed investment cost to a charge unit: For example, it is typical
for many projects to assume an even level of production annually for a
given number of years--in this case, the appropriate allocation would be
the "equivalent annual cost" per charge unit. For other patterns of usage
an alternative unit capital charge would have to be derived. This per
charge-unit capital or investment cost remains constant over the ranges of
possible installed capacities analyzed;
- MARGINAL OPERATING COST: Given a certain level of production
capacity, the producer can manufacture any number of charge units up to
that capacity at a constant unit cost, the marginal operating cost. The
combination of the unit capital charge and the marginal operating cost will
yield two concepts of marginal cost: i) "marginal cost before," the sum of
the unit capital cost and marginal operating cost, i.e., the cost incurred
1 For a more detailed analysis of the theory behind the value secured through
long-term contracts and the use of a model such as CONTRACT to estimate this
value, see John E. Parsons, "Valuing Forward Purchase Contracts Using Auction
Models," M.I.T. Energy Laboratory Working Paper, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
January 1986.
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to produce an additional unit when the contracting and planned production
decisions are made prior to the installation of capacity, and ii) "marginal
cost after," simply the marginal operating cost, i.e., the cost incurred to
produce an additional unit when contracts and production decisions are made
after the capacity has been installed;
SALE-UNIT: Capacity output can be subdivided and sold in subsets.
For example, if a natural gas field produces 100 million cubic feet (Mcf)
of gas per day, it can be sold as
-1 unit of 100 Mcf/day
-2 units of 50 Mcf/day
-3 units of 33.33 Mcf/day
and so on. These subsets of capacity offered for sale are called sale-
units since they are units of capacity for sale;
- NUMBER OF BUYERS: The market for the commodity produced consists of
a small number of buyers. In our natural gas example, the particular field
might be situated such that it may serve three distinct major buyers,
pipelines, or markets. The total number of end-users would not be
appropriate as the number of buyers since they do not each independently
contract with the producer. Each of the buyers has a potential demand for
ONE SALE-UNIT: therefore, the appropriate size of a sale-unit is determined
by the amount of production that is likely to be purchased by an average
buyer;
- RESERVATION PRICES: The producer assesses a range of prices over
which it anticipates the various potential buyers might value the product
available. For example, the producer may expect that it can obtain a price
of $3.50/Mcf, or per charge unit, for the gas. However, it is aware that
potentially there are several buyers out there willing to pay more, or
alternatively that its buyers may actually only be willing to pay much
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less. In extreme cases the price might be as high as $5/Mcf or as low as
$1/Mcf. This inherent uncertainty is represented as a range of prices that
each customer might be willing to pay--for example, $1, $2, $3, $4, or $5
per charge unit. For computational reasons we restrict the possible set of
values to a few points evenly spaced within a range. These values are
called reservation prices. CONTRACT models various scenarios in which
different numbers of buyers are willing to buy the product at each
reservation price: In a given scenario the reservation price that actually
describes how much a particular buyer is willing to pay is called that
buyer's reservation value.
MODELLING NEGOTIATIONS
With these pieces of information, CONTRACT automatically calculates
the price that the producer can anticipate negotiating under various
scenarios for buyer demands and under the two alternatives, forward
contracting and ex post contracting, and then CONTRACT calculates the
average profit earned by the producer under forward contracting versus ex
post contracting.
CONTRACT models the available set of scenarios using the following
algorithm: i) assume that each buyer is equally likely to have a
reservation value at any of the chosen set of reservation prices, ii)
calculate all of the possible combinations of the total number of buyers at
each reservation price and the probability of each combination.
CONTRACT models the negotiations over price for a given scenario using
the following algorithm: i) start at the highest reservation price--If
there are enough buyers willing to pay this price so they more than exhaust
total capacity, then the price will be bid up to this reservation price and
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the full capacity will be sold; ii) if not, drop to the next reservation
price and check to see if there are a total number of buyers willing to pay
this price and more than exhaust capacity--if so, then all units of
capacity are sold at this price; iii) if there are exactly enough buyers
willing to pay this price and exhaust capacity, then CONTRACT sets the
price above the reservation price at which the number of buyers more than
exhausts capacity; iv) if not enough buyers are found at this reservation
price, then continue through steps i-iii at successively lower reservation
prices; v) if, at the lowest reservation price just above marginal cost,
there are not enough buyers willing to pay that reservation price and
exhaust capacity, then the price is set at this reservation price, but only
enough units are produced to exactly supply those buyers with reservation
prices above the marginal cost.
This model of the outcome of contract negotiations can be justified in
two ways. First, it is directly analogous to the outcome that would occur
if the producer sold its available capacity by means of a sealed bid system
in which all buyers paid the clearing price, and in which the minimum bid
required for participation is the marginal cost. Second, the expected
revenue from this model is the highest that the producer can obtain using
any method of sale or bargaining given its uncertainty about each buyer's
actual reservation value and given its inability to credibly commit itself
to a minimum bid above its marginal cost.2
2For a derivation of these results, see Milton Harris and Arthur Raviv, "A
Theory of Monopoly Pricing Schemes with Demand Uncertainty," American Economic
Review, Vol. 71, pp. 347-365, 1981. For a discussion of alternative algorithms,
see John Parsons, "Valuing Forward Purchase Contracts Using Auction Models,"
o.cit.
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USING CONTRACT-AN EXAMPLE
Before actually running the CONTRACT program, the user should have on
hand values for:
-annual production capacity in charge-units
-number of prospective buyers
-number of allowable reservation prices
-the number of sale-units
-marginal operating cost per charge-unit
-buyers' minimum and maximum reservation prices
For example, consider our natural gas field. A familiar unit of
measurement is thousand cubic feet (Mcf), so that will be the charge-unit.
If we develop the field it will have a production capacity of 150 million
cubic feet/day, or 54.75 Bcf/year for 20 years. In terms of our charge
unit it will have capacity of 54.75 E6 Mcf/year. If the total fixed costs
necessary for developing this level of capacity amount to $1 billion, and
if our discount rate is 10 percent, then the equivalent annual cost is $1
billion/8.514 = $117.454 million/year. Since we produce 54.75 E6 Mcf/year,
the per charge unit capital cost is $2.145/Mcf. We know that there are 3
potential buyers and that all three have reservation values somewhere
between $2.90/Mcf and $4.00/Mcf for our gas. We decide to set the number
of reservation prices at 4, and so the reservation prices are $2.90, $3.27,
$3.63, and $4/Mcf. Our typical buyer is likely to purchase the full
capacity, 54.75 Bcf/year, so there is 1 sale-unit of size 54.75 Bcf or, to
be consistent, 54.75 E6 Mcf. After development costs, we need only pay
$0.50/Mcf to extract the gas, so marginal operating cost is $0.50/Mcf.
CONTRACT prompts the user for all information in the terminology
described earlier. The program requires an IBM Personal Computer or
compatible. Users have the option to see results 1) in summary form on the
screen, or 2) printed in summary form, or 3) printed results in a detailed
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table displaying the outcome of negotiations for each scenario and which
shows precisely how CONTRACT summed to get final profit figures.
To run the program start with the DOS A> prompt. Insert the program
diskette into Drive A and type CONTRACT. Follow all responses by hitting
the Return key. To stop the program at any time, hit <CONTROL><BREAK>.
Type RUN to restart.
Follow this sample session as it demonstrates how the example outlined
above would look in a CONTRACT run. All items typed by the user are
underlined.
INTERPRETING CONTRACT PRINTOUT
The printed output begins with a statement of the items that the user
inputed to the program. These include the "PRODUCTION OUTPUT," or
capacity, the "NO. OF BUYERS," the number of "DISCRETE PRICES," the "MIN.
RESERVATION PRICE," and the "MAX. RESERVATION PRICE". From the information
given by the user on the marginal operating cost and the per unit capital
charge, CONTRACT calculates the marginal total cost--listed here as "MARG
COST-before." This is the marginal cost figure that is used in the
algorithm that calculates the price for each scenario of forward
contracting. However, once production capacity has been installed the
capital charge is not variable, and therefore "MARG COST-after" is just the
figure inputted by the user for marginal cost: This is the marginal cost
figure that is used in the algorithm which calculates price for each
scenario of ex-post contracting. Given the maximum and minimum reservation
prices and the number of reservation prices, the program claculates the
interval between each reservation price--the number which is listed "RES.
PRICE INCREMENT." The program also lists the number of sale units as
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ANNUAL PRODUCTIVE OUTPUT (in charge-units)? 54.75
FIXED COST PER CHARGE-UNIT ? 2.145
NUMBER OF BUYERS ? 3
NUMBER OF DISCRETE BUYER VALUE LEVELS 4
NUMBER OF SALE-UNITS 1
MARGINAL COST ( $ per charge-unit) ? .5
MIN. RESERVATION PRICE ? 2.1
MAX. RESERVATION PRICE ? 3.5
OUTPUT TO (P)RINTER or (S)CREEN -? p
DO YOU WISH TO SEE A FULL TABLEAU? ( (Y)ES or (N)O )? y
-M
PRODUCTION OUTPUT =
NO. OF BUYERS =
DISCRETE PRICES =
MIN. RESERVATION PRICE =
MAX. RESERVATION PRICE -
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4
3.5 )0
MARG COST-before 2 '.65
MARG COST-after - 0.50
RES. PRICE INCREMENT = r. 47
SALE-UNITS AVAILABLE = 1
SALE-UNIT SIZE = 5.475E+07
[ CONTRACTING BEFORE DEVEL
FRED. PRICE PRICE -
N.C.
QTY. EXP OPR
PROF
I CONTRACTIN6 AF
PRICE PRICE -
M.C.
:TER DEVEL
OTY. EXP OPR EXP REVS-
REVS. FIXED COST
3 0 0 0 0.01563
2 1 0 0 0.04688
2 0 1 0 0.04688
2 0 0 1 0.04688
1 2 0 0 0.04688
1 1 1 0 0.09375
1 1 0 1 0.09375
1 0 2 0 0.04688
1 0 1 1 0.09375
I 0 0 2 0.04688
0 3 0 0 0.01563
0 2 1 0 0.04688
0 2 0 1 0.04688
0 1 2 0 0.04688
0 1 1 1 0.09375
0 1 0 2 0.04688
0 0 3 0 0.01563
0 0 2 1 0.04688
0 0 1 2 0.04688
0 0 0 3 0.01563
T BEFORE = 3
TOT PROFIT - contracting before devel
T AFTER 1
TOT.PROFIT - contracting after devel
- 2.578954E+07
= 1. 80675E+07
**** PERCENT ADVANTAGE OF PRIOR CONTRACT: ****
CFPRFCFIT(bef)-PROFIT(aft) ]/PROFIT(bef) = 29.94
NET PROFIT
(PRE-POST)
3.03
3.03
3.03
3.03
3.03
3.03
3.03
3.03
3.28
3.50
3.03
3.03
3.03
3.03
3.28
3.50
3.03
3.28
3.50
3.50
0.39
0.39
0.39
0.39
0.39
0.39
0.39
0.39
0.64
0.86
0.39
0.39
0.39
0.39
0.64
0.86
0.39
0.64
0.86
0.86
0 0
0 0
1 996621
1 996621
0 0
1 1993242
1 1993242
1 996621
1 3270743
1 2194278
0 0
1 996621
1 996621
1 996621
1 3270743
I 2194278
1 332207
1 1635371
1 2194278
1 731426
2.10
2.41
2.41
2.41
2.57
2.83
2.83
3.03
3.28
3.50
2.57
2.83
2.83
3.03
3.28
3.50
3.03
3.28
3.50
3.50
1.60
1.91
1.91
1.91
2.07
2.33
2.33
2.53
2.78
3.00
2.07
2.33
2.33
2.53
2.78
3.00
2.53
2.78
3.00
3.00
1 1368750
1 4904688
1 4904688
1 4904688
1 5303906
1 11938540
1 11938540
1 6501563
1 14280630
1 7699219
1 1767969
1 5969271
1 5969271
1 6501563
1 14280630
1 7699219
1 2167188
1 7140313
1 7699219
1 2566406
-466231
-600254
-600254
-600254
-201036
928658
928658
996621
3270742
2194278
-67012
464329
464329
996621
3270742
2194278
332207
1635371
2194278
731426
466231
600254
1596875
1596875
201036
1064584
1064584
0
1
0
67012
532292
532292
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
54750 ! ) 0!
I
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inputted by the user gave, and CONTRACT calculates the implied size of one
sale-unit: This unit size is the quantity of the product that the average
buyer is willing to buy at its reservation value.
Below this summary information is a table listing vertically the
various possible scenarios for demand, and horizontally the results of the
forward and ex-post negotiations. The first set of columns including the
column labelled "FREQ." represent the number of buyers at each reservation
price for a given scenario, and the associated probability of this
scenario. For example, row 1 represents the scenario that all three buyers
have reservation values equal to the minimum reservation price of $2.10,
and the probability 0.01563 for this scenario; row 2 represents the case
that two of the three buyers have reservation values equal to the minimum
and that one buyer has a reservation value one increment above the minimum
at $2.57, and the probability 0.04688 of this event.
The next set of columns list the results of the forward contracting
negotiating process for each scenario. For the scenario described in row 1
all three buyers have reservation values of $2.10, all below the marginal
cost of $3.50. The price is therefore set equal to the reservation price
just above the marginal cost, or $3.03, but no buyer is willing to
purchase, and therefore the quantity sold is zero. For the scenario
described in row 8 there is one buyer with a reservation value of $2.10 and
two buyers with reservation values of $3.03. Since there is only enough
capacity for one buyer, the two buyers at $3.03 will compete the price up
to their reservation value, p=$3.03/Mcf, and q=1. If we subtract the
marginal cost, then the seller receives a per charge unit profit of
$0.39/Mcf which is listed in the column directly following price. The
final column lists the expected profit obtained in this scenario. It is
-12-
the product of the per charge-unit profit margin, the number of charge
units sold, and the probability of the scenario. For row 8, it is equal to
($0.39/Mcf).(54750 mcf).(0.04688) = $.997 million.
The next set of columns list analogous information for the case of ex-
post contracting; that is, contracting after development or installation of
capacity. The price is determined by the same algorithm using the marginal
operating cost instead of the marginal total cost. The profit margin
displayed in the following column is the difference between the price and
the marginal operating cost; it is the operating profit. The expected
operating revenue for this scenario is the product of the per charge-unit
operating profit margin, the number of charge units sold, and the
probability of the scenario. The final column incorporates the sunk costs
into the calculations. It is the expected revenue minus the expected
expenditure on capital for this scenario.
The difference between forward and ex-post contracting can be seen in
the scenario described in row 2. In this scenario there is one buyer with
a reservation value of $2.57/Mcf, and two buyers with reservation values at
$2.10/Mcf. These are all below the marginal total cost of $2.65/Mcf, and
therefore if the producer attempted to negotiate a contract before
installing capacity it would find no buyers willing to pay the costs of
production. It would sign no contracts and make no sales, but it would
also not incur the costs of capacity installation. In the case of ex-post
contracting the producer has already expended the capital costs. The
marginal operating cost is $0.50/Mcf. The producer will therefore sell the
one unit of capacity to the buyer with the highest reservation value at a
price of $2.41/Mcf, slightly below that buyer's reservation value. This
price covers marginal cost, and the per unit operating profit is listed on
-13-
the table as $1.91/Mcf; the expected operating profit is listed as $4.905
million. However, this per unit profit does not cover the per unit capital
expenses, and therefore the expected profit inclusive of capital charges is
negative, -$.600 million.
In a scenario such as that described in row 8 there is no difference
between forward and ex-post contracting. The price that the producer
receives has been bid above the level of marginal cost inclusive of capital
charges; the price is, in this case, exclusively determined by the
competition between the buyers, and not by the negotiating power of the
producer with one of the buyers. The producer incurs the capital costs in
both forward and ex-post contracting. In all scenarios of this sort the
last column, the difference between the profits from forward and ex-post
contracting, will contain a zero.
Below these columns appears the summary of the expected profits earned
from forward and ex-post contracting. "TOT PROFIT - contracting before
devel" is the sum of the expected profits for each scenario listed under
the column labelled "Gross Exp Profit" under the "Contracting Before Devel"
heading. The entry "TOT PROFIT - contracting after devel" is the sum of
expected profits net of capital charges listed under the column labelled
"Exp Profit-Fixed Cost" under the "Contracting After Devel" heading. The
associated number, "T BEFORE," is the lowest reservation price at which the
producer will accept bids in the case of forward contracting: In this case
it is 3, or $3.03. For ex-post contracting the lowest reservation price at
which the producer will accept bids, "T AFTER," is 1, or $2.10. If, for a
particular run of CONTRACT, these two numbers are identical then, the
profit from forward and ex-post contracting will be the same.
-14-
The user may wish to see only the summary information, including the
inputted figures and the total expected profits from forward and ex-post
contracting. This can be done using either the screen or the printer. If
the user has selected printed output, then by responding with a "N" to the
query whether or not a full tableau is requested they receive the summary
information only. Alternatively the user may request screen output by
responding with an "S" to the query whether screen or printed information
is desired. Screen output is always in the summary form. The summary
information received from either the screen or the printer is:
PRODUCTION OUTPUT =
NO. OF BUYERS =
DISCRETE PRICES =
MIN. RESERVATION PRICE =
MAX. RESERVATION PRICE -
MARG COST-before =
MARG COST-after =
RES. PRICE INCREMENT =
SALE-UNITS AVAILABLE =
SALE-UNIT SIZE =
54750000
3
4
2. 10
3.50
2.65
0.50
0.47
1
5. 475E+07
T BEFORE 3
TOT PROFIT - contracting before devel = 2.578954E+07
T AFTER = 1
TOT.PROFIT - contracting after devel = 1.80675E+07
***t PERCENT ADVANTAGE OF PRIOR CONTRACT: t**t
EPROFIT(bef)-PROFIT(aft)/PROFIT(bef) = 29.94
q-
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THE POWER OF CONTRACT
What if more customers for the natural gas can be found? How will
changing development costs affect the relative profitability of forward and
ex-post contracting? CONTRACT allows the user to try alternate problem
formulations and to watch how changing market conditions change the
benefits of a project.
In our natural gas example, suppose that instead of three buyers, each
potentially willing to purchase a quantity of gas equal to the full output,
we faced three buyers each potentially willing to purchase only one-half of
the full output. Then we are essentially facing a lower demand schedule,
and we expect that profits would be correspondingly less. CONTRACT will
easily confirm this intuituion, but in addition it will draw attention to
the increased importance of forward contracting. To represent this case we
raise the number of sale units to 2, reducing thereby the size of each to
18,250 Mcf. The output for this case is displayed below.
Profit under forward contracting has indeed declined--by 38 percent,
from $25.7 million/year to $15.8 million/year. Profit for ex-post
contracting has, however, declined by more than 132 percent. Profit for
ex-post contracting is, in fact, negative. This means that the average
price earned from negotiations after capacity is installed will not cover
the operating and capital charges. Without forward contracts the capacity
should not be installed at all. The most important result to note is that
under these different market conditions the forward contract becomes more
critical, and CONTRACT gives one a measure of by how much.
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PRODUCTION OUTPUT
NO. OF BUYERS
DISCRETE PRICES
MIN. RESERVATION PRICE
MAX. RESERVATION PRICE
MARG COST-before
MARG COST-after
RES. PRICE INCREMENT
SALE-UNITS AVAILABLE
SALE-UNIT SIZE
= 54750000
= 4
= 2. 10
= 3.50
= 2.65
= 0.50
= 0.47
= 2.7375E+07
T BEFORE = 3
TOT PROFIT - contracting before devel = 1.581477E+07
T AFTER = 1
TOT.PROFIT - contracting after devel = -5885636
**** PERCENT ADVANTAGE OF PRIOR CONTRACT: ****
E PROFIT(bef)-PROFIT(aft)]/PROFIT(bef) = 137.22
mw
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Consider now the scenario that the number of buyers increases from 3
to 5. Profits increase accordingly. Note, however, that in this case the
relative importance of forward contracting declines.
PRODUCTION OUTPUT
NO. OF BUYERS
DISCRETE PRICES
MIN. RESERVATION PRICE
MAX. RESERVATION PRICE
MARG COST-before
MARG COST-after
RES. PRICE INCREMENT
SALE-UNITS AVAILABLE
SALE-UNIT SIZE
= 54750)00
= 5
- 4
= 2. 10
= 3.50
- 2.65
= )0.5()
= 0.(:47
= 1
= 5.475E+07
T BEFORE = 3
TOT PROFIT - contracting before devel = 3.482849E+07
T AFTER = 1
TOT.PROFIT - contracting after devel = . 304605E+0)7
*tt* PERCENT ADVANTAGE OF PRIOR CONTRACT: tt**
CPROFIT(bef)-PROFIT(aft)]/PROFIT(bef) = 5.12
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION ABOUT THE PROGRAM
CONTRACT is capable of analyzing many combinations of buyer numbers
and reservation price levels. The following table shows the combinations
that the program and data diskette already have been written to accept:
PtcI /MetACA&Zf
The program is equipped with a BASIC program entitled WRITER which
will create data files to permit CONTRACT to work on other combinations.
Simply get into BASIC, load, and run WRITER. It is an interactive program
which prompts the user for the required information. The important
constraint on the use of WRITER is the size of the matrix of combinations
being generated and the user's available memory.
The original source code for CONTRACT is included for users familiar
with BASIC and interested in the details of the program and desiring to
modify it to fit their particular purposes. Users could, for example,
adapt the program to accept alternative probability distributions for the
various scenarios. Other variations on the fundamental program are also
possible.
U'.
V".:
0-
0-1
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
180
190
200
210
220
230
240
250
260
270
280
290
300
310
320
330
340
350
330
360
370
380
390
400
410
420
430
440
450
460
470
480
490
500
510
520
530
540
550
560
CLS:FULL$=" " -19-
COLOR 14.0
LOCATE 1,20
PRINT
INPUT "ANNUAL PRODUCTIVE OUTPUT (in charge-units)";CAPACITY
PRINT
INPUT "FIXED COST PER CHARGE-UNIT ";FIXEDPERUNIT
PRINT
ADVANTAGE=0O
INPUT "NUMBER OF BUYERS ";N$
N = VAL(N$)
IF N<1 THEN 3120
PRINT
INPUT "NUMBER OF DISCRETE BUYER VALUE LEVELS ";K$
K = VAL(K$)
IF K<1 THEN 3120
PRINT
FILE$ = "DATA" + N$ + K$
INPUT "NUMBER OF SALE-UNITS ";Q
IF Q<1 THEN 3120
PRINT
INPUT "MARGINAL COST ( $ per charge-unit) ";CAFTER
IF CAFTER <0 THEN 3120
CBEFORE=CAFTER + FIXEDPERUNIT
PRINT
INPUT "MIN. RESERVATION PRICE ";L
IF L<O THEN 3120
PRINT
INPUT "MAX. RESERVATION PRICE ";H
IF H<1 THEN 3120
IF H<=L THEN 3120
PRINT
INPUT "OUTPUT TO (P)RINTER or (S)CREEN ";OUTPUTS
IF OUTPUT$="s" OR OUTPUT$="S" THEN GOTO 390
IF OUTPUT$ <> "P" AND OUTPUT$ <> "p" THEN PRINT "AGAIN, PLEASE":GOTO
PRINT
INPUT "DO YOU WISH TO SEE A FULL TABLEAU? ( (Y)ES or (N)O )";FULLS
PRINT
DIM G(3)
FIXEDCOST=FIXEDPERUNIT*CAPACITY 'total annual fixed cost
D=(H-L)/(K-1) 'calculate interval size
UNITSIZE = CAPACITY/Q
'given the above information,
'an optimal quantity of sales and
'can be calculated, based on
'a value referred to as "T" by
' Harris and Raviv
'************************* calculate prior contract T Value ******
FOR Y=1 TO K
IF L+( (Y-1) *D) >= CBEFORE THEN 550
NEXT Y
PRINT "MARGINAL COST FOR CONTRACTING BEFORE IS TOO HIGH"
PRINT "TRY AGAIN BY TYPING 'RUN' ":GOTO 3110
TVALBEFORE=Y
'*************************** Calculate ex post T Value **********
570 FOR I = 1 TO K -20-
580 IF L+( (I-1) *D) > CAFTER THEN 630
590 NEXT I
600 PRINT "MARGINAL COST FOR CONTRACTING AFTER IS TO HIGH"
610 PRINT " TRY AGAIN BY TYPING 'RUN' ":GOTO 3110
620
630 TVALAFTER = I
640 '**********************************************************
650 K1I(1/K)^(N-1)
660 K2 :(1/K)
670 '
680 '***************** calculate A-Values ***********************
690 DIM M(K)
700 DIM O(K)
710 DIM T(K)
720 DIM A(K)
730 C11
740 I=-
750 IF I>K THEN 1440
760 A1-Q:A2=0
770 IF A>(N-1) THEN 1120
780
790 IF C1=2 THEN 820
800 IF A2>(Q-2) THEN 1070
810 GOTO 830
820 IF A2>(Q-1) THEN 1070
830 G(1)=(N-1):G(2)=AI:G(3)=(N-1-A1)
840 GOSUB 3140
850 R=R1
860 G(1)=AI:G(2)=A2:G(3)=A1-A2
870 GOSUB 3140
880 R=R*R1
890 Z=(K-I)
900 Y=A2
910 IF Z<>Y THEN 930
920 IF Z=O THEN 950
930 X=Z^Y
940 R=R*X
950 Z=(I-1)
960 Y=(N-A1-1)
970 IF Y<>Z THEN 990
980 IF Z=O THEN 1010
990 X=Z^Y
1000 R=R*X
1010 IF C1=1 THEN 1040
1020 X=(Q-A2)/(A1-A2+1)
1030 R=R*X
1040 SI=Sl+R
1050 R=1
1060 A2=A2+1: GOTO 790
1070 S=S+S1
1080 S1=0
1090 A1=A1+I
1100 A2=0
1110 GOTO 770
1120 IF C1=2 THEN 1160
1130 M(I)=K1*S
1140
1150
1160
1170
1180
1190
1200
1210
1220
1230
1240
1250
1260
1270
1280
1290
1300
1310
1320
1330
1340
1350
1360
1370
1380
1390
1400
1410
1420
1430
1440
1450
1460
1470
1480
1490
1500
1510
1520
1530
1540
1550
1560
1570
1580
1590
1600
1610
1620
1630
1640
1650
1660
1670
1680
1690
1700
-21-S=O
C1=2:GOTO 760
O(I)=KI*S:S=O
C1-1
R=1
G(1)=(N-1):G(2)=(N-Q):G(3)=(Q-1)
GOSUB 3140
R=R*R1
Z=(K-I)
Y=(Q-1)
IF Y<>Z THEN 1250:IF Z=O THEN 1270
X-Z^Y
R=R*X
Z-I
Y=(N-Q)
R1=Z'Y
Z=(I-1)
R2=1
IF Z<>Y THEN 1340
IF Z=O THEN 1350
R2=Z^Y
R-(R1-R2)*R
R=R*K1
IF R<>O THEN 1390
R=1
T(I)=R
X-O(I)-M(I)
A(I)=1-(X/T(I))
I=I+1
GOTO 750
'******************************* end of A-calc section *********
'**************** calc t profit and quant in before & after state *****
GOSUB 3500
' Go read in prob-distn from disk
:'Create distn matrix from the data
'Calc price & consump using array J
PRINT "*********** RUNNING ....please wait *************"
W=ROWS
DIM THOLDPRICE(W):DIM THOLDQUANT(W):DIM THOLDARRAY(W)
DIM TBEFOREQUANT(W):DIM TBEFOREPRICE(W):DIM TBEFOREARRAY(W)
DIM TAFTERQUANT(W):DIM TAFTERPRICE(W):DIM TAFTERARRAY(W)
'************************ loop through 'before' & 'after' state *****
'calculate profits,quantities for
'forward or ex-post contracts
FOR PREFIX=1 TO 2
IF PREFIX = 1 THEN THOLD=TVALBEFORE:GOTO 1620
THOLD=TVALAFTER
PRICEHOLDI = L + (THOLD-1)*D
FOR C2= 1 TO W
S=O 'S is the sun of demand
FOR I = K TO 1 STEP -1
S = S + J(C2,I)
IF S < Q THEN 1750
IF S > Q THEN PRICEHOLD2 L + (I-1)*D:GOTO 1780
FOR I1 - I-1 TO 1 STEP -1 : 'here if demand sum = quant supplied
S = S + J(C2,I1)
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IF S > Q THEN PRICEHOLD2 - L + (I1-1)*D + A(I1)*D: GOTO 1780
NEXT II
IF S = Q THEN GOTO 1790
PRINT "PROBLEM WITH DATA:T* SECTION. PLEASE TRY AGAIN":GOTO 3110
here if S<Q
IF I=THOLD THEN THOLDQUANT(C2)=S :THOLDPRICE(C2)=PRICEHOLD1:GOTO
NEXT I
IF PRICEHOLDI<=PRICEHOLD2 THEN THOLDPRICE(C2)=PRICEHOLD2:GOTO 1800
THOLDPRICE(C2) = PRICEHOLD1
THOLDQUANT(C2) = Q : GOTO 1810
NEXT C2
THOLDPROFIT=O 'create T* profit array
IF PREFIX = 2 THEN 1920
TBEFOREPROFIT = 0
FOR X1=1 TO W
X=FREQ(X1)*THOLDQUANT(Xl)*UNITSIZE*(THOLDPRICE(X1)-CBEFORE)
TBEFOREARRAY(X1)=X
TBEFOREPROFIT=TBEFOREPROFIT + X
TBEFOREQUANT(X1)=THOLDQUANT(X1):TBEFOREPRICE(X1)=THOLDPRICE(X1)
NEXT X1
GOTO 2000
TAFTERPROFIT = O0
FOR X2=1 TO W
X=FREQ(X2)*THOLDQUANT(X2)*UNITSIZE*(THOLDPRICE(X2)-CAFTER)
X=X-(FIXEDCOST*FREQ(X2)) 'profit=revenues-(fixed cost)
TAFTERARRAY(X2)=X
TAFTERPROFIT=TAFTERPROFIT + X
TAFTERQUANT(X2)=THOLDQUANT(X2):TAFTERPRICE(X2)=THOLDPRICE(X2)
NEXT X2
NEXT PREFIX
************************* display section ************************
IF OUTPUTS = "S" OR OUTPUTS ="s" THEN GOTO 2770
WIDTH "LPTI:",132
XS=SPACE$(2*K+7)
LPRINT:LPRINT
LPRINT USING " PRODUCTION OUTPUT = ##*######;";
LPRINT
LPRINT USING " NO. OF BUYERS = ##";N
LPRINT
LPRINT USING " DISCRETE PRICES = ###";K
LPRINT
LPRINT USING "MIN. RESERVATION PRICE = ###$.#";L
LPRINT
LPRINT USING "MAX. RESERVATION PRICE = ####.##";H
LPRINT
LPRINT USING " MARG COST-before = #####.##";C
LPRINT
LPRINT USING " MARG COST-after = #####.##";C.
LPRINT
LPRINT USING " RES. PRICE INCREMENT = #####.##";D
LPRINT
LPRINT USING " SALE-UNITS AVAILABLE = ####";Q
LPRINT
LPRINT " SALE-UNIT SIZE = ";UNITSIZE
LPRINT
IF FULLS = "N" OR FULLS = "n" THEN 2590
CAPACITY
BEFORE
AFTER
1710
1720
1730
1740
1750
1760
1810
1770
1780
1790
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
2060
2070
2080
2090
2100
2110
2120
2130
2140
2150
2160
2170
2180
2190
2200
2210
2220
2230
2240
2250
2260
2270 LPRINT -23-
2280 LPRINT CHR$(15)
2290 LPRINT X$;" ";" ";"
II .SI . II .SI .
2300 LPRINT I . . II .; .. . .... '
2310 LPRINT X$;" ";" ";" I CONTRACTING BEFORE DEVEL I";
CONTRACTING AFTER DEVEL i
2320 I,PRINT X$;" FREQ.";" ";" ;" PRICE ";" PRICE - ";" QTY. ";" EX]
OPR";" .. ;
2330 LPRINT " PRICE ";" PRICE - ";" QTY. ";" EXP OPR ";" ";"EXP RE'
";" NET PROFIT"
2340 LPRINT X$;" ";. "; .";" ";" M.C. ";" ". ;"
PROF";" "I
2350
2360
2370
2380
2390
2400
2410
2420
2430
2440
2450
2460
2470
2480
2490
2500
2510
2520
2530
2540
2550
2560
2570
2580
2590
TS_
LPRINT " ";" M.C. ";" ";" REVS. ";" ";"FIXED COST
(PRE-POST) "
LPRINT
I
FOR C9=1 TO W
FOR S9= 1 TO K
LPRINT USING "## ";J(C9,S9);
NEXT S9
LPRINT " ";
LPRINT USING "#.#####";FREQ(C9);
LPRINT " ";
LPRINT USING "
LPRINT USING "
LPRINT USING "
LPRINT USING "
LPRINT "
LPRINT USING "
LPRINT USING "
LPRINT USING "
LPRINT USING"
LPRINT USING"
LPRINT USING"
NEXT C9
LPRINT CHR$(18)
'enter the distribution
#x.## ";TBEFOREPRICE(C9);$#.## ";TBEFOREPRICE(C9)-CBEFORE;
## ";TBEFOREQUANT(C9);
#####*#";TBEFOREARRAY(C9);
";TAFTERPRICE(C9);
##.$# ";TAFTERPRICE(C9)-CAFTER;
## ";TAFTERQUANT(C9);
#####$## ";TAFTERARRAY(C9)+(FIXEDCOST*FREQ(C9));
#####*#* ";TAFTERARRAY(C9);
###**##*";TBEFOREARRAY(C9) - TAFTERARRAY(C9)
2600 LPRINT
2610 LPRINT
2620 LPRINT USING " T BEFORE = ## ";TVALBEFORE
2630 LPRINT "TOT PROFIT - contracting before devel = ";TBEFOREPROFIT
2640 LPRINT
2650 LPRINT USING " T AFTER = ## ";TVALAFTER
2660 LPRINT "TOT.PROFIT - contracting after devel = ";TAFTERPROFIT
2670 LPRINT
2680 LPRINT " **** PERCENT ADVANTAGE OF PRIOR CONTRACT: ****"
2690 LPRINT USING "PROFIT(bef)-PROFIT(aft)]/PROFIT(bef) =
####.#X";100*(TBEFOREPROFIT-TAFTERPROFIT)/TBEFOREPROFIT
2700 LPRINT
2710 GOTO 3060
2720 '
2730 '
2740'
2750
I
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2760
2770 ' screen output section
2780 CLS
2790 FOR ZZ=I TO 4:SOUND 440,2:SOUND 660,2:NEXT ZZ
2800 X$=SPACE$(2*K+7)
2810 PRINT
2820 PRINT
2830 PRINT " PRODUCTION OUTPUT - ";CAPACITY
2840 PRINT
2850 PRINT " BUYERS = ";N;" DISCRETE PRICES - ";K
2860 PRINT
2870 PRINT "MIN. RESERVATION PRICE = ";L;" MAX. RESERVATION PRICE - ";H
2880 PRINT
2890 PRINT "MARG COST-before - ";CBEFORE;" MARG COST-after = ";CAFTER
2900 PRINT
2910 PRINT " SALE-UNITS AVAILABLE ";Q;" SALE-UNIT SIZE = ";UNITSIZE
2920 PRINT
2950 PRINT "---------------------------------------------------
2960 PRINT " T BEFORE = ";TVALBEFORE
2970 PRINT " PROFIT - contracting before devel - ";TBEFOREPROFIT
2980 PRINT
2990 PRINT USING " T AFTER - X# ";TVALAFTER
3000 PRINT " PROFIT - contracting after devel - ";TAFTERPROFIT
3010 PRINT "--------------------------
3020 PRINT
3030 PRINT " **** PERCENT ADVANTAGE OF PRIOR CONTRACT: ****"
3040 PRINT USING "[PROFIT(bef)-PROFIT(aft)]/PROFIT(bef) =
###X#.#"; 100*(TBEFOREPROFIT-TAFTERPROFIT)/TBEFOREPROFIT
3050'
3060 ERASE FREQ,J
3070 ERASE THOLDPRICE,THOLDARRAY,THOLDQUANT
3080 ERASE TAFTERPRICE,TAFTERARRAY,TAFTERQUANT
3090 ERASE TBEFOREPRICE,TBEFOREARRAY,TBEFOREQUANT
3100 '
3110 END
3120 PRINT "OOPS - THERE IS A DATA PROBLEM. PLEASE REENTER.":GOTO 40
3130 '
3140 FOR Z=1 TO 3 '*** COMBINATORICS SECTION
3150 X=1
3160 IF G(Z)=O THEN 3210
3170 IF G(Z)=1 THEN 3210
3180 FOR Y=I TO G(Z)
3190 X=X*Y
3200 NEXT Y-
3210 G(Z)=X
3220 NEXT Z
3230 Rl=G(i)/(G(2)*G(3))
3240 RETURN
3250 '
3260
3270 R1=1:C3=1
3280 GI=J(C2,C3)
3290 X-1
3300 Y=1
3310 FOR Y=1 TO G1
3320 X=X*Y
3330 NEXT Y
#4W
3340 Rl=RI*X -25-
3350 IF C3=K THEN 3370
3360 C3=C3+1:GOTO 3280
3370 RETURN
3380 U2=U2*100:U2=CINT(US):U2=U2/100
3390 RETURN
3400 '
3410
3420 ******************************** A Value Printout *****************
3430 LPRINT " COL. A-VALUE"
3440 FOR 01=1 TO K-1
3450 LPRINT USING " ";01;
3460 LPRINT USING " ##.##";A(01)
3470 NEXT 01
3480 RETURN
3490 '
3500 1********************* PROGRAM TO READ DATA INTO ARRAY **************
3510 PRINT
3520 G(1)=(K+N-1):G(2)=(K-1):G(3)=N
3530 FOR Z=1 TO 3
3540 X=I
3550 IF G(Z)=O THEN 3600
3560 IF G(Z)=1 THEN 3600
3570 FOR Y=I TO G(Z)
3580 X=X*Y
3590 NEXT Y
3600 G(Z)=X
3610 NEXT Z
3620 RI=G(1)/(G(2)*G(3))
3630 DIM J(R1,K)
3640 DIM FREQ(R1)
3650 'READY ARRAY FOR INPUT OF PROB. DATA
3660 ' AND FREQUENCY DATA FROM DISK
3670 OPEN "I",#1,FILE$
3680 FOR R=1 TO R1
3690 FOR COL=I TO K
3700 INPUT #1,J(R,COL)
3710 NEXT COL
3720 INPUT *1,FREQ(R)
3730 NEXT R
3740 CLOSE
3750 ROWS=RI
3760 RETURN
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INTRODUCTION
Natural gas is an ideal fuel for residential, commercial, industrial,
or electric generation applications where high-quality, controllable
thermal energy is required. Because the fuel can be delivered essentially
pollution-free (no sulfur, inorganic solids, or heavy hydrocarbons), it is
possible to build the simplest of combustion systems to produce
high-temperature heat with emissions of only CO2, H20, and some NOx,
depending upon the application and design of combustion system.
Natural gas systems have the lowest capital costs of any system using a
hydrocarbon as its primary energy source. The problem with natural gas as
a primary thermal energy source is that it is difficult to transport and
store. Conventional crude oil and its many liquid derivitives are much
easier to store and transport and have much higher energy density per unit
volume under normal temperatures and pressures.
Both pressurization and liquefaction are used to transport natural gas,
but the former requires the cost of constructing and maintaining pipelines
from source to end use, and the latter involves cost in liquefying,
One cubic foot of middle distillate has, under standard conditions, a heat
at combustion of 106 Btu/ft3, while natural gas (or methane) is only 10
Btu/ft3 . By going to higher pressure (140 bars), the energy densit 
increases to 180,000 Btu/ft3 or by liquefying at approximately -160 C the
energy density becomes 675,000 Btu/ft .
-
2transporting in special temperature-controlled vessels, and regasification
for final use.
For contiguous land masses and a large natural gas demand, a system of
pipelines has proven to be an efficient and economic system. The network
of natural gas pipelines in North America has functioned well for over 50
years and collects, transports, and distributes 25 percent of U.S. total
energy demand. Any contiguous land mass that has a significant natural gas
supply potential and future demand potential must carefully consider
pipeline networks in its energy planning. Figure 1 shows the relative
costs of delivery of hydrocarbon fuels by pipelines or ocean transport,
including liquefaction of natural gas.
Liquefaction of natural gas is a well-developed, mature technology
whose major disadvantage is cost for liquefaction, transport, and
regasification, except for long distances (over 3,000 miles) where it
competes with pipeline transmission. For large-size facilities, say 1
Bcf/d, Adelman and Lynch (see Supply paper) give typical costs for
liquefaction and regasification of $1.50/Mcf plus transportation charges of
$0.20/1000 mile. Thus, processing and transport charges for 3000 to 4000
mile transport are typically $2.00 to $2.50 per Mcf. To this must be added
the resource cost plus any profits, taxes, etc. Adelman and Lynch give
typical discovery and development costs of $0.30/Mcf, so delivered LNG from
supplier to large consumer at prices of $3.00 to $4.00/Mcf should be
feasible and allow for reasonable profit margins at all parts in the
system. At these prices, LNG is competitive with other clean liquid fuels
such as middle distillates with world crude oil around $20/bbl. Because
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4natural gas is difficult and expensive to store and transport via pipelines
or LNG, the potential for large rents to be obtained by resource owners and
developers, under normal supply/demand conditions, is substantially less
for natural gas than for crude oil.
Today delivery of natural gas to the end user can be by pipeline,
conversion to LNG and transport, or conversion to a liquid such as
methanol, gasoline, or middle distillate. If a transportation fuel is
desired, chemical conversion to methanol, gasoline, and middle distillate
is technically feasible but expensive in processing costs and primary
energy lost in conversion relative to petroleum-derived liquid fuels.
There are significant worldwide R&D programs in the laboratories of the
major oil and chemical companies on ways to transform the methane molecule
to a more useful hydrocarbon. The high chemical stability of the CH4
molecule makes this a difficult and expensive task in terms of process
economics and energy lost. New chemical conversion technology may come,
but making projections based on inventions not yet made is even more risky
than predicting world crude oil prices. History has not been kind to such
forecasts.
The following sections discuss specific potential technologies based on
methane and methane-derived chemical or transportation fuels.
METHANE TO CHEMICALS
Figure 2 shows the typical petrochemicals derived from methane. In
addition to carbon black, the major primary products, often used as
5Produced Annually,
10* kg (lt year
Basic Derivative reported) Uses. percent
Ammoma 17,545 Fertilizer 80, plastics and fibers 10, expiosives 5
Carbon black 122 Tirs 65. other rubber 25. colorant and filler 10
Methanol 3,830 Polmers 50. solvents 10, derivatives(HCHO,CHCOOH)
Chloromethans
CHCL methvyl chloride 177 Silicones 37, tetramethyl lead 19
CHtCs methyviene chlorid 236 Paint remover 30, aersol propellant 20l
degrmeser 10
CHCS chloroform 183 Fluoco 90
CCL, carbon tetachloride 322 Fluorocarbons 95, degrsing, fumigant 
etc. 5
Acetylene 131 VCM 7, 1.4-butnediol 25. V acetate 14, 
V
Auoride. and acetylene black 5
Hydrogen cyanide 227 MMA 58. cvnuric chloride 17, cheating
agents 13, NaCN 9
Figure 2. Petrochemicals from Methane.
Source: George T. Austin, Shreve's Chemical Process Industries 
(Fifth Edition),
McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, New York, 1984, p. 750.
6feedstocks for other products, are ammonia, methanol, and acetylene. The
methanol and ammonia streams follow after producing synthesis gas (CO, H2)
from methane by steam reforming or partial oxidation. These products can
be derived from synthesis gas produced from any feedstock (coal, heavy
petroleum, etc.), but for products with a hydrogen/carbon ratio of two or
greater, methane is the preferred feedstock to produce the hydrogen at
minimum energy and processing costs.
The extraction of methane as associated gas from petroleum production
by petroleum-exporting nations, plus the general surplus of methane in
remote locations or in nations with modest population or industrialization,
has resulted in a worldwide excess of petrochemical production from
methane. Since chemicals derived from methane are a logical way to obtain
markets, there is every reason to believe this excess of methane-produced
chemicals will continue and be exported to the developed Western world. In
North America and Europe, where pipeline networks allow methane delivery
for fuel use to a wide range of consumers, use of methane for chemical
feedstocks faces stiff competition and has been declining.
METHANOL FOR LIQUID TRANSPORTATION OF FUELS
Methanol can also be used as a transportation fuel. For such use it
has both advantages and disadvantages, but it is clearly one way that
methane can be converted for use in a huge worldwide market.
The first disadvantage of methanol over petroleum-derived gasoline or
middle distillate is its lower energy per unit volume (or weight).
7Methanol (CH30H) has 52 percent of the energy/gallon of isooctane (C8H18),
a representative hydrocarbon with which to compare commercial unleaded
gasoline. Other disadvantages of methanol often cited are its tendency to
dissolve some gasket materials (elastomers and rubbers) and the coatings on
the interior of gasoline tanks used in today's commercial gasoline-powered
vehicles. Other factors affecting its use in present internal combustion
engines are a vapor pressure 2 1/2 times, and a heat of vaporization 4
times, that of gasoline. Thus, methanol cannot be used as a direct
substitute for gasoline in cars designed and optimized for gasoline.
It is, however, possible to design internal combustion engines
specifically for methanol and offset some of the energy per unit volume
penalties and gain other advantages, i.e., lower levels of emitted
pollutants. Reference 1 gives data on internal combustion engines using
methanol and concludes that properly designed engines can give about 20
percent higher output for the same size, consume about 15 percent less
energy at part load, and at high load operate more economically than
comparable diesel engines.
Reference 2 has comparable results using a research engine, and further
shows that 10 to 20 percent H20 added to methanol gas yields greater energy
efficiency and lower emissions. Here a single cylinder test engine using
methanol and also isooctane was operated under conditions that met standard
U.S. EPA emissions requirements. It was shown that a properly designed
methanol engine could have greater efficiency than a gasoline engine when
both met stringent emission conditions. As much as 40 percent greater
output per unit of energy consumed was obtained by increasing the
8compression ratio from 8 to 12 and also adding 10 to 20 percent H20 to
reduce NOx emissions. The higher octane rating of methanol plus its
cleaner burning characteristics, if exploited in a dedicated engine
designed for methanol, partially offsets the lower energy per unit volume
or weight of methanol over gasoline.
In today's world, with transportation vehicles optimized for gasoline
or diesel fuel, it is very difficult to postulate a methanol fuel strategy.
The problems of developing markets for methanol-fueled vehicles (in
addition to the comparative cost of methanol and gasoline) are substantial
and probably insurmountable. If methane is to become a significant
resource for transportation vehicles, the methane-to-methanol-to-gasoline
process developed by Mobil or the middle distillate Shell process may be
the only feasible way to use methane as a primary source for transportation
vehicles when considering the total economics of auto production, fuel
distribution, and primary energy resource.
Gasoline from Methanol
The Mobil process using the shape-selective zeolites ZSM-5 yield
approximately 95 percent of the energy in the methanol in the hydrocarbon
yield. With additional processing, 88 wt percent of the hydrocarbon can be
in the gasoline range. Thus, the gasoline yield and energy yield are
reasonable for the overall process. However, even at these yields, it
takes approximately 2 1/2 gallons of methanol to yield one gallon of
gasoline. The Mobil-M route takes methanol to a product compatible with
existing transportation equipment and is the only commercially operating
gm
9process for going from methane to gasoline. Methane to synthesis gas to
methanol to gasoline carries with it significant processing costs plus
energy loss from the primary feedstock. Methane is not a promising
economic route considering that today's crude oil prices are around
$20/bbl.
Middle Distillate from Methane
The production of middle distillate from synthesis gas has been
developed by Shell and also Gulf-Badger. These processes are essentially
Fischer-Tropsch reactions optimized to produce aliphatic straight chain
hydrocarbons in the middle to upper part of the C1 to C5 0 range. The Shell
process first produces a product that is 40 to 70 percent wax, depending
upon process conditions, and then hydrocracks the wax to the desired end
products. Typical final product yields are 60 percent gas oil, 25 percent
kerosene, and 15 percent tops/naptha for a process maximizing gas oil. For
a maximum of kerosene, the yields are typically 50 percent kerosene, 25
percent gas oil, and 25 percent tops/naptha (see Reference 4).
Overall thermal efficiency of methane to hydrocarbons is about 60
percent. The Shell process for middle distillates or gasoline is an
alternative to the production of methanol as a way to obtain liquid fuels.
Well-optimized methanol processes will usually yield better thermal
efficiency--say, 65 to 70 percent, as compared with about 50 percent for
the higher hydrocarbon fuels preferred for transportation.
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Compressed Natural Gas-Fueled Vehicles
Natural gas is an excellent fuel for use in internal combustion
engines. Gasoline and diesel fuels have specific combustion
characteristics requiring that engines be designed to match the fuel to
give optimum performance: spark ignition (gasoline), and high-compression
auto ignition (diesel). Natural gas, which has an octane of approximately
130 (compared to 87 to 92 for no-lead gasoline) needs higher compression
ratios (15/1) plus spark ignition because it does not auto-ignite as does
diesel fuel. While dual-fueled engines, both gasoline and diesel plus
methane, can and have been built, the efficient use of natural gas vehicles
requires dedicated vehicles.
All general-purpose vehicles need, in addition to their design and
manufacturing infrastructure, an operational fuel supply system. Developed
nations have an existing transportation system based on gasoline and diesel
fuel. So long as reasonably priced petroleum-derived fuels exist, it is
hard to imagine a set of conditions that would bring forth both the
manufacturing infrastructure and a compressed natural gas fuel supply
system in competition with the existing complex and highly competitive
auto/truck manufacturing and fuel supply system. However, in nations where
the indigenous resource base is predominantly natural gas--Canada, New
Zealand, Australia, and Indonesia (i.e., many nations in the Asia/Pacific
region)--an alternate mobile vehicle infrastructure could, and may, be a
logical development.
For most countries the most probable natural gas-fueled vehicles market
is for fleet vehicles--short-range intercity vehicles, such as taxis,
11
delivery trucks, postal service, police vehicles, school buses, and
government fleet vehicles. Special engines and fuel delivery systems could
be developed to serve such a market. In the United States there are 4 x
106 fleet automobiles in fleets of 10 or more and 3 x 106 fleet trucks in
fleets of 6 or more. Manufacturing to supply the special engines for this
fleet is technically feasible and the national network of natural gas
pipelines could distribute the fuel.2
METHANE FOR ELECTRICITY GENERATION
Via Gas Turbine and Steam Turbine Cycles
Gas-fired boilers for steam turbine (rankine cycle) drives for
electricity generation have a long history of use in the United States.
Before 1970, natural gas was the dominant industrial and utility boiler
fuel in the southwestern United States. In 1985, because of excess natural
gas capacity and hence favorable prices, there was 3 Tcf of natural gas
burned by electric utility companies. For 1986 the drop in world crude oil
prices may affect the natural gas consumed. Nevertheless, the lower
capital costs of natural gas boilers, considering combustor design and
emission control, make such systems competitive against heavy residual fuel
oil and even coal if long-term modestly priced natural gas is available.
While uncertainties in both government regulations and the future price
A typical conversion factor (clearly engine-specific) for natural gas to
gasoline is 125 cu. ft. natural gas = 1 gallon of gasoline. Thus, if the
average gasolige consumption per vehicle is 1000 gallons per year, it would
require 8 x 10 vehicles to create 1 trillion cu. ft. of natural gas
demand.
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of natural gas makes conventional boiler steam turbine systems unlikely in
the United States, there is growing interest in gas turbine combined cycle
systems (GTCC) for electric utility applications. In the United States,
several utility companies are currently planning GTCC installations based
on using middle distillate (7) or using natural gas by obtaining a Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) waiver of the Fuel Use Act for a
specified period (usually 10 years).
For natural gas-fired electricity generation in applications where
natural gas can be planned for the useful life of the installation (30 to
50 years), the favorable capital costs and heat rates now available for
GTCC systems make them highly competitive for future installations of new
generating capacity. Data taken from the EPRI study are shown in Table 1.
Table 1
PLANT COSTS AND HEAT RATES
System ($ 1984/kW) (overnight cost) (Btu/kWhr)
Advanced Gas Turbine 500 8,000
Combined Cycle
Advanced Combustion Turbines 250 11,000
SOURCE: Electric Power Research Institute, "Planning Data Book for
Gasification-Combined-Cycle Plants: Phased Capacity Additions," EPRI
Report No. EPRI AP-4345, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto,
California, January 1986.
Lower capital costs by a factor of 2 plus a 20 percent improvement in
heat rate make the GTCC system very competitive over conventional
coal-fired boilers. The ability to add capacity in modest sizes, 100 to
250 MW per unit, is an advantage for small systems or where load growth is
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modest. In the Asia/Pacific region where there is significant present and
future natural gas available, the GTCC system is a promising and very
competitive technology.
The largest commitment to gas turbine combined cycle systems comes from
the Japanese utility industry (see Reference 10). The plan is for 7,200 MW
to be built by 1994. Tohoku Electric brought on stream two 548 MW GTCC
systems in 1985 that were supplied by Mitsubishi. The measured efficiency
was 49.1 percent (low heating value [LHV] for methane). Using the high
heating value (HHV) typically used in U.S. efficiency calculations would
yield 44 percent efficiency. The NOx level was 10 ppm obtained using a low
NOx combustor followed by selective catalytic reduction using ammonia
hydroxide in the exhaust streams. The combination of high efficiency and
very low emitted pollution is a major accomplishment. The approximate 10
point gain in efficiency over conventional scrubbed coal or heavy fuel oil
fired steam plants is a significant fuel savings for these natural gas
fired GTCC systems. While less than one year of operation has been logged
on these plants, the current and projected availability of these plants is
high, making them attractive competitors for base-load as well as
intermediate-load applications.
The first of the GTCC systems at Tohoku Electric was built in
approximately 30 months and placed into commercial use just 34 months from
the start of construction. Modular design and factory construction of the
heat recovery boiler (4 units: economiser, evaporator, SCR module, super
heater) plus three gas turbines (118 MW) and one steam turbine (191 MW)
helped to reduce the plant construction time.
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The initial low capital overnight cost of GTCC--$500/kW in the United
States, and $400 to $500/kW in Japan--is further aided in holding final
plant costs down by the short construction period. For a 3 percent
escalation rate and 12 percent interest the following is the percentage
increase in overnight costs during time of construction, assuming a linear
construction expenditure rate.
Construction Increase in Overnight Cost by Escalation and
Allowance for Funds Used During Construction
3 years +25%
5 years +46%
10 years +116%
The lower capital cost of GTCC plants allows them to use more
expensive fuels and still be cost competitive. Typically, coal-fired power
plants will cost at least two times that of GTCC plants. At $500/kW for
GTCC systems and with a 14 percent rate of return on capital, this results
in at least a $1.50/MMBtu fuel price premium that can be paid for a natural
gas fueled system. The lower operating and maintenance costs of GTCC over
coal-fueled plants yield at least another $1.00/MMBtu cost advantage for
the clean-burning fuel. Thus, lower capital and operating costs of natural
gas-fired plants allow fuel premiums of $2.50/MMBtu or larger on a
comparative cost of producing one kWhr of electricity. The higher thermal
efficiency of the GTCC systems (approximately 20 percent) further help to
offset the premium paid for a clean-buring fuel.
The advanced GTCC systems with heat rates of 8,000 Btu/kWhr (t = 42 +
percent) are believed to have even further potential for improvement.
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Higher gas turbine temperatures through material improvements and
interblade cooling are currently under development and expected soon in
commercially available equipment with projected heat rates around 7,500
Btu/kWhr. Further potential efficiency gains may be possible using the
isothermal turbine concepts employing interstage reheat. Gas turbines for
stationary base-load electric power generation have the potential to add 5
to 10 percentage points to their overall thermal efficiency during the next
20 years through continual design optimization.
Methane for Electricity Generation: Via Fuel Cells
Fuel cell systems using phosphoric acid electrolytes and hydrogen as
the fuel are under commercial development by United Technologies. Funding
from the Gas Research Institute (GRI) and the Department of Energy (DOE)
have produced a 40 kW system and units are being field-tested in the United
States and Japan. Concurrently, EPRI and DOE are funding a parallel
development at United Technologies of an 11 MW phosphoric acid fuel cell.
Recently, United Technologies and Toshiba of Japan entered into a joint
agreement for development of the phosphoric acid fuel cell. These two
companies are currently seeking purchase commitments for 23 systems from
utilities worldwide to begin initial production of these 11 MW systems.
The price on these systems has met with resistance from electric utilities
and at this time the marketing success of the first production units is
unknown. The maximum system efficiency is approximately 41 percent and the
cost exceeds $2,000/kW (current price is $2,000/kW + site costs). The high
capital cost and low efficiencies, coupled with no appreciable gains in
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cost as unit sizes increase, make fuel cells a poor bet for large-scale
electric power generation. The GTCC system is much more promising for
intermediate and base-load power.
Specialty applications in commercial or large residential complexes may
be an application. Alternately, modest power generation in a city's
central core where load exceeds existing transmission facilities is a
potential application. Fuel cell systems are unlikely to be major sources
of methane demand in the next decade, if at all, unless new technology not
now foreseen becomes available.
INDUSTRIAL COGENERATION: A SOURCE OF NATURAL GAS DEMAND
The installation of cogeneration facilities becomes economic when the
electric power generated produces revenue (or savings) that justifies the
additional capital required for a cogeneration facility over a simple
steam-raising facility. For plants in the range of 125 x 106 Btu/hr to
1,000 x 106 Btu/hr, the additional capital for the cogeneration part of the
system is approximately 130 percent for the smaller and 85 percent for the
larger systems. Thus a cogeneration plant will involve a capital
investment approximately two times that of a boiler producing process
steam. The ability to generate enough revenue from electricity production
to justify the larger capital makes cogeneration systems very sensitive to
the plant steam-load factor. In general, load factors at least 50 percent
or larger are required for cogeneration to be feasible (usually found in
petrochemical plants, steel plants, etc.).
For the United States, the opportunities for cogeneration are in six
17
major industrial sectors (SIC 20 - Food; SIC 22 - Textile Mill Products;
SIC 26 - Pulp and Paper; SIC 28 - Chemicals; SIC 29 - Petroleum and Coal
Products; SIC 33 - Primary Metals). Natural gas has to compete in price
with middle distillate and residual fuel oil to obtain the cogeneration
market. Dual fuel capability is usually standard practice in package
boilers and cogeneration facilities. It is thus easy to shift from gaseous
to liquid fuels and prices will determine which fuel is used.
CONCLUSIONS
The prospect for new technology to be a major driving force for methane
to develop new markets is very poor except for GTCC systems used for
electric power generation. In the United States and probably most other
consuming countries, this requires the delivery of methane to the burner
tip below $4.00/Mcf. For base-load plants with a 70 percent load factor
using an advanced GTCC system with 8,000 Btu/kWhr, every $1.00 per Mcf
represents a $0.008 per kWhr fuel cost. For capital charges of 18 percent,
every $500/kW plus a 70 percent load factor also represents a $O0.015/kWhr
capital cost. Considering all factors (clean emissions, modest sized units
of capacity, low capital costs, well-established technology), the gas
turbine or GTCC system gives methane a reasonably competitive position
against any other electric power generation system--heavy fuel oil, coal,
or nuclear. A 1,000 MW GTCC system at 8,000 Btu/kWhr and a 70 percent load
factor represents a potential natural gas demand of 50 billion cu. ft./yr.
For Japan, the 7,200 MW of GTCC systems that are planned to be completed by
1994 represent an additional 350 billion cu. ft./yr of natural gas demand.
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Electric power generation thus represents one of the major sources of new
natural gas demand.
Natural gas as an energy source for residential, commercial, and
industrial thermal loads is dependent upon the delivery system, not new
end-use technology. While considerable improvements have been made in
furnaces for all applications and gas-driven thermal machines for air
conditioning, process drying, compression, etc., there is no outstanding
technology development that appears to offer unique opportunities for new
natural gas applications in conventional markets. Natural gas has always
been and still is a very desirable primary energy source for these markets
when it can be delivered at competitive prices.
The potential for natural gas in the transportation market exists but,
as discussed earlier, has the disadvantage of requiring special engines and
a dedicated delivery system. The transformation of methane to gasoline and
middle distillate has significant process and energy costs. While the
technology has improved, no outstanding breakthroughs have been made, nor
can any be forecast with any degree of assurance. The stable CH4 molecule
is a difficult one to transform into the higher energy density and more
transportable higher-order liquid hydrocarbons.
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